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RÉSUMÉ 
Après la guerre de 1812, les Autochtones perdent rapidement leur importance 
militaire aux yeux des Britanniques, ce qui se traduit dans un vaste programme de révision 
de la politique indienne du Canada. Les Abénakis de la réserve de St-François (connue 
sous Je nom d'Odanak) sont parmi les premiers à subir les effets de cette nouvelle 
politique. La « politique de civilisation » est donc devenue le pilier de la str.atégie 
canadienne, et ce dans le seul but d'assimiler les Premières Nations. 
Les Abénakis de la bande de St-François représentaient une population idéale 
pour Je Département des Affaires Indiennes, lorsque le temps est venu d'implanter le 
système des Conseils de bande. Plusieurs facteurs ont contribué à ce que cette bande 
intègre Je nouveau système politique sans aucune résistance documentée. En fait, la 
bande, consciente de sa situation socioculturelle particulière, avait déjà commencé à 
restructurer son système politique avant l' intervention gouvernementale. En rétrospective, 
le processus de création des conseils de bande à Saint-François peut être considéré comme 
une réussite presque totale. La bande non seulement a participé au processus, mais s'y est 
aussi pleinement engagé au plan idéologique. Alors que certains chercheurs ont surtout 
insisté sur l' illusion de pouvoir qui se trouvait dans les conseils de bande, les Abénaquis 
de Saint-François se sont engagés sans réserve dans cette transformation politique dans Je 
but de retrouver une partie de leur autonomie 
Dans le présent mémoire, il sera question: a) des actions prises par l'État colonial 
qui ont peu à peu transformé les coutumes d' avant guerre et ont pavé la voie à 
l'établissement d' une nouvelle structure légale; b) de l'élaboration et de l'évolution de la 
politique gouvernementale des Conseils de bande; c) du processus initial d'implantation 
du système des Conseils de Bandes; d) des transformations de la culture politique 
autochtone dans la réserve de Saint-François. 
Mot clés: Odanak, St-François, Abénakis, Conseil de bande 
ABSTRACT 
The war of 1812 rendered the utility of First Nations as military allies obsolete, 
requiring the colonial state to restructure relations with their indigenous neighbours. The 
Abenakis of the reserve of St-Francis (renamed Odanak) were at the frontlines of these 
govemmental initiatives. What was to be termed the 'civilization · policy ' henceforth 
became the pillar of Canada' s strate gy with the objective of assimilating First Nations into 
a society that no longer had any room for them to be, let alone to flourish . 
The St-Francis Abenaki proved to be an ideal population for the Department of 
Indian Affairs as they began implementing the Band Council system. Due to a number of 
factors, this community embarked in the system without any documented resistance. ln 
fact, the Band had already begun restructuring its political system, conscious of its 
particular socio-cultural situation. In retrospect, the process of establishing Band Councils 
in St-Francis can be considered a near total success. The Band not only participated in the 
process, but was also fully engaged ideologically. Whereas sorne scholars have discussed 
the illusionary power residing in the Band Council's political structure, the Abenakis of 
St-Francis committed wholeheartedly in an attempt to regain the !ost privileges of agency 
and self-determination. 
The following research therefore discusses: a) the precursory actions from the 
colonial state that eroded pre-1812 customs, paving the way for the establishment of a 
new legal framework; b) the elaboration and evolution. of the official Band Co un cil 
govemment policy; c) the initial process of implementing the Band Council system; d) the 
transformations of indigenous poli ti cal culture within the Band of the St-Francis Abenaki. 
Key Words: Odanak, St-Francis, Abenaki, Band Council 
INTRODUCTION 
Intrinsically part of North America's history, First Nations played a crucial role in 
the development of colonial culture, mostly through trade, alliance, and diplomacy. Once 
their ' utility' as military allies disappeared after the war of 1812, the British government 
tumed its efforts at instituting a new set of policies that totally redefined the relationship 
between the indigenous and the colonial neighbours. The British lndian Department was 
bence transferred from the military to the public service branch in 1830 1, mar king the official 
emergence of a new colonial ·arder. Thus from the 1830s onwards, British Canada 
experimented with what it termed as its civilization po licy. Finally providing a framework to 
guide White-Indian relations, this newly concocted legal and intellectual instrument served as 
a springboard for the passing of legislation that would facilitate and accelerate Indian 
assimilation into Euro-Canadian society. The same policies were followed by the Canadian 
govemment after its creation in 1863 . In fact, it fully committed to continue the program 
previously developed by the British. The infamous objective of transforming the lives of the 
indigenous people of Canada gave rise to a non-Indian legal and bureaucratically controlled 
process with a legacy that has endured to the modem day. 
While the consolidation of Indian law occurred with the passing of the Indian Act in 
1876, indigenous people had been subject to a series of govemmentallegal initiatives since 
the start of the 19th century. One trigger that engendered a pressing need to handle the now 
considered idle Indian population was the new wave of immigrants coming from the British 
Isles between 1815 and 1850. Indigenous inhabitants incidentally became cumbersome to 
settler ambitions over land and economie development2. Contained and constrained to small 
parcels of land through the newly established ' reserve system', the Department of lndian 
Affairs sought to absorb the remnants of Indian ~ulture into Euro-Canadian society. The 
facets of this pro gram were expressed through the passing of Acts that undermined almost all 
1 Richard H. Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, 
1988, p. 3. 
2 R.J. Miller, Compact, contraà, covenailt: Aboriginal treaty-making in Canada, Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2009, p. 102. 
2 
aspects of indigenous culture. Through overweening state patemalism, the Canadian State 
sought to transform aboriginal society through the de-tribilization and reconstruction of the 
'Indian' into a refurbished version of a White, enfranchised, and self-regarding individual3. 
More concretely, and as the focus of the following research paper, the govemment 
engineered the transformation of indigenous govemmental structures through the 
implantation of Band Councils with the stated objective of making these communities 
resemble Euro-Canadian municipalities. Consequent! y, by the end of the 19th century, Canada 
was edging closer to what has been termed as an 'Empire ofUniformity' 4. 
1. Case Study: Odanak 
The following research will analyse the process that led to the transformation of a 
particular indigenous political culture and community: the Abenakis of Odanak, otherwise 
known as the St-Francis Indians. This reserve, first established as a religious mission and 
later used as refuge from southem military conflicts in the 18th century, was from its 
conception, subject to the influence of Euro-Canadians. It evolved as what can be 
conceptualized as a hybrid society. Principally composed of exiled members of the more 
southerly Abenaki nations, St-Francis' population was heavily influenced by the presence of 
missionaries and their very proximate Euro-Canadian neighbours at Pierreville. Classified as 
a sedentary people, the Abenaki nation was originally organized by what has been termed a 
tradition of ' complex' political structure. Established near the mouth of the Saint-Francis 
River near the end of the 17th century, this reserve, as a few others in the province of Que bec, 
has a history of close and prolonged contact with the non-indigenous population during the 
191h century- the most dynamic decades of po licy formation. 
Due in part to the site's geographical proximity with colonial centres and the 
resulting regularity of contact with non-Indians, the Abenakis of Odanak seemed to have 
3 P.G. McHugh, Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law: A History of Sovereignty, 
Status, and Self-Determination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 49. 
4 This term was used by J.R. Miller inCompact, contract, covenant: Aboriginal treaty-making 
in Canada, Toronto : University ofToronto Press, 2009. 
3 
adapted to the imposed Band Council without any serious crises within their society. In fact, 
sources demonstrate that the Indian Act instigated changes in the political structure of the 
community as early as 1876- there is yet to be documentation indicating any form of direct 
resistance to this overhauling govemment initiative. This is not to say that St-Francis was in 
accord with the European-inspired modifications made to its political system, but as a general 
rule, the population cooperated within the new structure. In short, Odanak already bad a long 
historical experience with colonial governments and cultural transformation by the mid-19th 
century. This Abenaki community thus emerges as an interesting case in the study of the 
implementation of Band Councils and its related processes. 
To study this scantly researched Abenaki community reveals itself of importance in 
the understanding of the mechanisms that enabled the govemment to launch its nation-wide 
polie y of transforming indigenous poli ti cal structures. This process has a direct link with one 
the most damaging legacies of Canadian colonial history: the placing in tutelage of the 
indigenous people of Canada; a phenomenon still at the heart of the most modem debates on 
First Nations autonomy and self-determination. The following research on the establishment, 
the functioning, and the effect of the Band Council at Odanak can contribute to enrich 
debates on indigenous govemance and help to better comprehend the current political 
situation of Indians in Canada; mbre particularly the communities having settled in the St- · 
Lawrence valley. 
1.1. Timeframe 
The period studied bas its start in 18 12, when the diplomatie status of indigenous 
people shifted from potential rnilitary ally to an administrative burden. From the conclusion 
of the war of 1812, the British government re-orchestrated its. Indian po licy and organized its 
legal apparatus, progressively laying the foundations for the eventual imposition of Band 
Councils. The study ends in 1914 as archiva! records of activity relating to the functioning of 
the St-Francis Band Council are sparser and the grievances become oriented to interna! 
matters of a municipal-type nature. In fact, as testimony to the permanent success in the 
establishment of the Band Co un cil in Odanak, by the co ming of the Second World W ar, the 
population had grown accustomed to proceed within the system to express their (albeit 
4 
limited) political powers. In other words, the new political structure was firrnly established 
and its authority, sternming from the government, was unthreatened. Providing more than a 
century of observation into the realms of Euro-Canadian policy implementation and Abenaki 
agency, this large historical pe~iod of study allows for a thorough analysis of the changes 
experienced by the inhabitants of Odanak. 
1.2. Research Objectives 
The following research paper hopes to fill a void in Canadian indigenous studies. Not 
only is Odanak a sparsely studied community in general, thesubsequent work hopes to shed 
light on the transitional phase that brought Odanak from a 'traditional' to a modern political 
system engineered by the British colonial and Canadian state.This system, with all its laws 
and regulations, has been termed 'Band Councils', and remains largely unaltered to this day. 
The fully understand how Band Councils developed to be unilaterally imposed on a national 
scale, this paper will be divided under three frameworks of analysis : 
a) Examine the elaboration and evolution of the official Band Co une il government po licy 
Band Councils started to take their official form in 1876 when the Canadian 
parliament instated the Law on Indians. The architects of this law hoped that it would 
accelerate the assimilation process; an objective that many legislators thought of as the 
prerniurn way to operate with the indigenou population. One of the objectives of this 
research is th us to observe the logic behind the argumentation and justification of the Law on 
Indians and more precisely, on the jurisdictional, political, and ideological discourse that 
aimed at transforming the essence of indigenous political culture. In arder to account for the 
evolution of this process, the discussion will encompass the policies of the colonial 
government prior to the unification of the Upper and Lower Canadas, as weil the years 
following 1840 leading up to the establishment of the Canadian Confederation in 1867 under 
which the Law on Indians was passed. This study spans out until1914, convenient as eut-off 
point with the start of the Great War, white also providing a marker for the purpose of this 
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research, indicating the clear success of the Band Council system in Odanak un til 1951 when 
the Canadian parliament revised the Law on Indians. 
b) Study the process that led to the concrete establishment of Band Councils in Quebec 
In the implantation process of Band Councils, the Canadian government considered 
the leve! of' social and cultural ad van cement' of indigenous communities. The more the band 
appeared 'civilized', the more likely they would qualify for the governrnent's investment in 
the establishment of a new political system. Odanak was therefore to become one of the first 
comrnunities that underwent the shift from a tribal to a European based political organization. 
In this particular case, transformations can be observed as early as 1869. Nearing the end of 
the 191h century, Odanak had already organized severa! successful elections. One of the 
objectives of this research is to observe the different phases in the establishment of this new 
system, analyse the attitude and the reactions of Odanak's inhabitants as weil as those of the 
other actors included in the jurisdictional and poli ti cal affairs of the band. 
c) Analyse the transformations of indigenous political culture 
The third objective of this study centres on the analysis of Odanak's transformations, 
more particularly the changes at the political culture leve!, once the government imposed its 
desired structure. Drawing inspiration from municipal-type autonomy, this new system was 
composed of defmed guidelines and was founded on principles that were often in direct 
contrast to traditional indigenous political customs. For example, the cult of the individual 
and of property was one of these underlying principles of the new electoral system, but for 
most indigenous people living at the end of the 19th century, this was contrary to their 
customary modes of living. This fmal framework of analysis will seek to observe how these 
Abenakis positioned and expressed themselves within the structures of the Band Council and 
the accompanying bonds to Euro-Canadian values, mores, and expectations. 
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2. Historiographie Perspectives 
2.1. Historiographie Context 
Undoubtedly stemming from the dehumanizing horrors of the 20th century, the 
intellectual drive of scholarship during the 1960-70s evolved to include previously ignored or 
' forgotten ' people, giving rise to what has been termed subaltern studies . At the end of the 
1970s, historiography had effectively moved away from the three mainstream paradigms of 
the Marxist economie mode!, the French ' ecologie-demographie' mode!, and the American 
Cliometric methods 5. There emerged a sense that these paradigmatic models were in fact 
fatally flawed when trying to explain the full human experience. These intellectual traditions 
had in fact 'forgotten' and ' ignored' a large section of worthy historical inquiry that simply 
did not fit with any ofthese explanatory currents. 
From the late 1970s to the 1980s, al! three analytical fields of class, gender and race 
were confronted with major paradigm shifts, re-evaluations, and adjustments in their 
respective historiographies. The same process occurred with Native American studies, albeit 
an entirely different and independent area of study. All-encompassing historical views 
became increasingly irrelevant as the 1980s progressed. The grand ideals of the previous 
generations of progress movements and emancipation since the industrial revolution, to the 
triumph of science over nature, al! the way to the emancipation of the working class, the 
vic tory of socialism and social equality, were now considered unworkable 6 . In a rapid 
overview of the main North American developments in historiography, generally speaking, 
indigenous people were largely excluded from the large tract Western narrative; historians 
proceeded to include them but often without changing the story line7. Finally, leading up to 
the 21 51 century, there occurred a re-evaluation of the nature of the relationship between 
5 Christian Delacroix, Les courants historiques en France, Paris: Armand Colin, 2005, p. 
485. 
6 Geoff Eley, "De l'hi stoire sociale au tournant linguistique dans l'historiographie 
Américaine des années 1980", Genèses, vol. 7, no 7, 1992, p. 183. 
7 Daniel K. Richter, "Whose Indian History?", The William and Mary Quarter/y, vol. 50, 
no 2, 1993, p. 381. 
7 
'settler' and 'native' , from cooperation and negotiation, to a discourse accounting for the 
modem state of settler domination and the general cultural depreciation of native 
communities. 
2.2. Discourse Assaulted, Deconstructed, and Rebuilt: lndigenous History at the 
Crossfire 
On an epistemological level, Western engineered history was criticized from al! 
angles by the post-modem onslaught. Michel Foucault was pivotai in changing the current 
ideological thought especially among ' new wave' intellectuals centred on the noble project of 
releasing the 'subaltem' societies from the shackles of the history of the dominant classes. 
Foucault is mostly recognized for having perceived a different organization within power 
relations and knowledge: "the ' disciplining' of subordinate groups through being made the 
object of 'disciplines' " 8 . In other words, subordinate groups or subaltem societies, were 
being oppressed by the simple fact that they were being discussed as ' subjects' by the 
dominant classes, institutions, race , or gender, and were historicized by the language and 
discourse of any and every other person but themselves. 
For Foucault, discourse could be a form of oppression on its own. Edward Said also 
discussed this issue but centered his argument on historiographie trends focusing on the 
concept of the Orient. Said, in many ways in parallel with Foucault' s theorising, condemned 
the Occidental construction of the 'Orient' and questioned the legitimacy of Westemers that 
were responsible for defining and describing non-Western cultures9. Both these intellectuals 
sent shockwaves that had international influence, especially on the post-colonial paradigrn, 
much to the dismay of a large number of scholars who prided themselves in their seemingly 
selfless and righteous enterprise of fighting oppression in historiography. 
8 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: the ''Objectivity Question ' and the American 
Historical Prof ession, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 471. 
9Ibid., p. 471. 
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2.3. Paradigm Shifts 
Western intellectuals started to recognize their near total domination of native/settler 
history and, from the 1970s onwards, worked upon restoring agency to their subjects by 
shifting their epistemological outlooks. In this context, The New Indian History focused on 
raising the Amerindian as a historical a~ tor equal in status to the colonizer 10 . In other 
intellectual circles, the concept of the famous American 'frontier' was re-evaluated. While it 
was previously defined within a discourse of conqueror versus conquered, it was 
reinterpreted as a zone of contact, exchange, and fluidity 11 . Sirnilarly, in the Australian 
context, the static nature of the structuralist-functionalist anthropological mode!, which had 
previously focused on reconstituting past cultures, was also criticised for complete! y ignoring 
the processes of change 12 . The idea that indigenous people were immune to changing 
circumstances was a theme observable in almost al! post-colonial societies until the late 201h 
century, thus reinforcing the concept that natives had no 'history' since they never 
'changed' 13. In almost all intellectual circ! es, the European colonizer was at the centre of al! 
historical discourse. For the indigenous peoples of post-colonial nations, their existence was 
usually relegated to one of myth and awe, trapped in a literature of timelessness. In the case 
of Australia, the experience of the colonial frontier was so central to the formation of the 
nation that it tended to forget aboriginals altogether14. 
The domination of ethnocentric and culturally exclusive perspective was dismantled 
in part by Francis Jennings. His re-evaluation centred on the joint creation of the United 
10 Gilles Harvard, "Les Indiens et 1 'histoire coloniale nord-américaine: les défi s de 
l'ethnohistoire", in François-Joseph Ruggiu et Cécile Vidal (dir.), Sociétés, colonisations 
etesclavages dans le monde atlantique. Historiographie des sociétés américaines des XV!e-XIXe 
siècles, Rennes: Les Perséides, 2009, p. 102. 
11 lbid., p.107 . 
12 Ann McGrath, "Un domaine de controverse: qu ' est-ce que l'histoire aborigène?", 
LeMouvement social, no 167, 1994, p. 23. 
13 Ibid., p. 23. 
14 Ibid., p. 22. 
9 
States by both Euramericans and Amerindians 15 . The concept could be extended to the 
different post-colonial contexts of other nations such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 
Emphasis was put on the meeting of 'two-worlds', instead of the domineering discourse 
previously espoused 16 . Richard White followed the steps laid out by Jennings with his 
seminal work The Middle Ground, which emphasized the dynamics of adaptation, 
accommodation, and mutual comprehension between the two cultures 17. While Jennings and 
White attempted to include Amerindians in the formation of their respective nations, their 
writing heavily under-represented the eventual and or graduai cultural domination of settler-
societies. In most historical cases of settler-indigenous relations, Euramericans and 
Amerindians failed to maintain an egalitarian system. One author explains that "exclusive 
stress on the arenas of cooperation runs the risk of obscuring the very real conflicts that must 
remain central to the tale 18." The unfortunate reality remains that policy making remained 
' colonial' in nature, no matter the humanitarian arguments that governments presented. In 
other words, settler societies were constantly looking to gain a permanent advantage in 
territorial, economie, and political negotiations. Even the intellectual project of The New 
American Indian Histor.y tended to downplay the conquering process, power relations, and 
the growing importance of having to re-integrate Amerindian societies within the Atlantic 
realm 19. 
Scholars have for long aggregated the indigenous experience by large geographical 
areas or periods of conflict20. Obviously, this gravely ignored regional diversity of cultures 
and experiences, while supporting the notion of a universal consciousness of 
15 Daniel K. Richter, loc.cit., p. 380 . 
16 Gilles Harvard, loc. cit., p. 104. 
17 Ibid. , p. 108. 
18 Daniel K. Richter, loc. cit., p. 390. 
19 Gilles Harvard, loc. cit., p. 108. 
20 Alain Beaulieu, "Une histoire instrumentalisée. Réflexions sur l'usage du passé dans 
les revendications autochtones", Vert, le droit? Conférence des juristes de 1 'État 2009, 
Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2009, p. 367. 
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'Indigenousness' 21 . Only recently have sorne scholars attempted to demonstrate that 
indigenous people made conscious decisions in an attempt to adapt to the changing 
circumstances, before and after the post-contact periods. Whereas they had previously been 
portrayed as passive victims 22 doomed in the face of the spreading grip of colonization, 
scholars increasingly hoped to depict them as individuals that responded to a set of structural 
conditions with precise motivations23 . Therefore, previous paradigms-centred on giving birth 
to indigenous identity only through the colonial experience can no longer hold. A narrative 
based on the latter type of explanatory mode! remains segmented and would speak only for 
the socio-cultural relationships between settler and native24 . As one historian explained, "the 
need is to construct a larger vision of both native and Euro-American experience (and, 
indeed, of the experience of aU the peoples who have shaped North American society) that is 
inclusive and empowering, rather than irriperialistic and dominating"25. Australian historian 
Ann McGrath expressed the sarne idea in that large narratives on particular nations have 
henceforth the obligation to integrate 'aboriginal history' 26 . The direct consequence of this 
paradigm shift, unfortunately but necessarily, brings back the colonial discourse at the 
forefront of the indigenous experience. This has direct implications for the present because 
instead of regarding colonialism as an amalgamation of discontinued historical pieces, it 
suggests that the legacy of the colonial heritage is still very much at work and perceivable 
through the general state of' ghettoization' of native communities around the world27. 
Through all these developments, the historical field continued to evolve and 
historians attempted to reconstruct their field left largely ' deconstructed' by the 
21 Ann McGrath, loc. cit. , p. l8. 
22 Ibid. , p. 24. 
23 Denys Delâge, "L'histoire des autochtones d'Amérique du Nord: acquis et tendances", 
Annales HSS, 57e année, no 5, 2002, p. 1349. 
24 Ann McGrath, loc. cit., p. 39. 
25 Daniel K. Richter, loc. cit., p. 389. 
26 Ann McGrath, loc. cit., p. 39. 
27 Denys Delâge, loc. cit. , p.l350 . 
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postmodernist intellectual wave now largely concluded. In response to how postmodemism 
and other related fields seem to suggest that "each culture is trying futilely to explain its 
untouched and unknowable othemess to the other28 ," Daniel Richter intelligently expressed 
that the historical enterprise should be understood as only a "partial, imperfect, provisional 
truth29." W~stem historians seem to have reached an epistemological sensibility that accounts 
for the changing dynamics of objectivity, methodology, and interpretation, and have thus 
agreed that it was still possible to make relevant, well researched, and nuanced ' native 
history'. However, they are still confronted with the fact that they are largely writing (and 
often considered from the targeted communities) as 'outsiders'. 
3. Indigenous Political Culture in Epistemological Currents 
The 1970s produced key publications that opened new avenues of historical thinking 
propelling the epistemological developments described above. While contributing to the field 
of the native people of Canada and the study of indigenous poli ti cal culture, little weight has 
. been attributed to Band Councils. This govemment initiative completely altered poli ti cal 
culture in indigenous communities. In fact, the implementation of Band Councils engendered 
changes in political organizational structure that remained largely unchanged to this day. 
Authors of modem general texts have mentioned to a limited degree the existence of Band 
Councils and have given them sorne degree of notice. For example, Gélinas' text on the 
Indigenous people of Quebec in the post-confederate era focuses on thematic discussions 
about many aspects of aboriginal life studied in parallel to evolution in Canadian and 
Quebecois culture30. Changes in Canadian legislation are interpreted as watersheds, but the 
reader of is left with few details about the process of implementation of Band Councils and 
the different effects they had on the political cultures of Quebec' s indigenous communities. 
Beaulieu, a specialist in indigenous history, emphasized that Band Councils were key 
28 Daniel K. Richter, loc. cit., p. 384. 
29 Ibid., p. 386. 
3° Claude Gélinas, Les Autochtones dans le Québec post-confédéral, 1867-1960, Sillery: 
Septentrion, 2007 . 
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products of govemment policy that undermined Quebec's First Nations traditional political 
culture. Band Councils, Beaulieu stated, were one of the main tools of the federal government 
used to propel native communities toward the celebrated goal of 'civilization' 31. 
However, few historians have focused on specialized analyses. The work of 
Daugherty and Madill32 is certainly an exception but their work leave many areas of study 
unfulfilled. They base their presentation mostly around the electoral system and the 
administrative powers allotted to the Band Councils. Their work sheds light on the 
implementation of Band Councils through its legal proceedings, but their approach remains 
lirnited to a study centred on the history of the administration of Indian Affairs. Moreover, 
their case studies are exclusively examples of resistance to the federal government's efforts to 
overhaul their traditional political system. These cases are certainly iriteresting in how they 
demonstrate opposition to govemmental policies of assimilation, but analysis of instances of 
where and why indigenous communities accepted Band Councils 'peacefully ' lack 
representation. Written in 1980, there since have been few if any publications of similar 
dimension. 
The Abenakis, as a nation, have not received as much scholarly attention as their 
Iroquoian neighbours.Mentioned clearly in historical records, the Abenakis obtained 
recognition as a distirict people and are thus presentin most general narratives concerning the 
east coast of North America. Y et studies focusing solely on the history of the Abenaki people 
are sparse. The Jdentity of the Saint Francis Indians by Gordon Da/ 3 is revealing in how it 
traces the original location of severa! Abenaki groups at the moment of European contact,in 
addition to their migrations after a series of conflicts with the English displaced indigenous 
populations all over New England. Considering how little information exists documenting 
31 Alain Beaulieu, Les Autochtones du Québec: des premières alliances aux 
revendications contemporaines, Montréal et Québec: Fides et Musée de la civilisation, 1997, p. 
11 6-11 8. 
32 Wayne Daugherty and Dennis Madill, Indian government under Indian act legislation, 
1868-1951, Ottawa: s.n. , 1980. 
33 Gordon Day, The 1dentity of the Saint Francis Jndians, Ottawa: National Museums of 
Canada, 1981. 
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their move - in large majority- from their original lands to their permanent establishment in 
Canada, Day's work is interesting in how he puts the pieces together. Day also brings forth 
reports from the very few missionaries that worked closely with the Abenakis prior to their 
mass migration. From these documents are revealed the earliest cultural aspects of the 
Abenakis. In the end however, the reader is only offered a preliminary view of the daily 
workings of Abenaki livelihood, most certainiy attributable to the Jack of primary material 
for the period of Day's study. Another substantial survey on the subject is the work of 
Kenneth M. Morrison, The People of the Dawn: The Abnaki and their relations with New 
England and New France, 1600-1 72734 . As the title suggests, Morrison's explored early 
relations between the Abenaki and the two colonial powers thatinvested interest in their 
area.In fact, hisbody of analysis centeredon the conflicts between Europeans and the 
surrounding fust nations, but more specifically on how these clashes had a ripple effect in the 
interior of the country, influencing Abenaki livelihood, culture and territory. Philippe 
Charland adds to the works of Day and Morrison with his doctoral thesis The Last Warriors: 
Dynamic and Mechanic of Dispossession of Ameriquain Territory: the experience of the 
Wabanaki nation 35 . As the title suggests, the thesis observed the gradua! and systematic . 
territorial dispossession of Abenaki lands, from their original territory to their experience in 
Quebec. Char land did well documenting the a geney of the nation wh en faced with relentless 
pressure from the non-indigenous and neigh_bouring tribes. A portrait of survival, resilience 
and adaptation is thus painted, highlighting the character of the Abenakis. For the purpose of 
this research, Day, Morrison and Charland deliver compelling work on the Abenakis by 
providing an essential starting point in the observation of cultural and political 
transformation. As in the case of the majority of indigenouspopulations, the winds of change 
occurred almost irnmediately after first contact. The Abenakis were no different; economie 
34 Kenneth M. Morrison, The People of the Dawn: The Abnaki and their relations with 
New England and New France, 1600-1 727, Ph.D. Thesis: University of Maine, 1975. In the latter 
publication, Morrison uses the spelling 'Abnaki' in reference to what is more commonly spelled as 
'Abenaki' . When ci ting Morrison's work, I use his spelling. 
35 Philippe Charland, "Mejessala Migakawinnoak - les derniers guerriers: Dynamique et 
mécanique de dépossession du territoire amériquain: l'expérience de la nation W8banak" , Thèse en 
géographie: Université du Québec à Montréal, 2000. 
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relations, territoi-y, and religious culture were all affected by colonial trade, war, and religious 
ffilSSIOnS . 
Studies on the Abenakis living in Quebec specifically are also few in numbers. 
Thomas Marie Charland has written the decisive work covering the Abenakis of Odanak36. 
Large in scope, T.M. Charland starts his survey in the late 17th century as sorne Abenakis 
decided to settle on Canadian land. Chronologically, he described the events occurring with 
this group, ranging from armed conflicts, relationships with missionaries, religious 
movements, territorial confrontations, and political happenings. As an indication of the 
academie void, the His tory of the Abenakis ofOdanak (1 675-193 7) remains nearly fifty years 
old. T.M. Charland covers all the major events but for the purpose of this study, he leaves 
little detail on the transitional decades of the late 19th century. The author never stated that the 
purpose of his study was to cover the change in indigenous political systems, but like so 
many analyses, the emergence of the Band Council was never treated as a transformative 
phenomenon. 
This research paper, in junction with the larger project of the Canadian Chair of 
Indigenous Research, hopes to contribute to the void in the current academia described 
above. It is positioned between two historiographie currents: the study of Canadian policies 
and the judiciary implications of the latter. 
3.1. Study of Canadian Policies 
From the late 1960s onwards, scholars of Native American history published on a 
wide variety of aspects concerning Canadian policies regarding First Nations. One approach 
remains dominant: the examination of the federal government's logic in the process of public 
policy formulation for indigenous people. Bartlett studied the developments in legislation that 
lead to the consolidation of all previous legal amendments with the passing of the Indian Act 
36 Thomas-Marie Charland, Histoire des Abénakis d'Odanak, Montréal : Éditions du 
Lévrier, 1964. 
- --- - ----·-- -----
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in 187637. The author went into detail when he observed the influence of different political 
actors, how they pushed for different legislations, what amendments were passed and 
revoked, and which clauses affected different areas of indigenous life on the reserve. Be 
followed by writing The lndian Act of Canada; an analysis of the Act's repercussions on the 
aboriginal communities of Canada which has undeniably become a pillar in the field of · 
indigenous studies38 . In this particular book, he emphasized the negative nature of the lndian 
Act in how it not only undermined traditional native culture, but also how it severely redticed 
opportunities for First Nations to thrive under this type oflegislation. 
In the same vein, sorne authors have written about specifie aspects within the history 
of Canadian legislation. Most recently, Miller focused on treaties as special agreements 
between two goveming bodies that should be given renewed respect and their significance, 
revised. Whereas signed treaties were creations of Western Civilization, the author hoped to 
emphasize that prior to European arrivai, aboriginal communities had developed mechanisms 
that functioned to regulate one another as civil societies39 . His work was organized similarly 
to Bartlett's : he moved from one treaty to the next chronologically and studied how each 
treaty came to be, who it involved, what the different parties were hoping to achieve from it, 
the effects that these treaties had on indigenous and Euro-Canadian life, and how the essence 
of treaty-making changed over time. 
The history of federal legislation has undoubtedly been well documented, but far 
fewer efforts have been poured over state actions at a micro level. In a recent case study, 
Brownlie observed the interactions of indigenous communities in Ontario when confronted 
with the federal government's arbitrary imposition of Euramerican societal and political 
structures40. This author targeted ' lndian agents ' as prime actors in the fate of indigenous 
37 Richard H. Bartlett, The Historical Development of the lndian Act, Ottawa: Treaties and 
Historical Research Centre, P.R.E. Group, lndian and Northem Affairs, 1978. 
38 Richard H. Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, op. cit. 
39 R. J. Miller, Compact, contract, covenant: Aboriginal treaty-making in Canada, 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009, p. 284. 
40 Robin Jarvis Brownlie, Afatherly eye: Indian agents, government power, and 
Aboriginal resistance in Ontario, 1918-1939, Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press, 2003 . 
16 
communities, primarily due to the fact that they were trusted with the job of implementing 
federal policy, enforce the Indian Act, and manage First Nation communities41 . Brownlie 
therefore considered the 'Indian agent' as the underlying force in reshaping indigenous 
traditional political culture. By contrast, he attributed little to no power to Band Councils, 
which were. in fact the political system within which 'agents' had towork from. 
The historiography outlined above largely focused to measure the degree in which 
state institutions constituted agents of social change. The following research hopes to build 
upon previous work by combining both the logic behind the overarching state apparatus and 
on-field observations of a chosen reserve: Odanak. From this dual perspective, this study 
seeks to clarify a complex set of relationships between the state and indigenous communities 
within the colonial context. As a starting point, one h_as to observe how Canadian legislation 
evolved to undermine traditional native political structures. Subsequently, analysis of events 
and actors in Odanak will shed light on the degree to which new political configurations and 
governmental initiatives engendered a true process of change within this reserve's political 
culture. The goal therefore is not limited to study instances of resistance or collaboration, but 
how indigenous people invested in this new power configuration to advance their own 
interests. 
3.2. Judiciary Implications 
A second current in historiography involves perspectives between law and 
colonialism. he establishment of legal parameters between natives and settler-societies has a 
complicated history and has translated into a host of hotly contested debates in the judiciary 
arena. In fact, only recently have the differing perceptions of First Nations been seriously 
addressed by academies of history and law. One of the best embodiments of deliberation 
within the legal-colonial arena is the Treaty of Waitangi, and the subsequent creation of the 
Waitangi Tribunal to address the modem implications of the document signed in 1840. The 
41 Ibid. , p. 10. 
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main point of discussion remains whether the principles of the Treaty, as opposed to the 
terms and vocabulary used, are stjll negotiable to this day. "While it cannot be said that there 
is general agreement as to what these principles are, the Tribunal has emphasized the 
princip! es of partnership, good faith, active protection, the need for compromise, and the duty 
to consult42." According to the latter' s timeless essence, the government of New Zealand has 
to main tain negotiations with its indigenous population for an indefini te future 43 . This 
everlasting contract has been thought burdensome by sorne, but the interpretations of the 
Treaty by the Tribunal are a strategy of ' reparatory jurisprudence' m an effort to move 
beyond conflict arid towards understanding and settlement44. 
The Treaty of Waitangi has the tendency to depict New Zealand as an example of 
peace and cooperation between natives and settlers. The judiciary reality, in North America, 
as in New Zealand in most respects, is far Jess egalitarian. At the end of the twentieth 
century, Canadian courts have given increasing weight to oral traditions. While there have 
been judicial victories by indigenous clairttants, Mil don has demonstrated the court' s 
underlying reluctance in completely trusting oral narratives, especially in land claims cases 
where the stakes are high45 . First Nation oral traditions are still considered more primitive 
than 'writing' which has become th e marker of civilization 46 . The extent of the colonial 
heritage i.s unmistakable: even if ancestral indigenous rights are recognized, the law dictates 
that overall administration of land use remains in the hands of the non-indigenous/settler 
state4 7. In fact, Morin has argued that ancestral or treaty rights are too often recognized when 
42 Giselle Byrnes, " 'Relie of 1840' or founding document? The Treaty, the Tribunal and 
concepts oftime", K!tuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online, vol. 1, 2006, p. 4. 
43 Ibid., p. 5. 
44 Ibid., p. 6 and 1 O. 
45 Drew Mildon, "A Bad Connection: First Nations Oral Histories in the Canadian 
Courts", in Renee Hulan and Renate Eigenbrod, eds., Aboriginal Oral Traditions: Theory, Practice 
and Ethics, Halifax: Fernwood 2008, p.85. 
46 Ibid., p. 80. 
47 Michel Morin, "Quelques réflexions sur le rôle de l'histoire dans la détermination des 
droits ancestraux et issus de trai tés", Revue Juridique Thémis, vol. 34, 2000, p. 339. 
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this causes no inconvenience to the non-indigenous48 . If one was to compare Canada with the 
situation in New Zealand, there exists no system or organization currently in place that can 
systematically address and reassess terms or princip les of previous diplomatie agreements. In 
the case of the treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand, it is clear th at it was signed between two 
parties with the purpose of.an entente. Since, scholars and intellectuals have argued that it 
should thus be considered as transcending time, free from the context ofits original signing49. 
With all the odds seemingly stacked against indigenous claimants, sorne scholars 
embarked on the mission of producing 'histories' that could be used directly by the courts. 
The problem with such fmality, an essential requirement for !aws, is that the "fluid nature of 
theory in the humanities and the social sciences" cannot produce the type of argumentative 
certainty that the courts are looking for 50 . Beaulieu warned that historical research 
consciously conducted within a judicial framework will undoubtedly seek to answer 
questions about current legal issues, instead of a desire to comprehend the past, which should 
be the primary objective of a historian51 . The manipulation ofhistorical facts or vocabulary is 
one problem on the leve! of objectivity, but its effect reaches beyond the scholastic field. For 
example, Beaulieu argued that the use of the Royal Proclamation as a document still holding 
the same legal powers since 1774 until 'I982 is an aberration 52. The effects of sorne of these 
historical falsehoods and constructs have a disturbing range. In the case of Australia, the term 
Terra Nullius has erupted at the forefront of court cases and was in fact pivota! in the most 
famous; the Mabo Court Case (1982). According to Attwood, historian Henry Reynolds 
simultaneously inserted and undermined the term in the legal discourse. Terra Nullius has 
apparently no legal groundings, which renders it historically erroneous and shifts the focus 
48 Ibid., p. 363. 
49 Ibid., p. 358. 
50 Arthur J. Ray, "Native History on Trial: Confessions of an Expert Witness", Canadian 
Historical Review, vol. 84, no 2, 2003, p. 257 and 273. 
51 Alain Beaulieu, "Une histoire instrumentalisée", loc. cit., p. 360. 
52 Ibid., p. 364. 
19 
away from the real cul prit of aboriginal destitution: colonization53. "In other words, Reynolds 
set out to make history in order to help the judiciary remake the law54 ." In conclusion, if 
history remains fundamental in the p~ocess of recognition of indigenous rights, the academie 
work produced in the judiciary context often rest on an implicit negation ofhistory55. 
Therefore, it is undeniably clear that law bas played a central role in the colonial 
process. McHugh however, in his seminal book Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law: 
A History of Sovereignty, Status, and Self-Determination, demonstrated how History bas 
shown the centrality, but also the limitations of Western law in observing the interactions 
between indigenous people and settlers56 . In other words, colonial and eventually Canadian 
law undoubtedly dominated the fate of First Nations, but the process was nonetheless 
reconfigured through indigenous agency 57 . Consequently, this research project hopes to 
document how aboriginal communities reinvented themselves under imposed legal and 
political frameworks, and the ways in which they invested in Westemjudicial tools to pursue 
their own interests. To study the process of the implementation of Band Councils therefore 
offers a window of analysis within the new political and judicial order engineered by the 
settler state. 
4. Methodology & Sources 
In terms of primary sources, the reports on the commissions of inquiry of the !9th 
century on Indian Affairs (Great Britain, 1839; Canada, 1845 and 1847; Canada, 1858), the 
annual reports on Indian affairs (Canada, 1864-1990), and the debates at the Chamber of 
Communes and the Senate were consulted. Undoubtedly, caution was necessary when 
53 Bain Attwood, "The Law of the Land or the Law of the Land?: History, Law and 
Narrative in a Settler à Society", His tory Compass, 2, 2004, p. 7 and 17. 
54 Ibid. , p. 6. 
55 Àlain Beaulieu, loc. cit., p. 370. 
56 P.O. McHugh, op. cit. , p.VII . 
57 Ibid. , p.7. See also Lauren Benton, A Search For Sovereignty: Law and Geography in 
European Empire, 1400-I900, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 257. 
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interpreting this type of written material. In most cases, these documents were produced for 
governmental usage. The process thus required to filter out possible biases that naturally 
ocèur from the ethnocentric perspectives of the era, even though the hope remains that 
objectivity is standard in reports, censuses, and correspondences.We must constantly remind 
ourselves that these documents were written in a period where the government was 
attempting to adhere to the 'civilization policy' - a theme that transpires throughout the 
correspondences of the period. 
The RGlO series of the Canadian National Archives held the vast majority of the 
information relating to the subject. In order to plunge into 0 the universe of St-Francis, 
correspondences and administrative documents between the different actors responsible for 
the reserve proved to be the most 0 valuable. These ex changes were usually relayed by 
members of the Department of Indian Affairs or higher ranked government officiais, the 
Indian Agent stationed in St-Francis, elected rnembers of the Band Council or other 
influential members of the band. Offering an insider view of the daily occurrences within the 
band, these documents covered all of the band's official proceedings, while also bringing to 
light the frequency of their grievances, especially re garding internai matters. Luckily for the 
researcher, a few of St-Francis ' residents were renowned for constancy in their writing, their 
letters accumulating to an impressive number. While only a small proportion of the 
population took to the pen during the period studied, when combined with the remarks of the 
Indian Agent, we have a picture painted by the most socially involved and politically active 
segment of St-Francis. In other words, we are analysing the correspondences of Abenaki 
leaders. The latter often happened to be in opposition, adding to the richness of the 
information by presenting different angles of a single issue. The main incentive fuelling the 
large collection of letters was political competition or problems with the internai functioning 
of the band. Through this !ar gely negative array of correspondences, one can get a good idea 
of the tapies concerning the inhabitants of St-Francis. 
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5. Outline of Chapters 
Chapter 1 starts with an overview of the first contacts between the Abenaki and 
European settlers, situating the colonial state as the instigator of change for communities in 
the Eastern Americas. Especially as encounters became more frequent and prolonged, 
indigenous social structures were put under pressure. Approaching the mid-nineteenth 
century, indigenous identity, territory, culture, and economy was · already under 
transformation. The chapter serves to contextualize this situation as well as to examine how 
the colonial state was simultaneously organizinglegislature that would establish its 
dominance permanent! y. 
. Chapter II observes the establishment of Britain's colonial vision. More than any 
other imperial power, Britain sought to legitimize its authority through legal means. In terms 
of Britain'sguiding principle toward the Amerindian population, the greatest effort was 
placed on transforming traditional indigenous political systems. The lasting resultof this 
process and pillar of Canadian po licy was the Indian Act of 1876. The implementation of this 
Act and its underlying objectives will therefore constitute the chief foundation for this 
chapter. 
Chapter III examines the concrete effects of the Band Council legislation on the 
community of Odanak. The process by which Odanak' s inhabitants finally adopted the Band 
Council at the turn of the 191h century will provide key insights into a new phase of 
indigenous politics through state-imposed structures.Analysis will center on the electoral 
procedure, participation tendencies,and observation of the Band Council's duties within the 
framework ofCanadian law. 
Chapter IV will highlight the new political dynamic created by the imposition of the 
Band Council. The chapter observes how traditional chieftaincy was replaced by a new group 
of leaders that wholeheartedly embarked in the European-based system of elective politics. 
The characters ofH.L. Masta and Joseph Laurent in particular were central in redirecting the 
Abenakis of St-Francis away from traditional chieftaincy to the dictate of the Indian Act 
(1876). The importance the Abenakis put on the acquisition of political power can be 
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observed through the struggle of these two opponents within the framework of the newly 
established system of the Band Council. 
l 
CHAPTERI 
THE ABENAKIS: HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
In the prov ince of Quebec, the sett lements of the nation known as the Abenaki are 
limited to Wôlinak and Odanak; originally referred to through hi story as Bécancour and St-
Francis respectively. However the permanence of these settlements is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. As ali other indigenous nations in North America, wri tten accounts begin with 
the arrivai of European explorers. It remains useful to remi nd oneself of the long history of 
the indigenous people prior to European incursions. Clearly, the beginnings of co lonia l 
domination only gains momentum th rough time, but the narrative cannot be limi ted to one of 
graduai degradation of the Amerindian. Whereas indigenous people were encountering 
mass ive changes to their ways of !ife since European arrivai, their experience is one of 
remarkable res ilience and adaptation, even when confronted with the most pervasive co lonial 
influence. The fo llowing is not an attempt to cover the entirety of Abenaki history, but rather . 
to contextualize the situation of the Abenakis at Odanak in order to shed light to their 
relationship with the colonial order at the dawn of the 19111 century. 
1. People of the Dawn: the Abenaki at European Contact 
The Abenaki , as a nation, are part of one of the largest indigenous linguist ic group in 
North America: the Algonquians. Spec ialists have been able to trace th e territory of the 
ori ginal Abenaki tribes to what is now large ly the state of Maine. The term Abenaki has been 
used to describe a unified indigenous group or nation, but while it is usefu l for contemporary 
use, the term is mis leading since the Abenaki where not a cohesive political unit such as the 
Iroquois, for example. Historians have identified a series of tribes that have been grouped as 
'Abenaki' . These peop le have cooperated together po litically, a lbeit only in à very loose 
fashion , while sharing common characteristics in custom and territory. Perhaps more 
appropriately, in the historical phase preceding mass displacement (see below), historian 
Kenneth M . Morrison distinguished Abenaki tribes by their riverine or coastallocations: 
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Sacos, Androscoggins , Kennebecs (synonymously the Norridgewocks after the village site), 
Penobscots and Passamaquoddies 1• 
Solid information about these original tribes and their customs is rather scarce when 
it cornes to frrst hand observation by the earliest settlers. As Day has pointed out, 
geographically, Abenaki settlements were generally located in the interior of the country- an 
area not in direct contact with the first French, Dutch, and English newcomers2. Nonetheless 
he argued that this area is of special interest because it is not only a transitional zone between 
hunting and agricultural Abenaki tribes, but also a dynamic area of contact between the 
Iroquois and the Eastern Algonquians 3 . The earliest written documents treating with the 
Abenaki surface with religious missions in the interior; on the coastline, indigenous people 
were experiencing the colonization process in the more classical fashion - through direct 
contact with the White man. In consequence, the majority of the early information about the 
Abenaki originated from their involvement in conflict situations between European 
colonizers and their indigenous counterparts in closer proximity to the coast. 
1.1. Migrations: the Settling of Saint-Francis 1 Odanak 
The Abenakis had already been travelling up north to Canada prior to King Philip 's 
War. The relentless pressure of the Iroquois4, better trade relations with the French, and the 
increasing occurrence of the English encroaching on their terri tory were the main reasons for 
the Abenaki to get acquainted with their northem European neighbours5. King Philip's War 
1 Kenneth M. Morrison, The People of the Dawn: The Abnaki and their relations with New 
England and New France, 1600-1727, Ph.D. Thesis: Maine Urùversity, 1975, p. 14. 
2 Gordon Day, The Identity of the Saint Francis Indians , Ottawa: National Museums of 
Canada, 1981, p. 5. 
3 Ibid., p. 5. 
4 Kenneth M. Morrison, op. cit. , p. 88. 
5 Philippe Charland, "Mejessala Migakawinnoak - les derrùers guerriers: Dynarrùque et 
mécanique de dépossession du territoire amériquain: l'expérience de la nation W8banaki", Thèse en 
géographie: Université du Québec à Montréal, 2000, p. 57. 
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created a . front of resistance in the area around the Kennebec River which mobilized the 
majority of the Abenaki tribes. In the late 1670s however, the Kennebec region especially, 
experienced a mass exodus of its inhabitants towards the south shore of the St-Lawrence and 
its French missions6. Yet, there is evidence that sorne Abenaki had already settled at the 
Algonquian mission at Sillery even prior to the start of the war in 1675 in the hope of 
avoiding conflict 7 . 
-
The French and the Abenaki had already enjoyed a history of good relations, but a 
large scale migration from this particular nation requires further explanation. The war 
severely disrupted traditional Abenaki lifestyle and !ife among the Jesuits did offer sorne 
material security. Also, the English had long been indifferent in forging healthy trade rituals8, 
which had the effect of drawing the Abenakis to the French, further fostering the relationship 
between the two 9. The fact that the Abenaki had historically been not only enemies of the 
Iroquois but .also feared opponents rendered the French particularly welcoming to this 
particular nation 10 . Thus to accommodate the increasing numbers at Sillery, a new, 
exclusively Abenaki mission was created in 1683 on the Chaudière River: St-Francois de 
Sales 11 . By 1689, six hundred Abenaki had established themselves at the new settlement 12 . 
Whereas the special relationship between the French and the Abenaki discussed 
above was a major incentive for the latter's migration, the Abenakis did not hold any position 
of exclusive influence within the web of French-Indian alliance. Morrison argued that the 
success and permanency of the new Abenaki settlement had both practical and spiritual 
elements. The English had been exercising direct and indirect pressure between 1630 and 
6 Ibid. , p. 58. 
7 Gordon Day, op.cit., p. 16-1 7. 
8 For more details on trade rituals, please see pages 29-31 . 
9 Kenneth M. Morrison, op. cit., p. 11 3. 
10 Philippe Charland, op.cit., p. 65 and 67. 
11 Kenneth M. Morrison, op. cit., p. 113. 
12 Ibid., p. 113. 
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1688. European guns had revolutionized Abenaki hunting economy, while conflicts with the 
English had eut them off from the supplies they desperately needed to maintain a new 
economie order. Many of the Abenaki, faced with starvation or capitulation to 
Massachussets, preferred exile among the French. The missions offered an opportunity to 
regroup far from the English and offered a new French order: the Abenaki thus entered into 
' . 
an official alliance with powerful Europeans which balanced the English pressure and 
assured the preservation of the old hunting economy13 . On a spiritual level, Catholicism, a 
religion by now fully adopted by the migrating Abenaki bands, was equally instrumental in 
luring them northward towards French Jesuit missions: 
"New diseases left religious beliefs and social order largely bankrupt [ ... ] Catholicism offered them 
(Abenakis) sorne symbolic stability in the post-European world and because the Jesuits were not 
overzealous in demanding repudiation of their old lifestyle [ ... ] Catholic symbols embraced much of 
the old religiosity and the new liturgy, translated into the Abnakis language, supplemented the song 
and dance ri tua! familiar to the Abnaki 14 ." 
From the very foundation of St-Francois de Sales, the Abenaki and French benefited from 
their relationship reciprocally. Adaptation, flexibility, and toleration were key features that 
enabled both parties to survive and at times, thrive within an increasingly colonized North 
America. Morrison eloquent! y summarized the situation at the end of the 17th century: 
"The French! Abnaki alliance was based th en, on a reaffirma ti on of the principal elements of the 
aboriginal arder and on a program designed to minimize the debilitating effects of the post-Euro world 
[ ... ] The Jesuits rejected a program of forced civilization of the Abnaki despite the clamor from 
Minister and King for the creation of red-skinned Frenchmen. The sedentary village remained the 
mission ideal but the Jesuits accepted the necessity ofmaintaining the traditional hunting and trapping 
economy. The Abnaki missions became what Indian villages had been before European contact: the 
locus of economie and communal !ife 15 ." 
Th Abenaki were not the only nation experiencing heavy pressure on their territory 
and lifestyle. Hurons, Algonquins, Nepissingues, and Iroquois also sought refuge in New 
France for different reasons. Like the Abenaki, these other groups were fleeing the effects of 
· colonial wars, tensions between the converted and traditionalists, and the demographie 
13 Ibid., p. 115. 
14 Ibid., p. 114 and 116 & Jean-Pierre Sawaya, La Fédération des Sept Feux de la vallée 
du Saint-Laurent, XVIf-XDf siècle, Sillery: Septentrion, 1998, p. 23. 
15 Kenneth M. Morrison, op. cil., p. 116. 
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restructuration brought forth by Iroquoian war parties 16. Most ofthese groups settled around 
the valley of the St-Lawrence River, giving rise to what we know today as Wendake, Pointe-
du-Lac, Wôlinak, Odanak, Kahnawake, Kenehsatake, Awkesasne. In an effort to insure sorne 
cohesion, solidarity, and governrnental autonomy within French controlled territory, these 
communities known by the French authorities as 'domiciled Indians', forged an alliance 
coined by historian Jean-Pierre Sawaya as the 'Seven Fires ' Federation' 17. Headed by the 
Great Council at Kahnawake, the Seven Pires, representing the seven villages of 'domiciled 
Indians, met and discussed diplomatie and rnilitary issues. Aware that they shared similar 
interests in havirig ali invested in the Catholic religion and established away from their native 
lands, the Seven Fires attempted to represent their decisions as one voice - although in 
reality, this was not a~ways the case. The Seven Fires' Federation can therefore be interpreted 
as an adaptive response to new colonial situations. On many levels, these communities had 
already severed sorne ties with their nations of origin. At the very !east, economie, 
diplomatie, rnilitary, spiritual, and territorial relationships had changed forever. While 
maintairiirig a degree of autonomy and protectirig their interests through their alliance, the 
Seven Fires were, more than any native grouping, the most susceptible to changes in colonial 
society. Their proxirnity to large non-Indian population centers, shared religion with 
colonists, and close and prolonged cooperation with the colonial govemment combiried in 
placing them on the frontliries of po licy making for generations to come. 
1.2. Military Conflicts 
Many if not most of the indigenous communities living within the reach of the 
English colonies faced crippling pressure. Diseases had for long decimated the east coast of 
North America; territorial encroachments were becomirig more aggressive and recurrent, 
triggering irreversible change in traditional ways of !ife. However, many Indian groups, 
including the Abenakis, found sorne refuge in Canada. The emergence of fresh indigenous 
16 Jean-Pierre Sawaya, op.cit., p. 22-23 . 
17 There is indication that the Federation of the Seven Fires could have existed as early as 
1660. Ib id., p. 13 . 
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communities in New France, severa! in the St-Lawrence valley, began a new era. 'Domiciled 
Indians ', as they would be called - settled bands largely converted to Catholicism - were 
now undeniably part of French colonial society. While this phenomenon can be viewed as the 
first step to assimilation, it can also be considered as a remarkable moment of cooperation 
and mutual respect. At the very !east, most Indians living in New France would live with 
sorne degree of security, support, and the capacity to maintain their traditional ways of !ife. 
Until the conclusion of the War of 1812, domiciled lndians were an integral part in the 
development of the nation. 
The Abenakis who had immigrated to Canada continued to participate in colonial 
conflicts, usually alongside their southem Abenaki counterparts combating the English and 
their allies. The War of Spanish Succession called in the colonies Queen Anne 's War (1702), 
Dummer 's War (1713), the War of Austrian Succession also known as King George's War 
(1740-48), and the Seven Years' War (1754-60) involved many actions from the inhabitants 
of St-Francis 18. In fact, during the last French and lndian War, more recently renamed the 
'Seven Years' W ar' , the Abenakis of St-Francis were present in almost every military action 
of the French19. Conflict even occurred within the village itself. Robert Rogers, serving under 
the British, was sent on mission to avenge alleged Abenaki barbarity toward British troops20. 
In 1759, Lieutenant Rogers and his 'Rangers' approached the village. According to Abenaki 
oral tradition, an Indian belonging to Rogers' war party wamed the village of the raid a day 
prior. Fortunately for St-Francis, most inhabitants were able to flee and avoid a surprise 
attack that would certainly have occasioned heavy !osses. By contrast, Rogers ' account 
celebrated the raid as a crippling blow to the Abenaki community. He had originally reported 
that he had destroyed the village and most inhabitants had been killed21 . While deba e on the 
details of the so called 'massacre' under Lieutenant Rogers remains, St-Francis, as an 
18 Gordon Day, op. cit. , p. 33-34, p. 35-37 and 41. 
19 Ibid., p. 43. 
20 Thomas-Marie Charland, Histoire des Abénakis d'Odanak, Montréal: Éditions du Lévrier, 
1964,p.l07. 
21 Gordon Day, op. cit., p. 43-44, and 46. 
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Abenaki community, re-emerged before long. At the outbreak of the American Revolution, 
the village was reoccupied22 - indication that most of the inhabitants managed to scatter prior 
or during the raid rather than killed. 
2. Abenaki Culture at a Crossroad 
After the Seven Years ' War, with the political climate stabilized and most of the 
domiciled Indian population anchored clown, the British government re-organized its 
objectives toward managing relations with their indigenous neighbours. In direct contrast 
with the Bond Head Comrnission23 of keeping indigenous people segregated from the non-
Indian society, the 1830s were marked with initiatives that hoped to bring domiciled bands 
closer to the Euro-Canadian ideal. With permanent seUlement came the desire to transform 
roarning hunting bands into agriculturalists. While this project had been forwarded in the 
past, officiais were encouraged with sorne sparse signs of success across scattered 
communities: 
"The Committee therefore dismiss, as equally against Reason and Experience, the Apprehension that 
the Attempt to bring the Indians into agricultural and settled Habits must fail, because sorne 
Experiments made with this view have heretofore, under particular Circumstances, failed ... the 
Comrnittee have only to refer to the Returns laid before them by your Excellency to show that many of 
the Indians in this Province have applied themselves to Agriculture, and now subsist by it, either 
wholly or in part, and they believe that what has been done by sorne may, under the like 
Circumstances, be done by a11 24 ." 
As testimony to the influence of neighbouring non-Indian culture, changes in traditional 
customs were occurring in the Abenaki community. Fourteen individuals would have already 
been practicing agriculture by the end of the 1830s. More surprisingly, these Indian farmers 
would not only have been a small rninority in comparison to their hunting comrades, but they 
were acting in total dependence from the rest of the St-Francis by cultivating lots that were 
22 Ibid, p. 52. 
23 See Chapter 2: 2. Indian Allies Become Obsolete - Establishment of the "Civilization 
Policy", p. 55-56. 
24 Report from a comrnittee of the executive council for Archibald Acheson Gosford, June 
! 3th 1837, NAC, RGIO, vol. 792, p. 7597-7624, microfilm C-13449. 
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separa te from what the band held in common -the rest of the 316 inhabitants cultivated 250-
260 acres of land held in commune 25. 
To accelerate the process of implementing agriculture in the domiciled Indian 
villages, administrative committees concluded that they should modify one of the oldest 
rituals between the colonial regime and the Indian population. 'Gift giving' had for long been 
a manner of reaching a mutual mode ofunderstanding and cooperation - the basis of friendly, 
diplomatie and in turn, commercial relationships. If any party disengaged from this practice, 
the status quo was usually altered thus heavily affecting the general peace. Therefore when 
govemment officiais began tinkering with the age old system, the Common Ground so 
famously described in Richard White' s work, started to fade and give place to a well-
documented historical framework of domina tor versus dominated. 
The Abenakis wrote a petition in 1833 expressing alarm at the possible 
discontinuance of gift-giving by the British colonia[ .government - two years had passed 
without having received gifts or allowances 26 . While gifts were considered a necessary 
diplomatie lubricant in the past, after the major colonial conflicts they were considered more 
of a burden by the crown. The Indians however had grown accustomed if not dependent on 
externat assistance. In one particular example, the chiefs of the latter petition arguedthatthe 
gifts and allowances were needed to take care of the older members of the society. Albeit in a 
probably exaggerated discourse, the petition highlights the chiefs' reaction to the transition in 
the government's attitude toward gift-giving. 
The Indian chiefs had anticipated the govemment's intention correctly. In 1837, the 
Abenakis were asked directly whether they were willing to substitute the regular articles for 
money or for educative pur-poses. The Abenaki Council made it clear that the suggested 
25 Return to an address of the Honourable the House of Commons, dated 11 June 1839 for 
copies or extracts of correspondence since 1 st April 1835, between the secretary of state for the 
colonies and the governors of the British North Arnerican provinces, respecting the Indians in those 
provinces, Great Britain. Parliament, House of Commons (Extracted from Early Canadiana 
Online). 
26 Petition from the Abenakis, Malecites, and Micmacs of Green Island to Matthew 
Whitworth Aylmer, 20th of August 1833, NAC, RGlO, vol. 87, p. 34515-34517, microfilm C-
11466. 
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alternatives would bring nothing positive. They feared that the distributed money would be 
spent on liquor- a major problem in most Indian communities in contact with settler goods. 
Moreover, without clothes and blankets, the Council declared that "our wives and children 
would be naked and miserable and us, unhappy. The articles of clothing that we now receive 
annually from our Great Father the King, as a sort of remuneration for our past services we 
prize too much. We depend upon them to protect us from the cold27." The metaphorical style 
used by the Abenaki chiefs continued to declare the critical state of dependency and poverty 
of St-Francis, most likely to maintain extemal generosity and support28.The chiefs' insistence 
on material goodsbecomes even more evident in the following response to the education 
segment of the govemment's query: 
"[ ... ] We are weil aware that they can best reap great benefits from receiving an education. But at the 
same time tell him, that the great superiority of the Abenaquis tri be, are so wretchedly poor, that they 
have not the means of paying for the instruction of their children. That the presents that they annually 
receive from their great father are barely sufficient to protect them from the cold and should a portion 
of them be retained to pa y for schooling, part of the farnilies would be obliged to go naked. And tell 
him that many of us have no farnilies, and it would be unjust that such should be deprived of part of 
their father's great annual bounty to pay for the instruction of the children of others29 ." 
The discussion was saon thereafter taken up on a more official leve! with a report 
from the Committee of the Executive Council ordered by the Indian Departrnent. Two 
questions were of primary concem and reflected the same issues preoccupying domiciled 
Indians only a few months before. Again, the Committee tackled the question of whether to 
abolish the gift giving practice altogether, or substituting it with more utilitarian based 
assistance in the fields of education and or agriculture. After debating and analysing the 
situation of severa! bands across the country, it concluded "that good Faith, Justice, and 
Humanity alike forbid the Discontinuance of the Presents un til the Indians shall b raised to a 
Capacity of maintaining themselves on Equality with the rest of the Population of the 
27 At a Council held at the village of St-Francis 30th July, 1836, by the comrnand of his 
excellency the govemor in chief for the purpose of obtaining the real sentiments of the Abenaquois. 
(Extracted from Early Canadiana Online ). 
28 For more about how Amerindians used a rhetoric ofpoverty (and its related terminology) in 
their correspondences with non-Indians see Mary Black-Rogers, "Varieties of Starving: Semantic and 
Survival in the Subarctic Fur Trade, 1750-1850", Royal Ontario Museum: Toronto, 1986. 
29 Ibid. 
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Province30." In other words, the Cornrnittee, in a seemingly benevolent intention, felt that the 
Indian Department should continue to support indigenous communities through gift giving. 
The value of the abjects offered were not only ùseful, but served another, deeper purpose: "as 
to the moral Effect of the System on their Character and Habits 31 ." The forwarded 
justification to pursue the custom was that through govemmental support and assistance, 
reserve populations would eventually become self-serving municipal-type entities. 
For the Department of Indian affairs, the transformative objectives were simple and 
attainable if Indians were made to follow the Euro-Canadian mode! of citizenship. Obviously, 
this was not to be a two-way exchange: the British govemment was aligning policy to impose 
its own values and mores to reorder the Indian world and re-incorporate it into its own vision 
of Canadian society. In 1837, a report from the Cornrnittee of the Executive Council 
suggested severa! specifie modifications to the essence of the gifts in order to bridge the gap 
between indigenous and civilized culture. The frrst and primarily superficial suggestion was 
to modify the clothes that were being distributed: "[ ... ] a different Description of Clothing 
should be substituted for that hitherto supplied, in order that the Indians may be led to, adopt 
more generally the European Mode of Dress; and the Committee are of opinion that this 
Change should apply both to the Male and Female Indians32." Secondly, if the governrnent 
was to continue giving out items, they ought to encourage and support industry and 
agriculture: 
"It would also be desirable [ .. . ] that the Trinkets and Omaments hitherto fumished should be 
discontinued [ ... ] and that Agricultural Implements and Tools should be provided to be given to such 
Indians as shall show an Inclination for Agricultural Pursuits or other Employments. With the same 
View, the Committee would think it advisable that no Firearms or Ammunition should in future be 
distributed to them, except to the old Hunters, or to such adult Indians as shall have become Settlers in 
the Forest33 ." 
30 Report from a committee of the executive council for Archibald Acheson Gosford, June 
13th 1837, NAC, RGlO, vol. 792, p. 7597-7624, ffiicrofi1m C-13449. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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By controlling the type of articles given out, the government believed they could persuade 
male Indians to invest in 'ploughing the land' . Whereas sorne agricultural activities had been 
integral to Abenaki culture, responsibility rested in the women of the village.For the British 
colonial govemment, the measure of a people's civilization leve! therefore depended on the 
male segment of society. Endorsing a Western approach of using the land was only one part 
of a twofold strategy to undermine traditional livelihood. By restricting the distribution of 
firearms and ammunition, the Indian Department was also making hunting - a socio-
economic comerstone - more difficult. A third suggestion in the 1837 Report involved a 
more holistic and complex approach. Schooling Indians presented the Department an 
opportunity powerful in potential to permanently alter indigenous custorns. The following 
statement highlights how the project had become urging in priority: 
"[ ... ] to prepare the younger Generation of Indians for another and more useful Mode of Life the 
Committee would eamestly press upon His Majesty's Govemment the Necessity of establishing and 
maintaining Schools among them in which the Rudiments of Education shall be taught, joined, if 
possible, with Instruction in Agriculture and sorne of the Handicrafts; and in order to promote these 
Objects it is submitted whether sorne of the Medals or Ornaments now given as Presents rnight not be 
reserved, and hereafter be converted into Prizes for Proficiency in Learning, or for Industry and 
Success in Agriculture [ ... ]lt may therefore be necessary to make it a Condition of their continuing to 
receive Presents either for themselves or their Farnilies, that they should send their Children to such 
Schools; and it may be hoped that the Clergy will !end their Aid in recommending and enforcing the 
Measure, as a necessary Part of any Plan for assirnilating the Indians as much and as soon as possible 
to the rest of the Inhabitants of the Province34." 
The fmal proposai, one with the gravest implications, intended to dismantle indigenous 
goveming structures: 
"The Committee are of opinion, that, as a necessary Part of any Change in the Management and in the 
Condition of the Indians, the existing Institutions and Authority of their Chiefs and Councils (standing 
on ancien! Usage alone) mu t either be greatly modified or gradually but totally extinguish d, without 
which the important Point cannot be attained of teaching the Indians to fee! and value persona! 
Independence both in Property and Conduct35 ." 
The conclusions of the Report were not ignored. In fact, the suggestions highlighted above 
were to become the key foundations for govemment initiatives in the near future, 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
34 
implemented at varying degrees depending on the reserve. The goal, as explicitly expressed 
through the Report, was to assimilate the Indians. 
3. Undermining Traditional Land Tenure: Precursory Measures 
The theme of Indigenous Land is one of the most common throughout the 
historiography of native studies. Almost the entirety of the North American territory that 
Indians had traditionally used for their daily subsistence was progressively occupied by white 
settlers either through simple occupation, armed conflict, or written agreement. The story is 
no different in the case of the Abenaki. Of primary interest for this segment is how, and from 
whom the Abenaki defended their land and hunting grounds so intimately tied to their 
livelihood. Since the earliest days of European incursions into the interior, the Abenaki have 
experienced displacement as much as any indigenous nation on the Eastern coast of North 
America. In retrospect, it is perhaps fortunate that they were offered sorne land in Canada 
sorne distance away from the aggressive English and later American colonists. There, in the 
village of St-Francis, the Abenaki exiles were left to live in relative peace until their land and 
livelihood was challenged at severa! angles. 
Originally, the land on the St-Francis River was meant to be a temporary Joan as long 
as the Abenaki practiced the Catholic faith. The Act passed at Three Ri vers in 1 70 1 was 
described as a 'Title of Concession'. On the 23rct of August 1700, Dame Marguerite Hutel, 
Widow of Sieur Jean Crevier, Seignor of St-Francis, claimed that the Abenaki residents were 
considered as having no la ting, or at !east no permanent title. "In those grants the Seignors 
have reserved the Right of reuni ting to either the Seignory Lands, abandoned by the In di ans, 
and of dispossessing the Abenaquois as soon as the Religious Mission should cease to reside 
upon the conceded Land36." The nature of the concession becomes clear; if the Abenaki 
should venture to renounce their Catholicism, their land on the shores of the St-Lawrence 
36 Return to an address of the Honourable the House of Commons, dated 11 June 1839 for 
copies or ex tracts of correspondence sin ce 1 st April 183 5, between the secretary of state for the 
colonies and the govemors of the British North American provinces, respecting the Indians in those 
provinces, Great Britain. Parliament, House of Commons. (Extracted from Early Canadiana 
Online) 
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would be rapidly 'put to use' - by European standards - by neighbouring whites through 
settlement, infrastructure, and agriculture. The delicate nature of the grant lmown as St-
Francis was again exposed at the turn of the twentieth century, wh en one of the descendants 
of Jean Crevier, Louis Crevier, petitioned the government to reclaim the land as the rightful 
owner through inheritance. Fortunately for the Abenakis, it was proven that the Catholic faith 
had never left the village37. 
Even prior to the creation of an official reserve for the Abenakis, a Committee of the 
Executive Council concluded that these Indians would not have complete control and 
freedom over the donated territory. Hoping to limit the expression of full territorial 
independence from the Canadian state, title to the lands in the township of Durham were 
subject to provisions applied by the Crown. The 'gift' was subject to the following condition: 
"[ ... ] the said lots of land so granted nor any nor either of these nor any part thereof shall in any way be 
capable ofbeing alienated, leased, transferred, conveyed or otherwise disposed ofby our said grantees 
or any or either of them to any persan or persans in any manner or way whatsoever and if at any ti me 
or times hereafter the said lots of land so granted or any or either of them or any part thereof shall 
cease to be occupied by them our said grantees or sorne or one of them, or their or sorne or one oftheir 
lawful heirs [ ... ] 38" 
In short, the Abenakis could not do anything with the land given to them by the Crown other 
than occupy and cultivate it. The Department ofindian Affairs' justification in the late 1830s 
was to protect the integrity of the rapidly shrinking parcels of land reserved for lndians; the 
inexperience of Indian bands in managing property would surely bring forth their own 
demise. This strategy was in concurrence with the prevalent attitude of the times: lndians 
simply did not know how to look after their own interests. However, Jess outspoken was the 
desire of the government for Indian bands to settle permanent! y in a number of small parcels 
ofland out of the way of non-Indian developments. For the Abenakis, as with the majority of 
other bands at the time, the ideal would be to have the Indians settle, remain, and forget any 
attempts to do business with their land - it was not only more simple for the government to 
37 Jos Laurent, La Presse, February 23'd 1901 in Sylvain Rivard, l os Laurent, Québec: 
Cornac, 2009, p. 72-93 . 
38 Extracts of the Letters Patent granting Lands in the Township of Durham to certain 
Abenaqui Indians of St Francis, June 10 1839, NAC, RG1-L3L, vol. 172, p. 83879-83882, 
microfilm C-2559, and NAC, RGlO, vol. 711, p. 164, July 1 1839, microfilm C-13410 . 
--- ---- - -------
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administer, but it was in accordance with another point raised by the Committee: insistence 
on Indian 'occupation' of the land. This provision meant that any semi-nomadic activity such 
as seasonal hunting, a cultural pillar for Algonquian people, would jeopardize the Crown's 
toleration of Indians living on its land without making use of it by civilized standards. This 
condition would have the immediate transformative power the Department desired - lndians 
could no longer roam the land to maintain their traditionallivelihood. Instead, they were tied 
down to the land as any other good European settler. For the Abenaki, this created a 
hybridized reserve society as the nineteenth century progressed. Most men kept to their 
hunting activities, but agriculture, as Euro-Canadian policy makers had wished, entered the 
socioeconornic mix. 
3.1. Hunting Territory: Competition, Demographies, Intervention 
Sources indicate that the pressure from non-indigenous people on traditional hunting 
land had become so severe in the early l91h century as to drive the Abenaki further north, 
across the St-Lawrence into woods richer in game. Settling in St-Francis might have lirnited 
their movements, but hunting remained an integral part of their livelihood. Consequently, 
their search for more plentiful hunting grounds led them to overlap in forests claimed by the 
Algonquians. In fact, as the following petition highlights, the trend had become such a 
problem that conflict amongst tribes were becoming increasingly hostile, triggered by the 
white population expanding onto aboriginal hunting grounds: 
"[ .. . ] the Algonquin Indians of Three Ri vers, complaining of Abenaquis Indians of St Francis and 
Becancour trespassing on their hunting grounds and soliciting His Excellency's interference. It is now 
a general complaint among severa! Indian Tribes that they interfere with one another and I consider it 
an important and difficult matter to settle among them. Indians on the south side of the St Lawrence 
especially, have now but a very small extent of hunting ground, as settlements are rapidly increasing & 
the land clearing, [?] therefore [?] these to hunt elsewhere against their laws and customs and to the 
great dissatisfaction Of others which is the occasion of threats of hostilities amongst them 39." 
This was no small matter, as both the Abenakis and Algonquians were still heavily 
depended on hunting in order to sustain their families. The issue eventually grew to 
39 Louis Juchereau Duchesnay to George Couper, February 23 1829, NAC, RG8, vol. 268, 
p. 85-86, microfilm C-2856. · 
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encompass the Hurons, who also desired to have their say in territorial reckonings at a 
Council held between the three nations and Superintendent Louis Juchereau Duchesnay40 . 
Communications between govemment agents seem to have been tangled, as the Abenakis 
made reference to a previous Council held earlier that summer where they had made separate 
agreements with Colonel Napier. According to the Abenakis, Napier had ·questioned them 
about which side of the St-Lawrence they wished to hunt on. As they negotiated for the North 
Shore, the Abenakis declared that they did not aspire to hold the territory exclusively, but to 
share it among all Indians41 . Eventually, it was decided that the Abenakis had to keep their 
hunting activities on the South Shore where human activity was rapidly making their 
customary modes of sustenance more difficult. 
3.2. Non-Indians using Odanak's land 
The survival of the community of St-Francis was shaky at times, but the real 
challenge was to maintain the integrity of its borders. Archivai documents have confirmed 
that aggressive neighbours exploited, rented, and surveyed land within what the Abenakis 
claimed as their supposedly protected territory. Even though the Canadian government was 
adamant about interdicting Indians the management of what was now supposed to be their 
own territory, the following will highlight many examples where land transactions were made 
amongst Indians, between Indians and non-Indians, and where non-Indians simply declared 
or used the land as theirs. In all likeliness, the original Abenakis that were granted the lands 
of St-Francis must have been misinformed, or perhaps the terms of the grant misunderstood, 
considering the number of cases of leasing to non-Indians. In reality, it is difficult to know if 
the Abenakis were explained in their entirety the laws and provisions concerning the use of 
this particular piece of land. Officially at !east, the documents read that "[ ... ] the said lots of 
Land so granted [ .. . ] nor any Part thereof, shall in anywise be capable _of being alienated, 
4° Council between Louis Juchereau Duchesnay, the Algonquins of Three-Rivers, the 
Hurons of Lorette and the Abénaquis, October 26 1829, NAC, RG8, vol. 268, p. 724-736, 
microfilm C-2857. 
4 1 Ibid. 
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leased, transferred, conveyed, or otherwise disposed of by our said Grantees [ .. . ] to any 
· Person or Persons in any Manner or Way whatsoever42 ." 
In one case, frrst the agent and then the tribe, wrote to Colonel Napier demanding the 
return of 880 acres seized by a character known as Mr. Wartele 43 . The request for 
governrnent intervention in the settling of the territorial tangle can be traced to 1833 - twenty 
years later, the tribe demands that their rights be finally observed, still pursuing the issue in 
order for the same tract of land be returned to them44• Whereas this example demonstrates a 
confrontation, there are documents from notaries indicating that the Abenakis made clear 
land agreements with people outside the reserve. On this particular occasion, Mr. Louis 
DeGozague, a prominent family within the mission of St-Francis, rented a segment of land 
with a bail length of ninety-nine years 45 . Even though Indians, as the Committee of the 
Executive Council of 1839 had agreed, were not supposed to administer Crown land, sorne 
Abenakis understood that they could makea living from renting increasingly scarce land to 
willing cultivators. This in tum could provide an Abenaki with sorne persona! revenue while 
freeing him to pursue ether economie activities such as hunting. 
To rent land posed a lesser threat to the survival of the St-Francis Abenaki than to 
sell it due to the permanency of these types of legal dealings. One can only speculate the 
reasons that incited sorne Abenakis to sell their land - unfortunately, rarely do notary 
documents reveal the motivations of individuals. Y et, a few hypotheses can be presented: the 
need of liquidity in the changing socioeconomic culture of the nineteenth century, the Jack of 
42 Return to an addre s of the Honourable the House of Commons, dated 11 June 1839 for 
copies or extracts of correspond en ce since 1 st April 1835, between the secretary of state for the 
colonies and the governors of the British North American provinces, respecting the Indians in th ose 
provinces, Great Britain. Parliarnent, House of Commons (Extracted f rom Early Canadiana 
Online) 
43 Louis Guill to Duncan C. Napier, March 14 1845, NAC, RGlO, vol. 600, p. 48012-
4801 3, microfilm C-13380. 
44 Petition from the Abénaquis of St-Fran"cis to James Bruce Elgin, September 2, 1853 
NAC, RG 10, vol. 610, p. 53369-53370, microfilm C-1 3385. 
45 Bail from Louis Degonzague and his wife to David Guilmet, October 19, 1840 NAC, 
RGlO, vol. 800B, pt. 2, p. 67-71 , microfilm C-13625 . 
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affection for the reserve, or a misunderstanding of individual ownership of property. In one 
scenario, an Abenaki under the name of Annica Pierre Michel Degonzague was reported 
selling many acres to a cultivator, apparently residing on the reserve46 . The buyer, Mr. Joseph 
Plamondon, was most likely a non-Indian with the funds necessary not only to huy the land, 
but to make it profitable through cultivation. The character that was Plamondon resurged 
little more than a year later, when he acquired more land from the St-Francis mission, this 
time through Robert Obomsawin and Louis Ponteneut7. These recorded transactions are not 
isolated events but represent the repeated encroachments on Abenaki land during the 
nineteenth century, thus reinforcing the popular argument that non-Indians often heavily 
manipulated indigenous people during property transactions. But suxprisingly, there have 
been sorne cases where transactions also took place between Abenakis of the same mission48 . 
The latter example of an Abenaki selling to another brings forth another dimension to the 
highly discussed phenomenon of land loss. Contrary .to the prevailing governmental opinion 
of the era, lndians could in fact consciously act according to what they believed was in their 
best interest- even when dealing with landed property. Without dismissing the pervasive 
intentions of land-hungry neighbours, agreements among Abenakis of the same mission, at 
the !east, serves as an example of transactions between equal parties, thus restoring sorne 
agency in Abenaki land transactions. 
3.3. Neighbouring Non-Indians and Abenaki Land 
The number and nature of the transactions outlined above misrepresents the situation 
of land ownership in the mid-nineteenth century. While government officiais were debating 
46 Sale by Sr François Laurent Monatacque to Sr Joseph Plamondon, December 31 , 1840, 
NAC, RGlO, vol. 800B , pt. 2, p. 63-65 , microfilm C-1 3625 . 
47 Sale by Srs Robert Obornsawin& his wife and Louis Ponteneuf& his wife to Sr Joseph 
Plamondon and Ratification & by Marie Magdeleine widow of Pierre Jean Feuille, February 13, 
1841, NAC, RGlO, vol. 800B, pt. 2, p. 102-108, microfùm C-13625. 
48 Sale of property lot by Annica Pierre Michel Degonzague to Jean Stamilaces, August 
22, 1940, NAC, RGI O, vol. 800B , pt. 2, p. 59-61, microfilm C-13625. 
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how to implement individual ownership of land49, in the 1840s, the communal system still 
remained at St-Francis. In reality, as the selling of reserve land became a mounting trend, the 
Abenaki community grew correspondingly anxious. The weight of the issue can be grasped 
by the discussion held during this village Council in 1842: 
"We Chiefs and we Warriors, in our Council have Settled or decided, the Land situated within our 
Village which is cornmon to us here in St Francis, that no one shall be allowed to use more land only 
so much that has been designed by us Chiefs and Warriors. The Land above mentioned on which our 
Village stands belong to the cornmunity. The proprietors shall permit anyone who belongs to the 
cornmunity, to build a house in such place whlch shall eligible to him that is so designed to situate 
houses. And the proprietors shall allow a person to use Land adjoining to his house containing thlrty 
feet in length and thirty in width for a garden or for sorne other purpose not to sell it. Any person 
building a stable, the roof of which shall be covered with boards and put it or erect it at a proper 
distance from his house. A Barn is not to be build withln the Village. Bet it further known that no one 
shall be allowed to enclose any of the ground or Land that belongs to the cornmunity which is situated 
withln the Village only the said ground or land adjoining to his house50." 
Abenaki leaders were clearly putting their foot clown and establishing flrrn rules for the 
community. Since the conversation was held in Council, the latter precisions and restrictions 
were directed primarily at band members within St-Francis. Problems undoubtedly persisted 
and were occasioned extemally - a decade later 'Chiefs and Warriors' were no longer 
addressing their own people, but pleading the govemment to intervene. Whereas the Council 
held in 1842 blamed individual Abenakis of treating communal land as individual plots, the 
problem encountered ten yearslater shifts responsibility mostly to non-Indian incursions. The 
uneasy feeling permeating St-Francis at this time can be observed through this petition and 
deserves to be quoted at length: 
"That your petitioners possessing an undivided tract of land, which has a/ways remained common 
property for the whole tribe, and not being legally authorized to name and appoint for themselves a 
trustee or trustees, to act and defend the tribe, are wholly incapable and helpless in law, not able to 
stop any unjust claimants or trespassers upon the Indian lands . Being weil known that none of your 
49 Through the 'Act for the gradua/ enfranchisement of Indians and the better 
management of Indian A.ffairs '1 the Canadian govemment officialised individual allotment of 
property on reserve lands. Richard H. Bartlett, The Historical Development of the Indian Act, 
Ottawa: Treaties and Historical Research Centre, P .R.E. Group, Indian and N orthern Affairs, 1978, 
p. 53: "Clause 17 of the 1869legislation dealt with the size of individual allotments on a per capita 
basis, and provided for issuance and inheritance of these patented lands. This statute sought to 
establish a bond between an Indian and his property similar to that between a 'white' settler and his 
homestead." 
50 Synopsis from a council by Ignace Portneuf and al. , July 27, 1842, NAC, RG10, vol. 
245, pt. 2, p. 145965-145967, microfilm C-12639. 
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petitioners nor any other has legal right to prosecute anyone who is encroaching upon the Indian 
property held in cornrnon, the encroaching characters, unjust claimants, and trespassers are dai/y 
encouraged to do with the Jndian property as they please [ . .. ] Y our petitioners have been instructed 
from timè to time by the officers of the lndian Department that none of the White have any right to buy 
the Jndian lands that were given or bought by the Government for the lndians, but in spite of this 
instruction many persons believe they may safely buy parts oflndian lands from any individual lndian 
apd in fact sorne have bought privily, that the Chiefs may not be able to oppose. That is worse of al! 
the missionary to the tribe has bought severa! pieces of Indian land from different individual lndians 
against the view of the Chiefs [ . . . ] Your petitioners see no way to secure their property except sorne 
persan be appointed as saon as possible to be commissioner of trustee who will act and defend the 
tribe. But as your petitioners have not been incorporated to enable them to name or appoint a trustee 
for themselves, they entirely depend on their Father the Governor for whom it is /awful to appoint a 
commissioner of lndian lands for Lower Canada, according to the act of 12 and 14 Vict C.42 51 " 
More than ever, the St-Francis Abenakis were feeling the pressure of the Euro-Canadian 
world weighting down on their cornmunity. A few key elements from the above extract shine 
light onto this reserves' mindset during these years leading up to the passing of the lndian Act 
of 1876. More so than any other previous recorded document, the segment quoted above 
reveals a sense of helplessness from the Abenaki. Written as a caU for help to the Canadian 
government, leaders at St-Francis felt overwhelmed when faced with the rising number of 
white incursions on their land, but perhaps more importantly, they fe1t they could no longer 
deal with these difficulties on their own. Against warriors, they could have fought back; but 
the assault came with a different face and tactics. Trapped between the Crown' s promise of 
land exclusive to the Abenaki Indians and rogue individuals trespassing or negotiating, the 
concepts found in Euro-Canadian law, the only defence socially acceptable for Indians living 
within the white-dominated Eastern North America, proved overwhelming for the majority of 
the St-Frai).cis inhabitants not yet versed in the legal workings of their overseers. Ironically, 
even govemment appointed agents were questioning the system, unsure about the nature of 
Indian property and how it functioned within the larger system of land ownership: "[ ... ] in 
dealing with the Subject 1 think it should be insisted upon that the Soil or land is the property 
of the St. Francis Band of Abenakis Indians as a people. And that it was not competent to 
individual Indians to dispose of any portion of the lands, which formed the property and 
5 1 Petition from the Abenakis chiefs ofSt-Francis to James Bruce Elgin, January 20, 1852 
(own emphasis), NAC, RGlO, vol. 609, p. 52891-52893, microfilm C-13384. 
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. inheritance of the Band52." Even in 1868, debate still transpired on what system of land 
tenure not only best suited the St-Francis band, but domiciled Indians in general. According 
to agent William Spragge, St-Francis was not yet ready for its territory, previously held in 
comrnon by the band, to be segmented and distributed for the Abenakis to acquire sorne form 
of individual ownership. 
4. Conclusion 
At the conclusion of the Seven Years' War, the British attempted to smoothly impose 
their own system without overtly upsetting the previous structures of European-Indian 
alliances established by the French. For Amerindians, until the Royal Proclamation of 1763, 
they were able to sustain a certain equilibrium and maintain a leve! of autonomy by including 
Europeans within an adaptive conceptual framework. After the Proclamation, Europeans, 
especially the British and soon followed by the Americans, chose to move away from the 
system of ritualized gift exchange that had largely enabled peaceful interactions. One of the 
main indigenous grievances was the incessant daims made on their territory. In fact, the 
clashes are testimony to Native American recognition of the potentialities of European 
territorial aggression. Unfortunately, too many factors combined to deny full sovereignty in 
the long-term for Native Americans 53 . 
Nevertheless, the traditional Council did speak up as injustices and discontentment 
mounted. It is perceptible through the sources that the first land squabbles were 
. comrnunicated to the government by the form of petitions written by government 
intermediaries responsible for certain specifie communities. While traditional councils 
between native tribes still occurred and decisions agreed upon through ceremony and 
wampum belts, the pertinence of customs such as these was fading rapidly at the dawn of the 
191h century; especially since most of the dealings increasingly occurred between the 
52 William Spragge's memorandum, July 28, 1868, NAC, RGlO, vol. 722, p. 441 , 
microfilm C-13412. 
53 This conclusive remark was made in Bruce G. Trigger, "Early Native North American 
Responses to European Contact: Romantic versus Rationalistic Interpretations", The Journal of 
American History, vol. 77, no 4, March 1991, p. 1195-1215. 
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Canadian state and Indian communities. As the mid-nineteenth century approached, certain 
Abenakis had the privilege of receiving sorne education and were becorning gradually versed 
in the workings of the government enough to enable them to address their grievances directly 
through written petitions - St-Francis was seizing control over its own fate . However as 
political impositions neared culmination with the Indian Act of 187 6, power and agency 
within St-Francis became increasingly exclusive. Whereas early century petitions were 
signed by the chiefs and other members of St-Francis, the voice of the community was ever 
more restricted to a small number of actors. Moreover, the nature of the grievances forwarded 
to the governrnent shifted from territorial oriented issues to those of an almost exclusively 
internal nature. This trend is of key significance when analysing the nature of St-Francis' 
P?litical dynarnics and is testimony to the success of the Canadian government's efforts at 
isolatingthe political influence of the Indian populations within its borders. 
,- ·· ---·---- -- - ---------------------
CHAPTERII 
ELABORATION AND EVOLUTION OF OFFICIAL 
GOVERNMENT POLICY 
The British colonies on the eastern coast of North America were, from the start, 
founded with the intention of creating permanent settlements. By contrast, the French were 
more tentative in their efforts at controlling territory other than their major trade centers. This 
can be attributed to the fact that the number of French colonists was nowhere near the British 
figures, but it can also be related to the primary purpose of each nation' s colonial project. In 
Rich~d White's seminal book The Middle Ground1, he dedicates many pages to the forging 
of Franco-Indian relationships during the years prior to the Seven Years ' War , when the 
French were the major influence in the ' pays d'en haut' . The main initiative argued by White 
was the establishment of smooth and profitable trade patterns for the French2. Nonetheless, 
tht? French never did successfully colonize3 this area of North America, even if it was their 
prime area of trade for many years. In a different vein, the Spanish and their infamous tales 
of conquest of the Aztec and Inca empires speak in another type of colonial language. 
Spanish conquistadores had a mandate to assert lordship over the people of the New World, 
to eventually proclaim it their right to use indigenous labour4 . In fact, ali major institutions of 
Spanish colonial rule aimed at establishing public and private authority over the native 
1 Richard White, The Middle Ground: lndians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes 
Region, 1650-1815, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
2 Native people h~wever, would view this relationship totally differently. 
3 The notion of 'colonizatibn' will be used strictly to mean the formation of permanent 
settlements, inhabited, controlled and adrninistered by the European power in question. Though I 
am aware that more abstract conceptions of the term 'colonization' exist in reference to economie, 
social, political, mental, and cultural facets, they have a tendency to give coloni.zation a different 
meaning than the one I will be forwarding in this research. 
4 Patricia Seed, "Taking Possession and Reading Texts: Establishing the Authority of , 
Overseas Empires;" The William and Mary Quarter/y, Third Series, vol. 49, no 2, 1992, p. 207. 
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population5. In this context, the British colonial strategy seems even more evident. While the 
French (and to a similar extent, the Portuguese) focused on tracte and commerce, the Spanish 
hoped to control the 'conquered' , the English prioritized their colonial effort to consolidate 
control over lancf : "the English empire in the New World was established by habitation, 
'taking possession' 7." 
Grand imperial visions for North America had begun prior to hegemonie rule after 
the Seven Years ' War. The visit of the ' Four lndian Kings' to Britain, an almost theatrical 
visit of four Iroquoian leaders, brought the potentialities of empire closer to home for the 
British public. In fact, the much publicized convoy helped propelled a "new visual and verbal 
language of empire and thus helped to establish the images, conceptions and ideals that 
would make imperialis~ a powerful component of British public life8." Furthermore, on a 
practical level , the visit of the 'kings ' solidified Anglo-lroquois relations 9 , and more 
precisely, it pushed the British ministry to "revive and enlarge its efforts to effect a 
significant territorial conquest in North America10." 
Whereas land remained central to the British colonial initiative prior to the Seven 
Years' War, securing military advantage over competing imperial powers took precedent. 
After this major conflict was concluded, relationships changed between Britain and the 
indigenous peoples of North America. Previously, Britain had understood and participated in 
the keystone ritual of gift exchange with the native peoples - a practice mastered by the 
French. In fact, New France had achieved a leve! of mutual cooperation and a web of 
renewable alliances with many Indian communities unparalleled by North American 
colonists.The British however, were usually reluctant to fully embark in the process. As 
5 Ibid., p. 205 . 
6 Ibid., p. 195-196 and 207. 
7 Ibid., p. 209. 
8 Eric Hinderaker, "The 'Four Indian Kings' and the Imaginative Construction of the First 
British Empire", The William and Mary Quarter/y, Third Series, vol. 53 , no 3, 1996, p 488. 
9 The alliance eventually proved key in the power struggle for Eastern North America. 
10 Eric Hinderaker, loc.cit., p. 519. 
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discussed in chapter !, Britain could not contain its colonists from spilling over onto Indian 
land, creating severe pressure along overlapping Indian and _White frontiers. Territorial 
dispossession along the frontier of the thirteen colonies and soon, British North America, was 
a piecemeal phenomenon and remained largely unofficial. In other words, the legal apparatus 
that provided the arguments and authority that could effectively extinguish native title 11 was 
still in its infancy; only later did it occur on a systematic basis. But already, Britain was 
starting to fashion "very deliberate plans for the reallocation of land and the reordering of 
social relations 12." Once they had secured much ofNorthem America after the Seven Years ' 
War, people like Amherst wasted no time trying to change the nature of Anglo-Indian 
interactions 13. 
1. Fashioning the British Imperial Vision 
The fleeting potential of equality in future relations, something experienced by both 
French and British with their respective indigenous allies, was erased indefmitely after the 
Seven Years ' War. But a culture of domination does not occur overnight. Therefore, it is 
necessary to take a step back prior to the War, when Britain started to forward notions of a 
hierarchy of civilizations. 
John Locke, along with other European thinkers such as James Tyrell and Adam 
Ferguson helped formulate an ' ideology' of Empire 14 that provided a crucial condition to 
11 1 am not stating that native title has been extinguished. The English fostered their own 
distinctive brand of colonial logic, followed by a legal framework established to provide the basis 
for the extinguishment of native title. It is within this context that the English legitirnized the 
disappearance of native title to land. 
12 Cole Harris, "How Did Colonialism Dispossess? Comments from an Edge of Empire", 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 94, no 1, 2004,p. 172. 
13 Ibid., p. 256-257. 
14 Ibid. , p. 4. 
47 
British territorial claims overseas: legitimacy to their authority 15 . Many authors have 
discussed the essence of the British message. For instance, Buc han explained that one of the 
first steps to legitimize dispossession was to represent indigenous people with concepts such 
as 'uncivilized' or 'savage' 16. Waswo emphasized how the dichotomy was made clear: what 
constituted 'civilization' was agriculture and cities, while savagery was linked to nomadism, 
hunting, and gathering17. Using such terms and concepts, Locke and other thinkers framed 
indigenous governments as existing but deficient: 
"Locke' s strategy was to demonstrate by means of the account of the 'state of nature ', how political 
authority could be legitimately based upon the unforced consent of the members of civil society to 
renounce their own right of self-defence to an impartial, public authority [ ... ] The implication that 
Locke did not hesitate to draw, was that the immediate possessions necessary for self-preservation 
could be accumulated, and thus 'great Tracts ofGround' in America were unclaimed, and so 'silllie in 
common'
18
." 
British thinkers, attempting to highlight the difference in property relations, 
emphasized the fact that hidian chiefs did not own or possess land according to how British 
culture and law conceptualized it. Again, in the British logic, dispossession was legitimized 
because indigenous possession was not recognized 19 , and thus left the door open for 
colonizers to make good use of it. Locke made clear that 'rights' were intimately tied with 
one'~ relationship with the land, a 'deficiency' clearly visible in most indigenous societies: 
"God's gift of land to Adam and his posterity acquired value only as labour was expended on 
it, and that labour justified individual property rights20." Gaining the authority to govern New 
15 K.atherine A. Hermes, "Jurisdiction in the Colonial Northeast: Algonquian, English and 
French Govemance", The American Journal of Legal History, vol. 43, no 1, 1999, p. 59. 
16 Bruce Buchan, "The empire of political thought: civilization, savagery and perceptions of 
Indigenous govemment", History of the Human Sciences, vol. 18, no 1, 2005, p .3. 
17 Richard Waswo, "The Formation of Natural Law to Justify Çolonialism, 1539-1689", 
New Literary History, vol. 27, no 4, 1996, p. 743. 
18 Bruce Buchan, loc. cit., p. 4-5. 
19 Ibid. ,p. 8. 
2° Cole Harris, loc. cit. , p. 171. 
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World territory, the road to dominion was paved21 . Without a 'civilized' (Western) system of 
. property ownership, the recognition of indigenous government was limited22. Therefore, the 
preferred strategy by the British was not to wage wars of conquests but to negotiate through 
their legal conceptions of land acquisition. Often taking the form of treaties, Britain held the 
hope that they would eventually subject and control native North Americans with their own 
form of government23. 
Seminal thinker in British intellectual history Adam Smith placed 'savages' at the 
bottom of his theory of human historical development, while conveniently placing Western 
nations at the top: "The law of property formed the institutional keystone of this theory of 
history. Property rights were the exemplary indicators of a stage of civilization, 
corresponding in fairly neat ways to the sequential modes of social order and productive 
activity24." Similarly, Adam Ferguson, an important advocate of replacing native indigenous 
property tenures, maintained that 'property ownership' provided "the ground upon which 'a 
permanent and palpable subordination is laid' 25 ." Further articulating a rationale for 
subjection, he argued that to attain a higher leve! of 'civility' -a goal claimed to be pursued 
and used as a recurrent justification of colonization that portrayed imperial missions as 
philanthropie self-sacrifice26 - the 'civilized' person had to attain a specifie set of ' qualities' 
that "could only exist in a society in which private property provided the necessary 
foundation for 'relations of patron client, of servant and master', and for the legal and 
political arrangements th at protected them 27 " . The notion of European powers acting as 
Indian protectors was not a novel idea. In New France, Indian allies of the French bad 
21 Katherine A. Hermes, loc. cit ., p. 59. 
22 Bruce Buchan, loc. cit ., p. 9. 
23 Ibid. , p. 9. 
24 Jedediah Purdy, "Property and Empire: The Law of Imperialism m Johnson v. 
M'lntosh", George Washington Law Review, vol. 75, 2007, p. 356. 
25 Bruce Buchan, loc. cit., p.ll. 
26 Jedediah Purdy, loc. cit ., p. 336. 
27 Bruce Buchan, loc. cit., p. 11. 
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developed the custom of naming the governor Onontio. The relationship that developed 
between Onontio and his Indian allies can be loosely equated to one of a 'father ' over his 
'children' 28 . The father bad many responsibilities to his children and constantly had to show 
them favour. Children also bad to express their gratitude, but could also break the bonds if 
the relationship was not sustained appropriately. Out of this particular situation emerged a 
highly ritualistic form of ceremony celebrating and renewing alliances and more precisely, 
this father and children connection. But the notions of Adam Ferguson and other British 
thinkers orchestrated a different type of relationship in the colonies. In fact, Britain was 
moving increasingly closer in establishing themselves as the masters of the uncivilized 
savages without having to recourse to ritual or any type of negotiated relationship. 
For historian Michel Morin, these premises proved devastating in the long term: 
Britain was adamant that they could claim land that 'appeared to be empty', and even when 
inhabitants were tied to the territory, they could provide compensation which in their minds, 
legitimized further dispossession29. Sorne indigenous communities attempted to protect their 
title by making a case for ' possession' through oral history; only recently have they been able 
to make significant progress through those means. The following example however, although 
outside North America, shows the shattering potential of colonial ideology in its full 
application. Australian aboriginals were arguably the native population, within British 
influence, that the ideological arguments highlighted above affected the most. Due in large 
part to their nomadic lifestyle, James Cook concluded that: "Indigenous people possessed no 
extensive property, and hence no govemment, organized society or polity, and therefore had 
only tenuous claim to rights in land or political sovereigntl0".This description encompassed 
the precise vocabulary that could justify dispossession, and that would seal the Australian 
aboriginals' fate with the British colonizers. Combined with the concept of terra nullius-
empty land - the indigenous people of Australia were not only confronted with aggressive 
28 In fact, the French and the Indians actually developed a discourse that suggested a 
hybrid form offanùly bondage that included elements ofboth cultures. 
29 Michel Morin, "La dimension juridique des relations entre Samuel de Champlain et les 
Autochtones de la Nouvelle-France", Revue juridique Thémis, vol. 38, no 2, 2004, p. 406. 
30 Bruce Buchan, loc. cit. , p. 13. 
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settlers, but would have to resist an even more devastating set of ideologies. Whereas 
Amerindians experienced a very different historical course, the following example illustrated 
the full effect of colonial seeds of thought. 
Whereas legal justification for any action in the colonies was important for the 
govemment, so was public opinion. The visit of the 'Four Kings ' in 1710, a delegation of 
Iroquois leaders, was intended to introduce the New World to the British public31. With an 
almost theatrical procession, the newly labelled 'kings ' of the Iroquois helped create a sense 
of awe and wonder, further supporting the British in their undertakings. As their grasp on 
America was tightening, the British public was transrnitted a message quite different than the 
one during the 'Four Kings' visit. In 1762, a Cherokee embassy was sent to London. But far 
from being another celebrated visit of fantastical other-than-human characters, this embassy 
represented a shift in attitude; it had the effect of strengthening British conceptions of cultural 
and technological superiority 32 . The trend was continued when Britain organized public 
displays of indigenous ' material culture' , helping "to promote formation of an increasingly 
imperial, globally minded society that shared assumptions about alien cultures and their 
relationships with Britain" and "reinforced the drive to categorize human societies into [a] 
hierarchy of human civilization" 33 . In fact, Europeans expressed their superiority by 
consistently placing themselves on a higher level of his torical development34 . For indigenous 
people encompassed within the sphere of the British Empire, the course of progress was 
therefore rendered inevitable. Convinced of their superiority, Britain be gan strengthening the 
foundations for the institutionalization of their colonial venture. Justifying territorial 
31 Eric Hinderaker, loc. cit ., p. 488. 
32 Troy Bickham, "A Conviction of the Reality of Things: Material Culture, North 
American Indians and EII\pire in Eighteenth-Century Britain", Eighteenth-Century Studies, vol. 39, 
no 1, 2005, p. 36-37. 
33 Ib id., p. 31. 
34 Bruce Buchan, loc. cit., p. 4. 
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acquisitions "on the grounds that the indigenous inhabitants did not make proper use of the 
land35", they positioned themselves as the righteous managers of Amerindian territory. 
1.1. Formulation of Property Law 
The British did not need Locke, Smith, Ferguson and company to more solidly 
entrench property rights in the public mindset - property was a cultural bastion of Britain 
before the imperial age. What these intellectuals did however, was to highlight the 
deficiencies of the indigenous system of property ownership and govemance, which set the 
stage for the formulation of legal means that could justify dispossession, and in tum be 
included in the colonial administrative apparatus. However, the formation of law in the 
colonies was far from being a weil established and refined process. In fact, Comaroff stated 
that it was in most cases a patchwork exercise of trial and error, invention and reinvention36. 
One has to a void overdetermined or monolithic conceptions of colonialism, when it was more 
often an "undertermined, chaotic business, less a matter of the sure hand of oppression [ ... ] 
than of the disarticulated, semicoherent, inefficient strivings for modes of rule that might 
work in unfamiliar, intermittently hostile places37 ." Still, it was through the creation of legal 
instruments that "economie rights , entitlements, and proprieties were established, that labour 
relations and contracts were promulgated and policed, [and] that material interests were 
negotiated38." Therefore the establishment of law in the colonies, although often inconsistent, 
ruled the relationship between Amerindian and British coloniser. Even prior to the Seven 
Years' War, a body . of international law had to be formed by European powers due to the 
intense rivalry over territory and trading privileges in the New World, and the recurring· 
question of the respective ' rights' of colonizer and colonized39. Alberico Gentili was one of 
35 Ibid. , p. 4. 
36 John L. Comaroff, "Colonialism, Culture, and the Law: A Foreword", Law & Social 
Inquiry, vol. 26, no 2, 2001 , p. 310-311. 
37 Ibid. , p. 311. 
38 Ibid., p. 309. 
39 Richard Waswo, loc. cit., p. 744. 
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the major jurists to lay down the foundations for key principles of law used in the colonies. 
One of the ' rights' he helped establish was the right to commerce as part of the Law of 
Nature - any restriction of this by indigenous people was proof of unsociability and even 
hostility, and could become a just cause for war40 . 
Perhaps the best example that can be used to highlight the most pressing issues that 
were being considered in the application of colonial law was Chief Justice Marshall's opinion 
in Johnson v. M'Intosh (1823); a case analysed by Jedediah Purdy. One of the main points of 
debate involved the types of rnechanisms available for a colonial power to extinguish native 
title: 
"The customary principle that the European sovereign has the exclusive power to alienate native lands 
and thus extinguish native property claims - the principle on which Marshall relies - is nested with a 
higher-order principle distinguishing between (at !east) two types of sovereigns: full sovereigns whose 
rights and powers are commensurate with those of European governments, and imperfect sovereigns 
wh ose prerogatives sometimes must yield to the incursions of full sovereigns41 ." 
The passage above treats with the forever problematic concept of sovereignty. Constantly 
recurring in discussions about indigenous rights, the recognition of sovereignty has become 
central in the legal . arena. The British had, by custom of their law, the authority to 
'extinguish' native title if a particular tract of land was not under the dominion of a sovereign 
whose 'rights and powers' did not match the same leve! ascribed to a Western sovereign. 
Interestingly, the British discriminated between different sovereigns in other colonies. For 
example, they referred to ln dia as having 'princes or governments', therefore suggesting that 
they perceived the latter as edging closer to full sovereignty than the inhabitants of North 
America42 Clearly, the defining factor deciding rank within the Western hierarchical system 
of sovereignty rested on property relations with the land. 
40 Ibid., p: 746-747. 
41 Jedediah Purdy, loc. cit., p. 341. 
42 Ibid., p. 344. 
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The law usually had moral underpinnings. If a certain Indian 'nation ' 43 was 
considered ' uncivilized', as most if not all ofthem were, it was that nation's duty, and in its 
own best interest, to willingly place itself un der European tutelage. lt was also the duty of the 
European ' s goveming body to survey, control, and guide the said irresponsible and infantile 
native rulers: 
"[ .. . ] the independence of indigenous 'semi-sovereign' rulers was constrained by imperial and moral 
considerations. Their sovereignty was acknowledged, but they were placed under an obligation to obey 
the paramount [civilized] power in matters of strategie and military concem. They were also 
vulnerable to interventions by the imperial power in order to check the dangers of rnisgovemment that, 
in European eyes, arose from placing political authority in the hands ofuncivilized rulers44 ." 
The logic behind ranking claims to sovereignty could have led to an all-encompassing form 
of domination; but how the British conceptualized partial sovereignty is of particular 
importance. While the British intended to dominate indigenous territory thl-ough higher 
claims of jurisdiction, they did not assert all possible jurisdiction. As Katherine A Hermes 
has argued, the "sharing of certain kinds of jurisdiction [ among British and American Indian] 
was the legal reflection of the fragmentation and reformation of sovereignty in a colonial 
domain that characterized New England for two centuries45." In a sirnilar vein, Benton has 
argued that after struggling to come up with a coherent policy, Britain opted for a policy of 
toleration and "not to forma firm rule46." Even the status of British subjects was open-ended 
and uncertain 47 . Finally, Britain accepted and included the ambiguous and ill-defined 
characteristic of its people and terri tories in the formation of policy: 
"Indeterminacy was being articulated as policy - even as a core principal of an imperial law based on 
divisible sovereignty [ ... ] Even if the govemrnent wished for further precision, sorne legal advisers 
43 The use of the term ' Indian nation ' is misleading in the colonial context. Europeans did 
not recognize Indian as capable of being sovereign, independent entities. Still, the irony remains 
that the term was used, which demonstrating that they recognized a lirnited degree of independence 
and potentiality for govemment. 
44 Edward Keene, in Jedediah Purdy, loc. cit. , p. 351. 
45 Katherine A. Hermes, loc. cit., p. 5:4. 
46 Lauren Benton, A Search For Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empire, 
1400-1900, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 257. 
47 Ibid., p. 257. 
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argued, the ' infinite variety ' of arrangements in native states, with different portions of sovereignty 
perrnitted to various natives rules, made this goal impossible48 . " 
Recognizing the logistical and ideological impossibilities of ' total rule' over native people, 
Britain opted for flexibility. Constantly hoping to extend their influence, their strategy also 
made room for Jess aggressive tactics, but as the nineteenth century unravelled, it was clear 
that they did not intend to recognize Indian sovereignty. Negotiation, cooperation and 
peaceful coexistence could be maintained, but Britain would forever consider Amerindians 
falling within their territories as a subdued population under the yoke oftheir rule. 
As Jarri.es Kent expressed a few years later after the Marshall decision, the 'peculiar 
character' and 'habits' of indigenous peoples forcibly defined their relationship with their 
goveming colonial agents: Indian ' nations' were dependent and had to submit to European 
pupilage 49 . Similarly, Lord Cornwallis and John Stuart Mill's approach was that an 
indigenous sovereign was autonomous only if competent in promoting and securing progress: 
"So far as it is incapable of serving that role, it may be supplanted by another sovereign to 
vindicate the values of civilization50. " Kent's argument summarized the situation: "Indian 
title was subordinate to the absolute, ultimate title of the government of the European 
colonists51." Discussion about the possibility of sovereignty for Amerindian communities was 
henceforth closed. 
Eventually, colonialists came to separate the unproductive Indians from lands that 
could be made profitable by 'civilized people'. Across the British Empire, indigenous 
landscapes were perceived as nothing but wildemess until they were made of use by 
'civilized' Europeans - these territories thus became real estate that could be possessed, 
ruled, improved, and protected52 . Arnerican Indians would eventually be ignored, ejected or 
chased from their land, opening access for land-hungry Europeans. As Harris concluded: 
48 Ibid. , p. 25 8. 
49 James Kent, in Jedediah Purdy, loc. cit., p. 352. 
50 Jedediah Purdy, loc. cit.,p. 367. 
51 James Kent, in Jedediah Purdy, loc. cit. , p. 352. 
52 John L. Comaroff, loc. cit., p. 310-311 and 309. 
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"The momentum to dispossess derived primarily from the interest of capital in profit and of 
settlers in getting somewhat ahead in the world, both interests, in a new colony where land 
was the principal resource, dependent on the acquisition of land 53." As increasing numbers of 
people immigrated to America to start anew, setting large tracts of land aside for 
Amerindians became a losing cause. 
While tutelage became the initial strategy in dealing with the less civilized Indian 
'nations', colonial administrators usually framed their lordship as a process and mission for 
the ' public good' 54. The stated goal was to move societies along the civilization tirneline 
conceptualized by the historical experience of Europe. Based on the theory of property 
formulated by Adam Smith, imperfect sovereigns were identified as "incompetent to secure 
the interests of their populations" and civilized sovereigns were directed to take over "the 
sovereign powers oftheir imperfect counterparts55. " .Under the colonial structuré, "the power 
of elites wedded to old regimes" would be broken and "reordering incentives [ would] indu ce 
dynamic efficiency 56 ." In most cases however, this proposed practice would remain 
theoretical. One of the conclusions in the Marshall case was that the two opposing systems of 
property regimes, social orders, and systems of government were incommensurable: "The 
two systems could not be maintained concurrently; to follow one was to overrun and negate 
the other57." There existed therefore only two options: to leave and abandon the cause of 
humanitarian 'progress' , or expropriate an inhabited continent at the cost of extinguishing the 
way of life of indigenous people58• Consequently, to transform Amerindian societies, the 
British aimed primarily at eradicating tribal political organization and gradually (as shall be 
discussed in the following chapters) replace it with a system based on their own - one 
intimately tied to property tenure. 
53 Cole Harris, loc. cit., p. 179. 
54 Jedediah Purdy, loc. cit., p. 362. 
55 Ibid., p. 356 . 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid, p. 366. 
58 Ibid., p. 368. 
56 
2. Indian Allies Become Obsolete- Establishment of the "Civilization Policy" 
As a renewed war with the United States became Jess likely, the British became 
increasingly Jess interested in maintaining good relations with Amerindians. No longer 
important as military and commercial allies, natives were increasingly considered obstacles 
by the large influx of settlers hoping to acquire and ' develop ' unused Indian land59. Seven 
treaties were signed in Upper Canada between the years 1815 and 1827; but the British were 
decidedly Jess compliant to native terms. h). fact, from the latter treaties the Crown had 
secured access for non-natives to almost aU remaining arable land in Southern Ontario60 
Prior to the W ar of 1812, the British Indian Department, a bran ch of the military, had 
emphasized trade, diplomacy and alliance. By the year 1830, the British Indian Department 
ceased as a branch of the military, becoming instead the Department of Indian Affairs, a 
branch of the public service 6 1 . Transformations within these bodies of government 
represented important changes in the attitude of the British toward the native populations. In 
fact Major General H.C. Darling, the rnilitary secretary to the governor general, began the 
shift by founding the outlines of what was to become the driving force behind the formulation 
of British legislation for. the coming decades: the civilization polic/ 2. As their new official 
procedure, it served as a guide for the future of Euramerican-Amerindian relations. On an 
economie leve!, "financial pressures coincided with these trends as the colonial office in 
London questioned the expense of continuing to maintain Indian nations as rnilitary allies63." 
The focus therefore was placed on transforming natives into econornically self-sufficient 
entities. For the British, this translated into anchoring mobile cornmunities onto one 
determined piece of land where they could sustain themselves through farming. Combined 
59 R.J. Miller, Compact, contract, covenant: Aboriginal treaty-maki.ng in Canada. 
Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 2009, p. 94 and 102. 
60 Ibid., p. 95 and 102. 
6 1 Richard H. Bartlett, The lndian Act of Canada, Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, 
1988, p.3. 
62 Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, Vol. 1, pt.2, Chapter 9, p. 3. Indian Policy: 
Protection, Civilization and Assimilation. 
63 Ibid. 
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with the influence of religion and Christian schooling, Amerindians, officiais hoped, would 
absorb Western virtues and abandon their savagery. Even before the formation of the 
Department of Indian affairs, kin-forming rituals such as gift giving and pipe smoking were 
discouraged by a new wave of.appointed civil administrators. Instead, indigenous lifestyles 
not only had to be abolished, but had to mirror the 'civilized' virtues of Europe. 
Not all agreed that the ' civilization policy' was the best solution in dealing with 
Indians. Sir Francis Bond Head, lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, was in fact directly 
opposed to the policy established by Darling, the former claiming that it was impossible for 
Indians to become civilized. Over time, Bond Head argued, Amerindians would simply peter 
out as a race, doomed by the coming tide of ' civilized' settlers64. In the meantime, his 
solution was to completely separate them from contact with non-natives. Convincing Indian 
bands that they may pursue their traditional lifestyle unhampered, large tracts of land were 
thus abandoned for the infamous relocation on Manitoulin Island in 183665 . 
Soon enough, it was clear that both policies were dysfunctional. In the case of Bond 
Head's, many communities had grown aware of that by agreeing to relocation, they were 
permanently surrendering rights to their traditional lands, while also being diametrically 
opposed to humanitarian movements concerned with the general decline of Indian well-
being66. In the case of Darling, it quickly became clear that the vast majority of communities 
were not convinced that a Western lifestyle would be beneficiai for them, especially if it 
meant they had to abandon their traditional way of life. More irnportantly, both these policies 
reflected the underlying attitude of British colonial society: without help from the non-
natives, Amerindians had the inherent incapacity to adapt to the new economie and social 
clirnate of British North America67 . The govemment thus moved forward to create a more 
official program that would progressively force selected Indian communities to adopt key 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ever though the experiment failed, the British never reversed Head's di spos~ession. R.J . 
Miller, loc.cit., p. 109. 
66 Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, Vol. 1, pt.2, Chapter 9, p. 3. Indian Policy: 
Protection, Civilization and Assimilation. 
67 Ibid. 
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Western concepts that would Iead to their 'civilization'. Legislation for the next two decades 
would henceforth focus on implementing this project. 
3. 19th Century Policy Making: Deciding the Future Fa te of lndians in Canada 
As the British colonial government was debating future policies with the Amerindian 
populations, Abenakis were feeling the pressure of the non-native presence. Forced to wander 
on hunting grounds traditionally exploited by other nations in search of more plentiful game, 
the Abenaki found their movements constrained by both natives and non-natives: 
"[ ... ) the Algonquin Indians of Three Rivers, complaining of Abenaquis Indians of St Francis and 
Becancour trespassing on their hunting grounds and soliciting His Excellency's interference [ ... ) 
Indians on the south side of the St Lawrence especially, have now but very small extents of hunting 
ground, as settlements are rapidly increasing & the land cle.aring68 ." 
While Euramerican activity was mounting along the Canadas' waterways, the 
govemment had no choice but to address issues directly related to Indian land - neglect 
would undoubtedly bring serious confrontation between native and settler, and between 
Indian bands themselves competing for the same hunting territory. The following segment of 
a correspondence between British officiais highlights the confusion and Jack of a systematic 
policy regarding the management of lands exploited by Amerindians. Interestingly, it also 
mentions how the Abenaki used wampum belts not only with other nations, but also in an 
attempt to legitimize their claims with the goverrunent. Unfortunately for them, they would 
soon have to resort to other means of authenticating their traditionallands: 
"They pretend to hold this exclusive right as expressed by certain branches of beeds, which they still 
have in their possession, the only manner of proof Indians have amongst themselves. They further 
assure that the Abenaquis have similar collars ofbeeds, which explain that they shall hunt on the South 
side only of the St Lawrence and the Algonquins on the North. Mr le Chevalier de Niverville in his 
report, says ' that for 25 or 30 years passed the Algonquins have hired Abenaquis and since that, they 
(the Abenaquis) have taken knowledge of the courses of rivers & ca. They have continued on the 
North Shore, but that previously he never saw an Abenaquis hunt on that si de.' It seems to me that he 
is perfectly of opinion that it is an encroachment on the part of the Abenaquis, I conclude by declaring 
that I think it a difficult and dangerous point to be settled by Government, as the Proclamation of 1763 
68 Louis Juchereau Duchesnay to George Couper, Febraury 23, 1829, NAC, RG8, vol. 
268, p. 85-86, microfilm C-2856. 
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gives generally to the Indians the liberty of hunting on the ungranted or Crown Lands and. But there 
appears no Document for any distribution of hunting lands exclusively to any Tribe69 ." 
As problems of this sort would increase in momentum in the mid-nineteenth century and 
beyond, the government was pressured to deal with these issues. As the following paragraphs 
will demonstrate, commissions of inquiry were sanctioned, bills passed, and treaties signed. 
However, as Maclnnes has wryly observed, "[W]hile these treaties or agreements were 
bilateral in form, actually, of course, the Indians had to accept the conditions offered or Jose 
their interest in the lands anywa/0." 
3.1. Commissions of Inquiry and the Passing of Legislation: Pillars of the Indian Act 
In an attempt to resolve the ever-growing ' lndian Problem', Governor General 
Charles Bagot commissioned a report in 1844. The commission rightly concluded "that there 
were serious problems with squatters on Indian lands, poor records of land sales or leases, 
and inept official administration of band funds ; that the wildlife necessary for subsistence 
was fast disappearing from settled areas; and that Indians generally were suffering from 
alcohol abuse 71 ." Furthermore, not ail lndians communities were under treaty 72 , their 
livelihood th us left vulnerable to the score of settlers, speculators, and others hoping to gain 
profit from land and resources. 
The government, along with the Department of Indian Affairs, decided wiser to 
assume the full responsibility of transforrning the back:ward Indian instead of leaving 
Arnerindians deal as they could with the non-native onslaught. Emerging from a hybrid 
Darling Bond-Head consensus, officiais paternalistically decided that the best route to 
achieve the 'civilization policy' smoothly was to protect the Amerindians until they were 
69 Ibid. 
70 L.R.T. Maclnnes, "History oflndian Administration in Canada", The Canadian Journal 
of Economies and Political Science, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1946, p. 387. 
71 Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, Vol. 1, pt.2, Chapter 9, p. 3.Indian Policy: 
Protection, Civilization and Assimilation. 
72 Practically none in the province of Quebec. 
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'ready' for their Western metamorphosis. This would provide Indian bands shelter from 
aggression towards their lands, while providing a protected environment where the 
government could assume full control in the graduai implementation of its civilization plan. 
The 1850 statutes clearly exemplify this attitude, bearing the titles An Act for the better 
protection of the Lands and Property of Indians in Lower Canada and An Act for the 
protection of Indians in Upper Canada from imposition, and the property occupied or 
enjoyed by them from trespass and injury73 . The Bagot Commission tackled the issue of 
Indian land by suggesting that Indians should adopt individual ownership of land, and be 
encouraged to se li it among themselves in an attempt to promo te a spirit of free enterprise 74. 
Eventually, the aim was for the government to rid itself of the reserve system. The allocation 
of persona! property was a step forward in reaching this goal - perhaps equally telling was 
the fact that it was in full compliance to a British set of values. 
By the mid-nineteenth century, it had become clear that the government was bent on 
proactive means at achieving assimilation and integration of native populations. Perhaps the 
most explicit . official manifestation of this goal came in 1857, through the Civilization of 
Indian Tribes Act. "The act provided for the enfranchisement of lndians of 'sufficiently 
advanced' education or of Indians who were 'capable of managing their own affairs'. 
Enfranchisement removed the disabilities and distinctions imposed upon the Indian people 
for their protection75 ." The hope that Indians would shed their status as protected peoples 
through enfranchisement was not novel, but was now forwarded through legislation. The Act 
enabled Indians to assume the full duties and responsibilities of citizenship if they met 
specifie criteria; the applicant had to be male, over 21 years of age, free of debt, literate in 
English of French, having received basic education, and of good moral character76. Not only 
73 Richard H. Bartlett, op. cit., p. 3. 
74 Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, Vol. 1, pt.2, Chapter 9, p. 3. Indian Policy: 
Protection, Civilization and Assimilation. 
75 Richard H. Bartlett, op. cit., p. 4. 
76 Colin C. Buchanan, " 'They Have Presumptuously Opposed the Department in Many 
Ways': Kainai Leadership and Indian Act Band Government, 1880-1920", Ph.D. Thesis: University of 
Calgary, 2008, p. 56, and Bruce Buchan, loc. cit., p. 1-22. 
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did the criteria exclude the large majority of indigenous people, but even if sorne did meet the 
criteria and decided to apply, the final decision was stillleft at the discretion of the Governor-
General; only then could the Indian finally be allowed renounce his Aboriginal identity and 
embark on his new !ife as a colonial citizen. The clock had now been set for the Indian as a 
distinct member of society, treated different! y than non-natives. The government hoped that 
once the Indian was rid of his special status, he would finally be able to fully integrate into 
Euro-Canadian society. Reverend J. Marault, a missionary living am.ong the Abenakis at St-
Francis, shared many of the government's opinion of the period: 
"I think the best mode. to ens ure and promote the interest of the Abenaki , in every respect, would be to 
grant them a lot of good land, or else to give to each a certain sum of money, to relieve them from the 
supervision of the Government, to leave them completely free, and to grant them ali the privileges of 
citizenship. To keep the lndians in their present state is in fact to exile them from ali contact with the 
world [ ... ] daily intercourse with enlightened and educated men is essential to the improvement of the 
Indians 77 ." 
The Civilization of Indian Tribes Act also departed from the principle that the Crown 
protected reserve land: "Reserve lands could be reduced in size gradually without a public 
and formai surrender to which the band as a whole had to agree. No longer would reserve 
land be controlled exclusively by tribal governments 78 ." Put simply, the law enacted that 
what has been termed through history as ' Indian Land ' , no longer legally existed- this vital 
provision was carried through at the passing of the Indian Act in 187 6. As one legal expert 
noted: 
"[ ... ] nothing in common law or the Indian Act gives a band the necessary capacity to hold land. 
Section 18(1) of the Indian Act expressly rests title to reserve lands in the Crown. Due to this legal 
capacity the band could not acquire title to the land even with their long and obvious possessions and 
despite the fact that no other party contested their title 79 .'? · 
77 Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada, Report of the Special 
Commissioners, Appointed on the 8th of September 1856, to Investigate Indian Affairs in Canada, 
Appendix no. 21, p. 1. 
78 Royal Commjssion on Aboriginal People, Vol. 1, pt.2, Chapter 9, p. 5. The Graduai 
Civilization Act: Assimilating Civilized Indians. 
79 Alan Robert Reiter, An examination of the evolving concept of band councils, their 
authorities and responsibilities, and their statutory instruments of power, Edmonton: First Nations 
Resource Council, 1990, p. 1.3. 
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In fact, the Act held the provision that if the Govemor-General approved an Indian's 
application for enfranchisement, the latter would have to serve a three year probation period, 
which would eventually lead him to receive title of twenty hectares of reserve land and a 
portion of band funds 80 . Qui te blatantly, the policy airned to dismantle the community 
orientated reserve system, simultaneously undermining traditional customs and culture. 
However certain that the lure of civilization and citizenship would erode backward Indian 
culture, the Indian Department was soon offered a dose of reality. The Civilization of Indian 
Tribes Act, its policies and its strategy, proved a complete failure . As testament, only one 
individual had been successfully enfranchised; a fact that clearly illustrates indigenous 
attitudes toward the government's new policies and an overall rejection of Euro-Canadian 
culture largely comprising of agriculture, sedentary lifestyle, and education - especially if the 
package demanded a repudiation oftraditional lndian customs. 
Whereas intellectuals, politicians, and administrators predicted the eventual 
disappearance of ~e backward, traditional Indian, the latter Acts hoped to provide a 
framework that would accelerate the process. The idea was that through enfranchisement, 
aboriginal individuals would free themselves from the yoke of the traditional Indian 
community its communal relationships, in orcier to make way for autonomous individuals 
full y able to integrate colonial society peacefulll 1. In short, the Civilization of Indian Tribes 
Act explicitly declared traditional Indian values and practices as inferior and were thus 
undermined through legislation. Through these laws, colonial society offered respect and 
recognition as a member of society only to Indians who "renounced their communities, 
cultures and languages82 ." All these efforts by the lndian Department can be summarized by 
one guiding principle: indigenous people were incapable of comprehending their own 
interests and to act positively on their own behalf. The passing of Acts culrninating in the 
8
° Colin C. Buchanan, loc. cit., p. 57 . 
81 Ibid., p. S6. 
82 Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, Vol. 1, pt.2, Chapter 9, p. 5. The Gradua! 
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Indian Act of 1876 would render Amerindians as nothing Jess but "wards of the state to be 
civilized and assimilated by the Euro-Canadian polity83." 
Whereas the strategy to deal with the 'lndian Problem' had been agreed upon, the 
ever present concem of the government of cutting administrative costs pushed another 
important inquiry: the Pennefather Commission of 1858. lts mandate sought to secure the 
best means at achieving civilization and the best mode of managing Indian property without 
impeding non-native settlement84. The commissioners reported that the slow progress of the 
civilization policy could be solely attributed to the savage habits of the natives themselves. 
Lack of progress convinced officiais that full assimilation of the lndian population was the 
only possible solution. Amongst its many proposais, individual land holding, ;egrouping 
smaller bands in one larger reserve, consolidating Indian legislation, dismantling tribal 
structures and the eventual disbandment of the lndian Department once the civilization po licy 
accomplished, were ali concerns that were to be addressed in the near future. 
3.2. Creation of Band Government 
By the mid-nineteenth century, most Indian communities in Lower Canada had been 
segmented in what the Indian Department had created as its two basic units of administration. 
One geographical, the other demographie, the new official vocabulary of 'reserves' and 
' bands' embodied the shift in relationship between the Canadian government and what had 
previously been known as ' Indian nations'. Unlike what this simple term suggests, Indian 
bands :were not what certain anthropologists have defmed as "small , mobile kin-based groups 
with informai leadership and flexible social organization85," but rather were a creation of the 
Indian Act as "a group or body of Indians having in common lands or funds he id .in trust for 
83 Colin C. Buchanan, loc. cit., p. 52. 
84 Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, Vol. 1, pt.2, Chapter 9, p. 4. Civilization to 
Assimilation: Indian Policy Formulated. 
85 Leacock & Lee, in Colin C. Buchanan, loc. cil., p. 5. 
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them by the govemment86." During this very politically active period, a number of acts were 
passed in response to the emerging non-Indian settlements in the North-West Territories and 
the treaties subsequent! y signed with the neighbouring Indians. Combined with the frustration 
and failure of the Civilization of Indian Tribes Act, the govemment felt it had to gain more 
direCt control on Indian bands. Efforts were thus focused on dismantling indigenous political 
organizations and replacing them with an institutional structure dictated by the Indian 
Department87. Giving rise to the Act for the gradua! enfranchisement of Indians and the 
better management of Indian Affairs (1869), the Indian Department directly undermined 
traditional native governments: 
"The primary means of doing this was through the power of the superintendent general of Indian 
affairs to force bands to adopta municipal-style 'responsible ' govemment in place of what the deputy 
superintendent general of Indian affair.s referred to as their ' irresponsible ' traditional governance 
systems. This new system required that ali chiefs and councillors be elected for three-year terms, with 
election terms and conditions to be determined by the superintendent general as he saw fit. Elected 
chiefs could be deposed by federal authorities for ' dishonesty, intemperance or immorality ' . None of 
the terms was defi.ned, and the application ofthese criteria for dismissal was left to the discretion of the 
Indian affairs officiais upon receiving a report from the local Indian agent88 ." 
In the case of the Abenaki as in most cases, chiefs had traditionally been named for 
life. To impose an election on three-year cycles severed age-old traditions of chieftaincy. In 
most instances, aboriginal chiefs never held the power of coercion, but acted rather as a 
provider and trusted guide for the community. Under this new system, govemment officiais 
expected the elected chiefs to exert authority over band members, enforce departmental 
regulations, and maintain peace89. Thus un der Act for the gradua! enfranchisement of Indians 
and the better management of Indian Affairs, chiefs who had been in power under the 
traditional system, now had to present their candidature for election. If the majority of the 
band elected another candidate, it would thus become illegal for traditional chieftains to 
86 L R.T . Maclnnes, loc. cit., p. 3S9. 
87 Colin C. Buchanan, loc. cit. , p. 59. 
88 Royal Commission on Aborigin.al People, Vol. 1, pt.2, Chapter 9, p. 7. The Graduai 
Enfranchisement Act: Responsible Band Government. · 
89 Colin C. Buchanan, loc. cit., p. 11 8. 
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exercise their influence 90 . William Spragge, the sub-Superintendent of Indian Affairs, 
explained that this new legal disposition would place intelligent and educated men in charge 
of representing the band and the establishment of a 'responsible' system9 1. Quite blatantly, 
Spragge' s message totally dismissed traditional lndian political culture. The new law was 
meant to bring about candidates that Înost close! y conformed to the Euro-Canadian ideal of a 
civilized man. Undoubtedly, the elective system served to undermine traditional elements 
within bands that could potentially become disruptive to the Indian Department's assimilation 
policy92 . Perhaps of greater significance, this change in the structure of government marked a 
trans fer of power from the bands of the band, to the Indian Department and the government. 
In fact, the Govemor General was sole! y responsible for deciding to which bands to introduce 
(impose) the elective system and this without their consent93 . Usually, the Govemor chose 
bands who he felt were ' ready' for this upgrade toward the attainment of full civilization. For 
the first time in history, Indian nations were severed from independent decision making in 
their own communities. Chiefs were no longer the primary authorities, but rather had to seek 
the approval of the superintendent general through the allocated agent or risk being deposed. 
Elections themselves were also under the supervision and authority from forces outside the 
band. Whereas this transformation of indigenous govemmental organization did not alter 
Indian cultures ovemight, it did officially position Indian bands und er direct tutelage of Euro-
Canadian society. In other words, bands !ost most ofwhat enabled them to be self-goveming 
entities, except for matters of lesser importance. Whereas the Royal Proclamation of 1763 
referred to Amerindians as nations or at !east as independent tribes, the Act f or the gradua! 
enfranchisement of Indians and the better management of Indian Affa irs had "[ .. . ] simply no 
provision for traditional groupings going beyond the individual band leve!. In fact, the goal of 
90 Even though the majority of voters might vote for other candidates than traditional 
chiefs, in many cases chiefs continued to exercise sorne manner of influence within their 
communities. 
91 William Spragge, in Wayne Daugherty and Dennis Madill, Jndian government under 
Jndian act legislation, 1868-1951, Ottawa: s.n. 1980, p. 1. 
92 Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, Vol. 1, pt.2, Chapter 9, p. 8.The Indian Act 
and Indians: Children of the State. 
93 Wayne Daugherty & Dennis Madill, op. cit., p.2 . 
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the measures was specifically to undermine nation-leve! governance systems and the broader 
nation-leve! associations oflndians more generally94." 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the driving ideal of the British colonials was 
their title to land and its toi!. Since the 1830s, the belief amongst non-Indians was that 
indigenous people would never ' improve' their land until a system of individual allotment 
was established. The Act for the gradua! enfranchisement of Indians and the better 
management of Indian Affairs (1869) included land provisions that instituted individual 
property holding by encouraging reserve residents to obtain 'location tickets': "Clause 17 of 
the 1869 legislation dealt with the size of individual allotments on a per capita basis, and 
provided for issuance and inheritance of these patented lands. This statu te sought to establish 
a bond between an lndian and his property sirnilar to that between a 'white' settler and his 
homestead 95 ." The Act was also infarnously known for conferring the responsibility of 
allocation of reserve land and control of reserve revenues to none other but the 
Superintendent General. Clauses 25 through 28 determined conditions under which Indians 
could surrender reserve lands - a clear indication that the law engineered the disappearance 
of supposedly protected lndian territory: "no reserve or portion of a reserve shall be sold, 
alienated or leased until it has been released or surrendered to the Crown for the purposes of 
this Act 96 ." The government however, did leave an opportunity, albeit lirnited, for 
Amerindians to gain full control over a piece of land - but on! y if they renounced communal 
ownership and becarne private owners. An Indian man that qualified for franchise would 
receive a ticket for land. After a three year probation period, he would receive entitlement; 
after six years of 'good behaviour' he would !ose his status as an ' lndian' and become an 
ordinary subject of the Crown, equal to ali other citizens under Canadian law97 . Indigenous 
94 Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, Vol. ! , pt.2, Chapter 9, p. 7. The Graduai 
Enfranchisement Act: Responsible Band Govemment. 
95 Richard H. Bartlett, The Historical Development of the Indian Act, Ottawa: Treaties and 
Historical Research Centre, P.R.E. Group, Indian and Northem Affairs, 1978, p. 53 . 
96 Richard H. Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, op. cit., p. 4, & The Historical 
Development of the Indian Act, op. cit., p. 63. 
97 Richard H. Bartlett, The Historica!Development of the Indian Act, op. cit., p. 68. 
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people th us lost with this one piece of legislation, authority over their land, "th us breaking the 
direct tie between Indian nations and the British Crown upon which the nation-to-nation 
relationship rested 98 ." This was one of many contradictory examples in lndian policy 
formation during this time; the Canadian govemment, having used rhetoric of 'protecting' the 
Indian for decades, was providing a framework for the establishment of indigenous 
comrnunities based on a European-style independent unit of administration and political 
organization. The paradox was that ultimate discretionary power of band administration and 
the elective system remained in the hands of the Superintendant, and to a lesser extent, the 
agent responsible for the comrnunity in question. 
When the Indii:m Act of 1876 served to consolidate ali previous legislation, ali piliars 
of policy had previously been solidly entrenched and would hardly change until 1951 when 
the Canadian government revised the Indian Act. In short, with assimilation as its main 
policy, the Indian Department, through the Indian Act of 1876, transferred discretionary 
powers to non-Indians. The Indian Act altered and largely controlled key aspects of 
indigenous life: political culture, land management, land holding patterns, band revenue and 
resources. 
3. Conclusion 
Western imperial powers were rapid in categorizing North American indigenous 
cultures. Being 'kingdoms of custom', to Europeans they obviously lacked a co1pus juris , a 
modem sense of right-bearing selfhood, and most seriously of ali, anything approaching 
'civilized' judicial procedures 99 . Perceived as people of 'deficiency', it was easier for 
colonial powers to establish, legitirnize, and then exert their authority. Different European 
colonies had their own ways of establishing links with the indigenous populations: the French 
98 Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, Vol. 1, pt.2, Chapter 9, p. 5. The Graduai 
Enfranchisement Act: Assimilating Civilized Indians. 
99 John L. Comaroff, loc. cit. , p. 306. 
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preferred territorial alliances rather than complete dominion100.; the English were flexible in 
the sense that they accepted a certain amount of indigenous sovereignty while maintaining 
their superior status. In the end though, both powers hoped to establish their authority. For 
the English, the preferred manner was to concentrate on securing Land. To accomplish such a 
feat in the New World, colonial officiais thus improvised, invented new procedures, and cited 
familiar rationales that would allow them to legitimate their actions into a recognizable 
imperial legal framework 101 . 
The formative role of British colonial law was instrumental in establishing new 
parameters ofwhat it meant to be 'Indian'. McHugh brilliantly expressed the phenomenon: 
"It was by means of legal instruments that 'economie rights, entitlements, and proprieties were 
established, that labour relations and contracts were promulgated and policed, that material interests 
were negotiated [ .. . ) It was 'under legal provisions that the 'nature' of colonial subjects was 
constructed, ethnicized, and racialized, their relations to other human beings, to the earth, and to their 
own cultural practices delineated 102 ." 
Additionally, whereas the creation of Band Councils were products of legal impositions, the 
analysis below hopes to avoid overdetermined or monolithic conceptions of colonialism; in 
the words of Comaroff, the process was more often an "undertermined, chaotic business, less 
a matter of the sure hand of oppression [ ... ] than of the disarticulated, semicoherent, 
inefficient strivings for modes of rule that might work in unfamiliar, intermittently hostile 
places 103 ." Even the application of 'law', through ali Ùs theoretical finality, was far from 
· being a well established and refined process. In most cases, it was a patchwork exercise of 
trial and error, invention and reinvention 104 . In short, legislation, applied in the right 
circumstances, had the potential to shape the future of the Amerindian socio-cultural 
universe. However, law was not the sole factor that must be taken into consideration when 
10° Katherine A. Hermes, loc. cit. , p. 59. 
101 Lauren Benton, op. cit., p. 211. 
102 P .G. McHugh, Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law: A History of Sovereignty, 
Statusand Self-Determination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 6. 
103 Ibid., p. 311. 
104 John L. Comaroff, loc. cit., p. 310-3 11. 
69 
analysing interactions between state actors and indigenous people. As shall be demonstrated 
in the following chapters, native comrnunities were far from willing to surrender their agency 
to the state. 
CHAPTERIII 
THE BAND COUNCIL GOVERNMENT TAKES ROOT 
\ 
The nineteenth century, more than any other period, brought forth permanent changes 
in severa! spheres of Abenaki livelihood and domiciled Indians in general. As experiments, 
modifications, and arrangements with the indigenous people and the Department of Indian 
Affairs multiplied, they became part of a new political, cultural and legal direction the 
government hoped to establish through official legislation. Rarely was the application of new 
laws systematic and thorough. Instead, the first years irnplementing these laws were a period 
of transition and adaptàtion for both the government and the band. The Indian Agent often 
had to judge issues through a case by case scenario, rendering him both arbitrator and 
interpreter of the law. For the Abenakis of St-Francis, the string of new laws provoked a 
reaction in the fabric of their indigenous mode of governance. They were not alone; the 
pressure on reserve communities to conform to Euro-Canadian values, particularly in the 
valley of the St-Lawrence, influenced land-holding, cultural, and socio-economic patterns, in 
addition to the imposition of a new system of elected chieftaincy. In the instance of the 
Mohawk, clashes occurred between different factions, in part brought about by the imposition 
of Band Councils 1. For the Abenakis, the Band Council was met with approbation early. In 
both cases, the indigenous communities of the St-Lawrence did not let Canadian law override 
their community; their different solutions at handling legal impositions demonstrate a 
· willingness to carry on as a society different from White-Canada. Still, sorne traditional 
1 ad rs w re conc ntrating th ir fforts at warning their people from the detrimental potential 
of the corning waves of Canadian legislation by demanding firmer unity and solidarity to 
defend ancestral rights and custom. In reality, indigenous politics, in tenns of traditional 
avenues of leadership, legitimacy of rule, and negotiation power with the state were fading 
rapidly. As soon as the Act for the graduai enji-anchisement of Indians and the better 
1 Cori Simpson, "In the Eyes of the State: Indian Agents, Agency and Resistance in 
Kahnawake", M.A. Thesis: Trent University, 2008 . 
-- --- ------------
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management of Indian Affairs of 1869 was passed, the majority of the St-Francis Abenaki 
had wholly adopted the Band Council as their administrative system of govemance. The 
following hopes to shed light on Band Council govemment in St-Francis: the band's first 
experience in elected govemment, the elective process, the leve! of participation, and the 
nature of the band' s administration. 
1. First Elections in St-Francis 
Abenakis were already using legal avenues, inspired by elements of Euro-Canadian 
political culture, to rectify situations in their community. For example, even prior to the Act 
for the gradua/ enfranchisement of Indians and the better management of Indian Affairs 
(1869), the Council met to write clown a set of rules that were intended to serve as guideline 
for the community and its future leaders: 
"[ ... ]the subscribing majority of the Tribe in regular council [ .. . ) enacts and adopts few following fixed 
ru! es for the commencement of having written regulations drawn from the most important parts of our 
council, leaving other remaining parts for future acts that other fixed rules may hereafter be enacted 
and adopted to be written when the Tribe shall see fit to have such additional rules2." 
These rules were obviously based on pre-existing Abenaki political structures, but have 
nonetheless a Western-democratie and bureaucratie ess_ence to them: leaders now wished to 
have ali future ' acts' ofSt-Francis written clown; only the majority ofvoters could decide on 
which rules to adopt; Councils would take place with the most people possible in attendance; 
more than half of th ose at Co un cil had to sign the notarial agreement for the ' act' to pass as 
St-Francis law; complaints should be directed to a higher governing power such as the Indian 
Department; and only the majority had the rights to name and appoint a new chief or chiefs as 
well as to revoke or remove them from office3. The Abenakis were now cl oser to the Euro-
Canadian method of governance more than any other point in their history. Ironically, the 
Abenaki of St-Francis were re-organising and restructuring their local politics with many 
2 Constitution of a St-Francis Abenaki Band Council, February 9, 1856, NAC, RGlO, vol. 
603, p. 49410-49417, microfilm C-13381. ' 
3 Ibid. 
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European-inspired elements without direct government intervention. The Indian 
Department's aspiration of transforming indigenous communities into self-serving and 
'responsible' municipalities was, in the case of St-Francis, occurring even prior to the passing 
of the Act of1869. Y et, as the Indian Act confirmed, grassroots initiatives such as the one 
observed at St-Francis was simply not enough: the Department of Indian Affairs wanted the 
total overhaul of the traditional poli ti cal system- and they wanted it systematic for ali bands. 
Policy makers decided that it was better to eradicate old foundations , even if these proved 
flexible and adaptable, in order to build anew. 
Indian Agent H. Vassal was responsible for orchestrating the first elements of change 
in the political culture of St-Francis. Through his correspondences with the government, it 
can be understood that he attempted to respond to Abenaki demands while smoothening the 
transfer of power from the traditional to elected chiefs. As early as 1870, only a year after 
the passing of the Act for the gradua! enfranchisement of Indians, the Abenakis of St-Francis 
were transrnitting requests to the Canadian government to proceed with the elections of 
Chiefs and sub-chiefs4. Fully aware of the Act's provisions, the petition's signatories were 
demanding the permission to elect two head chiefs and four sub-chiefs. The Act of 1869. 
clear1y stated that the proportion was of "one Chief and two Second Chiefs for every two 
hundred people5." According to the last census, the band's population was composed ofthree 
hundred and thirty souls6. To create their Council St-Francis was demanding the maximum 
number of people allowed, with an additional chief; a provision unwritten in the Act. The 
absence of chiefs must have been a recurring and disabling affair, since the Abenakis justified 
their desire for additional chiefs in order that "sorne may be found when occasion requires 7." 
Therefore, at the dawn of the 1870s, the Abenakis were not only aware of the Act of 1869 but 
4 Henri Vassal to E. A. Meredith, June 28, 1875, NAC, MG24-Bl, vol. 26, p. 16, 
microfilm C-15774. 
5 An Act for the graduai enfranchisement of Indians, the better management of Indian 
affairs, and to extend the provisions of the Act 31st Victoria, Chapter 42, p. 10 
6 Saint Francois Agency - Request by the Abenakis of Saint Francois that they be 
permitted to elect two chiefs and four subchiefs and that Jean Harmess and Salomon Benedict be 
confirmed as chiefs for !ife, NAC, RGJO, vol. 1949, p. 9, microfilm C-11119. 
7 Ibid., p. 7. 
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communicated how they wanted to apply the new laws in accordance to the particular 
politicàl requirements of the ir comniurùty. Considering the novelty of this irùtiative - and the 
numero us failures of past ones - the fact that they agreed to cooperate and transfer to a state 
sanctioned democratie system marks success for the colorùal government. 
Still, the Department of lndian Affairs was not convinced that the community was 
'ready' to elect its chiefs. Contrary to sorne other disruptive bands, the Department had 
received positive feedback from H. Vassal about the traditionally chosen chiefs Hanness and 
Benedict. The Indian Agent was essentially trying to reach a compromise between Abenaki 
·requests and governmental initiatives, thinking wiser for the systems of traditional chiefs and 
the newly band-elected chiefs to co-exist. As a frrst venture in the realm of democracy, he 
thought more pruden.t for the sake of the community to keep the two traditional chiefs, who 
had fulfilled their duties competently, in power at !east in the short term. Jean Hanness and 
Salomon Benedict could thus keep their titles as chiefs and it would remain so for !ife, no 
matter the result of the frrst upcoming election scheduled for January 18768. The maintenance 
of the dual chieftaincy of Hanness and Benedict, in combination with the upcoming election 
of a Council of two chiefs and councillors would therefore function as a hybrid system of 
traditional and state-sanctioned politics. H. Vassal ' s initiative is in fact testimony to the many 
ad hoc decisions of this transitional period in the reserves of Eastern Canada. Approved by 
the Deputy Mirùster of the Interior, for the next cycle of elections, St-Francis could 
potentially have four Chiefs 9 . On the 22nd of January 1876, six candidates presented 
themselves for election. Samuel Wàtso and Lazare Wawanolet triumphed over their 
opponents by large margins and were thus confirmed as the first chiefs of a new political 
order10, whereas Hanness and Benedict were still officially recognized as ' !ife chiefs ' by the 
8 Saint Francois Agency - Request by the Abenakis of Saint Francois that they be 
perrnitted to elect two chiefs and four subchiefs and that Jean Harmess and Salomon Benedict be 
confirmed as chiefs for !ife, NAC, RG10, vol. 1949, p. 2, microfilm C-1111 9. 
9 E.A. Meredith to Henry Vassal, December 4, 1875, NAC, MG24-B1, vol. 26, p. 18-19, 
microfilm C-15774. 
10 Saint Francois Agency - R~quest by the Abenakis of Saint Francois that they be 
perrnitted to elect two chiefs and four subchiefs and that Jean Harmess and Salomon Benedict be 
confirmed as chiefs for !ife, NAC, RG10, vol. 1949, p. 32, microfilm C-11119. 
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Department. Unfortwiately, the emotional investment of Abenaki voters into the new 
electoral system would soon undermine the authority that used to be associated with 
traditional chieftaincy. 
2. Procedure 
From 1876 onwards, after the recommendations of Indian Agent H. Vassal, the 
triennial electoral system was implanted in St-Francis as dictated by the terms of the Act for 
the graduai enfranchisement of Indians of 1869 and the newly amended Indian Act of 1876. 
As one electoral cycle came to a close, the Abenakis would remind the Department of Indian 
Affairs directly, or through their agent, that the time had come to elect new leaders. Prior to 
the proceedings, the band would gather in the town hall and hold a Council to suggest 
candidates, their nomination in tum seconded by band members. At the moment of election 
therefore, the names of the candidates up for election· were on one single 'master ballot' . 
Since the majority of the band was unlettered, it was impossible for all voters to cast their 
vote by their o'wn hand. In any case, the Indian Agent appointed at the time, controlled the 
ballot, taking down the votes down one by one. In 1890, due to previous problems related to 
the public casting of votes, it was decided that "Only one person at a time may be allowed in 
the voting hall where the candidates and two witnesses along with the agent will be there at 
all time the preserve peace and order 11 ." The Agent also had the responsibility to hold a 
voting list usually handed down by his predecessor. At almost every voting year, the Agent 
would have to revise the list. This strenuous exercise often had to take into account a series of 
correspondences, letters, petitions and complaints contesting the eligibility of different people 
that had either been allowed to vote last election, or were planning to vote on the upcoming 
one. According to the massive amount of documents relating to this issue; the Agent had to 
filter through previous voting lists, censuses, paying lists, proofs of residence, baptism and 
marriage certificates - in short any document that could prove official membership to the 
band of St-Francis and thus the legality of a vote.· 
11 Saint Francois Agency - Correspondence regarding the desire of the Abenakis Indians 
of Pierreville to hold an election for their chiefs, NAC, RG 10, vol. 2496, p. 59, microfilm C-11230. 
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Depending on the voting year, the number of votes perrnitted per person would 
fluctua te. The latter variation was in direct connec ti on to the interpretation of the laws by the 
Agent. The Indian Act of 1876 states that the selection "may be in the proportion of one head 
chief and two second chiefs or councillors for every two hundred Indians 12." The Act leaves 
its reader to interpret whether another candidate could be elected after the initial two hundred 
people. Is the maximum number of members making up the Council attained with one chief 
and two councillors? After the initial two hundred, do an additional hundred add the 
possibility of another member to be elected? Oris it after another two hundred? Moreover, if 
there was to be additional Council members, the Act still did not precise if they were to be 
chiefs or councillors. In other instances, the Agent would go forward and either follow the 
procedure of his predecessor, make his own interpretation, or agree to those of the band itself. 
All these questions were brought up at sorne point during the fust decades of the electoral 
system. Moreover, according to the records, since 1870s the population of St-Francis 
remained stable over three hundred people; the Abenakis could thus elect one head chief and 
two councillors, as the Act states verbatim. However, depending on sorne censuses and more 
precisely when they were taken, the population could fluctuate significantly varying on the 
month of the year and did not always limit its survey to band members only, but rather on the 
people residing on the reserve. Excluding the elections of 1876 when two chiefs were elected, 
only one head chief was to be elected henceforth. The question however never completely 
escaped debate; as late as the elections 13 of 1890 was the band demanding a second head 
chief, along with four councillors 14 . The number of councillors however was a more 
troublesome matter. As the Agent clarified the issue prior to the election, the new chief and 
councillors could finally be decided. 
12 An Act to am.end and consolidate the laws respecting lndians, Chap 18, sec 62. 
13 There were two elections in the 1890s, one in June May and the ether in January, the 
first being annulled on pretext that the date chosen was not conform to procedure: Saint Francois 
Agency - Correspondence re garding the desire of the Abenakis In di ans of Pierreville to hold an 
election for their chiefs, NAC, RGIO, vo.I. 2496, p. 53, microfilm C-11230. 
14 Saint Francois Agency - Correspondence regarding the desire of the Abenakis Indians 
of Pierreville to hold an election for their chiefs, NAC, RGl 0, vol. 2496, p. 45-46, microfilm C-
11230. 
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The election itself usually occurred in winter, in most cases during the month of 
January or earl y February, when most voters- Abenak:i males of twenty one years of age and 
officially recognized band members 15 - were residing in St-Francis and not away on the hunt. 
The date of the election would thus be announced and the who le procedure occurred over one 
day, presided and watched over by the lndian Agent. Each person eligible to vote would 
approach the Agent to verbally transmit his chosen candidates in front of two witnesses in the 
voting hall 16. Electors would have a maximum of votes at any given year, even though every 
election severa! people chose to withhold using ali their votes 17 - a totally legal political 
decision. At the end of the 'election day', the Agent compiled the votes: the candidate with 
the highest number of votes would be come chief; the ones with the second and third highest 
numbers would be narned councillors, and so on until the established quantity of councillors 
had been reached to complete the new Council. 
3. Participation 
From H. Vassal's communications with the Department of Indian Affairs, the first 
elections at St-Francis can be considered a success. Once the date of election was announced, 
there was no protest. More tellingly however, was that six candidates presented themselves 
and a significant amount of voting actually occurred, enough for H. Vassal to state that 
15 An Act ta amend and consolidate the laws respecting !ndians, Chap 18, sec 61 . 
16 In one exceptional case, the·electors were asked to enter and give their vote only one at 
the time in the voting hall in arder to preserve the peace. Saint Francois Agency- Correspondence 
regarding the desire of the Abenakis Indians of Pierreville to hold an election for their chiefs, NAC, 
RG1 0, vol. 2496, p. 59, microfilm C-11230. 
17Saint Francois Agency- Correspondence regarding the desire of the Abenakis Indians of 
Pierreville to hold an election for their chiefs, NAC, RG10, vol. 2496, microfilm C-11230, 
Elections of May 1890: p. 33-36; November 1890: p. 63-65; January 1894: p. 150-151;Saint 
Francois Agency (Pierreville) - Elections of chiefs and councillors of the Abenakis Indians of 
St.Francois: February 1903, NAC, RGlO, vol. 3060, p. 170-173, microfilm reel C-11318, January 
1909: p. 323-325; January 1906: 121-124. 
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"Samuel Watso & Lazare Wawanonlet both had a large majority over their opponents18. " The 
following anal y sis of a survey of six election ballots ranging from 18 90 to 1909 confmns th at 
the population of St-Francis invested poli ti cal interest into the new system. 
The elections of May 1890, November 1890, January 1894, February 1903, January 
1906, and January 1909, had 58 , 68, 72, 84, 79, and 74 voters respectively. May 1890 is the 
oddone out, having the lowest participation numbers by far . The legality of this election was 
debated back and forth between the band, the agent, and the government, to finally be 
annulled on the basis that the date had been changed without proper notice 19. Considering the 
drop in voters partaking, there was sorne obvious confusion in St-Francis. Only a few months 
later, in November 1890, the election was attempted once again. Whereas there was ten more 
voters than in May, fall was not the ideal season to hold the election. As the rest of the survey 
demonstrates, late January to early February were the months most likely to gather the 
highest number of people to the voting poil. 
The annual reports of the Department of Indian Affairs present the total number of 
residents in St-Francis at any given time, but the census of 1890 offers the earliest statistics of 
greater detail. The total count for residents during that year was 379; 197 males and 182 
females ali ages confounded20 . Only males of21 years and older were allowed to vote, which 
represented a total number of 92 eligible voters for St-Francis. In the elections ofNovember 
1890, 68 band members turned up to vote, totalizing an impressive participation leve! of 
74%. Considering the largely unchanging population leve! of around 330 sou1s 21 , the 
18 Saint Francois Agency - Request by the Abenakis of Saint Francois that they be 
permitted to elect two chiefs and four subchiefs and that Jean Harmess and Salomon Benedict be 
confirmed as chiefs for !ife, NAC, RG1 0, vol. 1949, p. 32, nùcrofilm reel C-11119. 
19 Saint Francois Agency - Correspondence regarding the desire of the Abenakis Indians 
of Pierreville to hold an election for their chiefs, NAC, RGl 0, vol. 2496, p. 43-53, microfi lm reel C-
11230. 
20 Annual Reports of the Department of 1ndian Affairs fo r the yea~ ended 3 1'1 December, 
1890. 
21 Annual Reports of the Department of Indian Affairs for the year ended 31'1 December 
1881, 1887, 1890, 1891; and Saint Francois Agency (Pierreville) - Elections of chiefs and 
councillors of the Abenakis of St.Francois Indians, NAC, RG l 0, vol. 3060, p. 215, nùcrofilm reel 
C-11 318. 
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scenarioand an average of 75 voters22 for the sample elections mentioned above, the same 
scenario can be extended to ali the sample electoral cycles mentioned above. In fact, when 
combining ail categories of the total averages of population, eligible voters, and those who 
actually voted, the participation leve! slightly increases to 81-82%; an impressive 
participation leve! even to modem day standards. Taking into account that sorne males could 
have been away on the hunt or elsewhere (for their basket weaving business for example), 
and that sorne may have been too sick or elderly to participate, the number of Abenakis that 
could and did vote could potentially have hovered around a staggering 85%. 
4. Administrating the Band: The Elected Council Self-Determined? 
The Band Council was designed to offer indigenous communities a municipal-type of 
administration, similar to those of their white neighbours. The proviso, as described in 
previous chapters, was that ali Council decisions, no matter how trivial, had to pass through 
theindian Agent, and to a higher degree, through the Department of Indian Affairs .On more 
important matters, as the Abenakis became increasingly versed in the political processes, they 
communicated directly with governrnent officiais. Their relentless participation and 
. involvement of the Co un cil in local affairs is testimony to what Claude Gélinas explained as 
a profound willingness to preserve their socio-political autonomy and to establish themselves 
as demographically significant population, capable of organising themselves coherent!l3 . In 
St-Francis, as soon as the first Band Council was elected, the new community leaders began 
taking the reins for ali matters permitted by the Acts relative to a band's self-administration. 
22 Excluding the annulled election of May 1890. 
23 Claude Gélinas, Les Autochtones dans le Québec Post-Confédéral: 1867-1960, 
Septentrion, 2007, p. 128. 
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BandFund 
The Abenakis of St-Francis, as a band, have often reported that they had little money. 
Sorne found a source of income in basket weaving, but the great majority of inhabitants lived 
meagrely. Consequently, any expensive projects or processes attracted careful attention from 
the Band Council and other aware individuals. The Abenakis kept a well organized record of 
the band's accounts. Especially in the late 1890s and early 1900s, archivai documents offer a 
good account of the band ' s budget. Spending spanned across ail categories of administration 
authorized by the Indian Act24, ranging from the keeping of animais, land improvements, 
structural repairs, the appointment of constables, and the tenure of elections 25 . While regular 
co~Ill!lunity needs were carefully documented and was administrated systematically, anything 
relating to land management created tension. Within the heavy amount of correspondences 
concemiri.g this affair, discontent reached levels that lead to believe that there was a plot at 
every tum; whether it concemed Whites, the govemment, non-band members, band 
members, and Band Council members. As will be discussed more thoroughly in the 
forthcoming sections, anytime a sum had to be spent outside the regular budget, there was 
suspicion that sorne body was trying to ad vance his persona! gains. ·In reality, while 
information on the band's finances was available to everybody, administration of the fund, 
financial decisions and negotiations remained in the hands of the politico-elite. 
24 An Act to Amend and Consolidate laws respecting Indians, 1876, section 63. 
25 Abenakis of Saint Francois de Sales- Minutes of council held 26 April, 8, 15 June, 6, 9, 
11 November, 19 April, 21 March, re garding sundry matters, NAC, RG 10, vol. 3157, microfilm C-
11332; Saint Francois Agency- Minutes of council meeting of the Abenaki of Saint Francois held 
24 March 1897 regarding sundry matters, NAC, RGIO, vol. 2902, microfilm C-11295; Abenakis of 
Saint Francois de Sales- Minutes of council held 26 April, 8, 15 June, 6, 9, 11 November, 19 
April, 21 March, regarding sundry matters, NAC, RGIO, vol. 2942, microfilm C-11301 ; Saint 
Francois Agency - Correspondence re garding the appointment of constables on the Abenakis of St. 
Francois reserve, charges against certain constables and law enforcement on the reserve, NAC, 
RGIO, vol. 3030, microfilm C-9666. 
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Territory 
The most pressing issue, common to almost all reserves in the valley of the St-
Lawrence, was protecting what meager territory they had left. The frrst Band Council in 
authority tackled what had already become a recurrent problem in St-Francis: Whites, 
especially neighbouring Pierreville residents, encroaching on Abenaki land. One early 
occurrence relating to this issue began in 1879 and dragged on until 1881. Jean-Baptiste 
Charland, a non-Indian and resident of Pierreville, had been proven guilty of trespassing and 
cutting wood on the community's land26. Members of the Band Council thus took it upon 
themselves to make their cause known and for justice be served; they wanted Charland to be 
criminally charged and demanded 300$ for the damage he brought to the band. St-Francis 
had been exposed to this type oJ problem well before the emergence of the Band Council. 
Traditional chiefs Salomon Benedict and Lazare Wawanolette had accused the lndian Agent 
of providing too much latitude to Whites, especially in how they have been acquiring lands 
illegally from certain members of St-Francis, while sorne had not paid rent in over eight 
years27. The two chiefs ended their correspondences disenchanted and dejected; no one was 
showing any interest in their affairs28. The fact that the Band Council took up unresolved 
issues illustrates a continuation, but perhaps more accurately, a renewal in political energy 
and enthusiasm for political dialogue. 
The village of St-Francis being located on the populous South Shore and so close to 
neighbouring Pierreville, the deferree of Abenaki terri tory was for long at the top of the list in 
the Band Council ' s interaction with the government. One major issue that dragged on for two 
decades was the building of a railroad, projected to pass through the Abenaki community. In 
1890, the Band Council energetically protested against the plan by weighting its ills: the 
26 Saint Francois Agency - complaint from chief Salomon Benedict concerning 
trespassing and cutting of wood on the reserve, NAC, RG 10, vol. 2082, p. 8-16 and 30, microfilm 
C-11153. 
27 Saint Francois Agency - agent L.A. De Blois writes conceming rents due by white 
occupants of land on the reserve and the seigniory, NAC, RG10, vol. 2021 , p. 2-6, 71-73 and 95-
96, microfùm C-1 1136. 
28 Ibid., p. 95-96. 
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railroad would pass across the central properties of St-Francis, liquor would henceforth be 
easily available, and on the whole, the project would increase encroachment on the band and 
individual members29 . In 1902, the Council was able to arrange compensation for collateral 
damage on its land, the construction being halted 'until negotiations were agreed upon30 . 
Confrontations continued for severa! years however, with the Council and other members of 
the band again demanding compensation, or by directly interfering with railroad workers31. In 
fact, the Band Council launched its most aggressive and organized protest in 1907, while 
conforming to the political process accepted by white society, dictated by the law. On the 21 51 
of January, the Council announced that they were going to present their official opposition 
plan in the briefest of delays, but they were unable to meet with Sir Wilfred Laurier during 
their visit to Montreal a few days later32 . Their major grievances concerned the suspicious 
inequalities during negotiations between the railroad company and the indigenous proprietors 
in St-Francis, either in monetary compensations or land speculation33. 
On one parti cul ar occasion, conflict over land use occurred internally. In 1901 , Louis 
Nolet and Samuel Msadoquis forwarded a request to have a new road built from their homes 
leading to a better access to the centre of the village 34. The project sparked protest from 
certain band members; sorne were wary of the honesty of certain Band Council members 
involved in the project, but the more tangible problem brought forth was that sorne would 
have their land damaged by the road. The political climate already volatile during this 
29 Saint Francois Agency - correspondence regarding the Quebec Southern railway 
company right of way on the Abenakis reserve, village of Pierreville, NAC, RG10, vol. 2473, p. 
37, microfilm C-11226. 
30 Ibid., p. 63. 
31 Ibid., p. 138 and 228. 
32Ibid., p. 238. 
33 Ibid., p. 262 and 299. 
34 Saint Francois Agency - request by the band for construction of a road called the 
Maurault road, NAC, RGl O, vol. 2121 , p. 4, microfilm C-11162. 
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period35, debate raged on between band members, the Band Council, the Indian Agent and 
higher governmental authorities. The government, as the law indicated, had the final word. 
After revising the report of inspector Macrae, lndian Agent Comire and the majority of the 
Council in approval, the project was launched36. 
During the same politically active decade of the 1900s, the Abenakis in St-Francis 
defended their boundaries but also defined their relationship with the state. Illustrating this 
process, in 1902, the question of maintaining a fenced boundary between the reserve and the 
village of Pierreville was brought up. The debate was founded on whether the Abenakis 
should pay from their band funds to work on the fencing that would thus delineate their 
reserve. In May 1903, the Band Council was adamant that this was not their responsibility: 
"Reserves up to the present time belong to the government and are thus not subject to the common law. 
It is therefore an innovation in our customs, altogether to our detriment, and against which we protest 
with ali our might [ ... ] The expense should be covered by the government without band 
contribution 37 ." 
The St-Francis Band Council, while extremely vocal about its rights to justice, especially 
territorial integrity, was clearly positioning the community under the protective umbrella of 
the Indian Act - it was re-affirming its status as subject to the Crown. Oddly and without 
rouch explanation, the Band Council changed its views completely in 1911 which had until 
then supported the same position as in 1903. At the turn of the decade, the Council, without 
the regular leading figures of Joseph Laurent or H.L. Masta, decided it would take the matter 
into consideration38. 
35 See Chapter 4, 2. Opportunities Through the Band Council: Position, Power and 
Prestige?; 2.3.The Culture ofProtest and Interna! Turbulence. 
36 Saint Francois Agency - request by the band for construction of a road called the 
Maurault raad, NAC, RGlO, vol. 2121, p. 84-85, 127 and 182, microfilm C-111 62. 
37 Saint Francois Agency - correspondence regarding the building of fences by the 
Abenakis of Saint Francois, NAC, RG1 0, vol. 11201, p. 16-1 7, microfilm C-11226. 
38 Ibid., p. 119. 
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Membership 
The Indian Act enabled the Band Council to decide who could be accepted as a 
member. Described in the section 2. Procedure earlier in the chapter, and later in Chapter IV 
section 2.2. The Brosseau Commission, official membership was always a serious issue 
around the time of elections. Even after elections were confirmed, there was always 
contention on the legitimacy of certain individuals. In fact, the Robillard Inquiry sought to 
settle these controversies precisely. The Council would express its decision on the 
membership of a certain individual 39 . In turn, the Indian Agent had the duty of double-
checking the Council's claims, as with ail band decisions. Since most issues rarely reached 
unanimity, the Agent and or the Band Council often wrote directly to higher officiais. One 
scenario in 1888 prompted Joseph Laurent, chief at the time, to propose a period of probation 
of two to three years before being officially readmitted into the band40. Laurent's reasoning 
was to test the individual's character for intemperance. However, as the future demonstrated, 
sorne self-called Abenakis of St-Francis only showed for elections, to sell their lands, or to 
cause trouble in general. Laurent's proposition thus proved sensible to the lndian Agent at the 
time, H. V assai, who agreed to pursue the measure. 
The Civilization of Indian Tribes Act in 1857, its provisions passed on through the 
Indian Act, hoped to pave the way for the indigenous populations to become full citizens, 
le gall y undistinguishable from other Canadians. The Band Council exercised sorne control on 
who may or may not become members 41 , but in the case of disputed membership, the 
39 Saint Francois Agency - Correspondence regarding the de ire of the Abenakis Indians 
of Pierreville to hold an election for their chiefs, NAC, RGlO, vol. 2496, p. 70, 143-144, 147-149, 
185, 196-197 and 216, microfilm C-11230; Pierreville (Saint Francois) Agency- Correspondence, 
rep~rts, memoranda, petitions and orders in council regarding complaints registered against agent 
W.C. Boucher, Chiefs H.L. Masta and Joseph Portneuf of the Abenakis band and irregularities in 
elections for chief of the band, NAC, RGlO, vol. 2900, p. 267, microfilm C-11294. 
40 Saint Francois Agency - Chief Joseph Laurent of the Aben~kis of Saint Francois is 
suggesting that there should be 2 or 3 years probation for the Indians applying for readmission into 
the band, NAC, RG10, vol. 2438, p. 2-5, microfilm C-11221. 
41 Abenakis de Saint Francois - Resolution of the Abenaki Council of Saint Francois 
admitting Israel Msadaquis as a member of the band, NAC, RGlO, vol. 2632, microfilm C-12788; 
Abenakis of Saint Francois- (Pierreville) - Resolution of the council tore-admit Daniel Emmett to 
the Abenaki band, NAC, RG1 0, vol. 2887, microfilm C-11292; Saint Francois Agency (Pierreville) 
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Superintendant made the final decision42. The same process was implemented on individuals 
who wished to emancipate themselves. In one of the few documented cases of 
enfranchisement from a member of the St-Francis band, the band held Council to oppose the 
demand of Pierre Emmett who wrote to the govemment in 1884 "I' d rather be subject to her 
Majesty 's than to be deemed any longer an Indian in the meaning of the laws regulating to 
Indians [ ... ] 1 beg of your hon or to become enfranchised according to the true meaning of the 
Indian Act43 . " The petition, forwarded by chiefs Joseph Laurent and Thomas Msadoquis, 
protested that Emmett . did not deserve to be emancipated for lack of education. More 
importantly, the signatories were weary that emancipation would divide the little land the 
reserve held, and therefore demanded that the govemment let the Band Council decide on 
who may become proprietor and who should remain under the govemment's tutorship 44 . 
Other than protecting communal land, band membership became a contentious issue 
particularly around election time. A few weeks prior to the day of election, party leaders 
approached people to vote for their party. More often than not, the opposing party got wind 
of who was being solicited, and thus followed a series of correspondences to contest the 
membership , and in extension the right to vote, ofthese would-be electors. The same problem 
repeatedly occurred after the results were made public; the losing party sought to overtum the 
decision by disqualifying certain voters- in sorne elections, the opposition won their case45 . 
In short, the strict control that the Abenaki Band Council in St-Francis hoped to keep over the 
- Elections of chiefs and councillors of the Abenakis of St.Francois Indians, N AC, RGI 0, vol. 
3060, p. 26, 67 and 145, microfilm C-11318. 
42 Saint Francois Agency (Pierreville) - Elections of chiefs and councillors of the 
Abenakis ofSt.Francois Indians, NAC, RGIO, vol. 3060, p. 23, microfilm C-11 318. 
43 Saint Francois Agency - Correspond en ce regarding the attempt of Pierre Emmett to be 
enfranchised in the Abenakis of Saint Francois, NAC, RG10, vol. 2249, p. 5,microfilm C-12780. 
44 Ibid. , p. 9-14. 
45 Pierreville (Saint Francois) Agency- Report dated at Sorel 30 December 1898 of J.B. 
Brosseau, Commissioner, of the election of chiefs of the Abenakis of St. Francois held on 30 
January 1897; and complaints against Joseph Portneuf, chief of the same tribe, NAC, RG 10, vol. 
2901, p. 730, microfilm C-11294. See Chapter IV, 2. Opportunities Through the Band Council: 
Position, Power and Prestige?; 2.2. The Brosseau Commission. 
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members of its band illustra tes the importance it placed on establishing a legitimate and l~gal 
management. 
5. Conclusion 
Close contact with Pierreville, as well as their prolonged and continuai relationship 
with the governrnent rendered St-Francis in a particularly well disposed state to non-
indigenous avenues of politics. In other words, the Abenakis had already been acquainted 
with the possibilities of Euro-Canadian political systems and its opportunities for new types 
of leadership. As discussed above, change in the tenure of chieftaincy had been in process in 
1870, barely a year after the Act for the gradua! enfranchisement of Indians and the better 
management of Indian Ajfairs. Most remarkable was that it was the band, albeit not 
unanimously, that demanded the switch to an elective system. The da ys of ' traditional ' chiefs 
were counted, but the Indian Agent at the time sought to implement the law gradually. To his 
credit, the population embarked enthusiastically in the elective system from 1876 onwards. 
The establishment of Band Councils, therefore, did not provoke a great sliock nor was it 
severely challenged in St-Francis. Wl:iile there were sorne raucous elections46 , the system 
itself did not meet opposition. In fact as shall be discussed in the next chapter, most clashes in 
St-Francis emerged out of political competition to gain influence and leadership within the 
confines of the Band Co une il structure. Canadian laws, realities outside the reserve, and local 
problems confirmed to most Abenakis that the poli ti cal customs of their forefathers might not 
be the best option to cope with the new state of affairs . The Band Council was thus the best, 
and from the 1970s onwards, the only tangible political tool for the Abenakis to express sorne 
self-determination and agency. 
46 Alexandre Benedict came in the house to proclaim his vote for Jos Laurent. His 
adversaries violently stopped him from exiting the house despite the opinion of the agent to let him 
give his vote. See Saint Francois Agency - Correspondence regarding the desire of the Abenakis 
Indians of Pierreville to hold an election for their chiefs, NAC, RG 10, vol. 2496, p. 69, microfilm 
C-1 1230. 
CHAPTERIV 
EMERGENCE OF A NEW POLITICAL CULTURE 
As the Abenakis emigrated from their southem ·lands northwards into Canada, 
eventually settling at St-Francis and Bécancour, the early influence of Christianity travelled 
with them and grew, owing to their cooperation and proximity with the French. Catholicism 
became the dominant branch and a founding component in the Abenaki social universe. This 
cultural bastion was challenged with the arrivai of Protestantism, creating an ideological rift 
with the previously homogeneous society, coinciding with the Canadian government's 
application of laws that would forever change reserve communities . Through the newly 
imposed Band Council system, cultural and ideological realities within the reserve were 
offered new opportunities of expression that would have hitherto been contained by 
indigenous tradition. 
The first segment of this chapter observes the factors enabling a smooth transition 
from traditional Abenaki political culture to a newly state-imposed system. A necessary first 
step was to dismantle traditional political tenure. The success of this process could only have 
been possible thorough a willing population, compliarit in the replacement of customary 
modes of chieftaincy. The process launched, St-Francis witnessed the reinvention of their 
political leadership and the administration of its village through the implementation of the 
Band Co un cil. The second segment of the chapter analyses the political !ife in St-Francis. In 
particular, the fact that the majority of the band's correspondences with the govemment were 
product of the competition fostered by a democratically elected body politic deserves 
attention. It was through these political confrontations that the Abenakis of St-Francis most 
clearly expressed their desire to recapture sorne degree of self-determination. 
87 
1. Change in the Guard 
From its inception, St-Francis had been created as a Catholic mission. Mentioned in 
Chapter I, Catholicism had become ingrained in the culture of the St-Francis Abenaki 1. 
Moreover, it was one of the very few indigenous communities that had a functioning Catholic 
school- or a school at ali for that matter. The Abenaki community had therefore evolved to 
encompass key elements that rendered it doser to a Eurocanadian municipality than a 
traditional Amerindian village. The ad vent of PfOtestantism therefore shook peace and orcier. 
The ensuing struggle for the maintenance of Catholicism in the community thus became an 
arena of contest that sheds light on the transitional dynamics of St-Francis. Initially, 
Protestantism affected pre-established cultural and educational aspects of Abenaki life. The 
manifestation of religious rivalries was thus contained un til the government decided to apply 
the Act for the gradua! enfranchisement of Indians and the better management of Indian 
Affairs in 1869, dismantling traditional chieftaincy and crystallizing the process already in 
progress - transforming the small Protestant following into a strong political faction rival to 
the Catholic majority. Undoubtedly, the coming of Protestantism upset the ideological 
b.alance of the village, but more tangibly, it was the leader of the faith that embodied and 
accelerated a new political culture. The Protestants found a leader to take the band of St-
Francis to new directions, only to be checked by an equally ambitious leader who happened 
to be Catholic - th us be gan the rise of partisan politics in St-Francis. 
1.1. Competing for Influence According to New Standards 
A new wave of internai rivalries for leadership and influence within St-Francis started 
brewing in the early 1830s, triggered by a young Abenaki known as Pierre-Paul 
Osunkhirhine. Student in a protestant school in the United States, he soon returned to St-
Francis and attempted to establish Protestantism as a rival faith to Catholicism. The man also 
known as 'Masta' found that the Abenakis were far from being reluctant to his teachings. A 
1 Chapter 1: ].People of.the Dawn: the Abenaki at European contact; 1.1. Migrations: the 
Settling of Saint-Francis 1 Odanak and 3. Undermining Traditional Land Tenure: Precursory 
Measures. 
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few factors helped his cause: he was a resident of the village and he could communicate his 
mess~ge in the Abenaki language; while the Catholic priest that was associated with St-
Francis visited weekly and spoke only French 2 . Ambitious and full of conviction, 
Osunkhirhine attempted to gain position as a schoolrnaster and became a nuisance· at 
Councils by insulting chiefs and Bellenger, the Catholic missionary. Predictably, 
Osunkhirhine's antics pushed the Abenaki community into . quarrel. The more severe 
accusation was how he was eroding the authority of the current chiefs, propelling a number 
of his adversaries to petition for his removal in 1832 and again in 18343. To thejoy of the 
village chiefs, Masta was removed as institutor in 1835, but bounced back by building a new 
Protestant chapel with the support of a religious society in the United States. Notwithstanding 
petitions and local opposition from Abenaki chiefs, Masta's chape! was built in 1837 with an 
entourage of ten faithful followers4. As a testimony to his tenacity, yet another petition from 
his opponents was sent in 1846 for roughly the same reasons as more than a decade before: 
"That the conduct and proceedings of the Rev . P. P. Osunkhirhine Minister of the independent church 
of the Indian Mission of the said place of St François du Lac is of a nature rather capable of 
demoralizing his flack than to render them more moralizing in as much as he is the sou! and instigator 
of Division and disorder about the mission. That in order to rea ch to his plans un worth y of a minister 
he adopts ali the means that hatred, irreligion and tyranny can suggests, He even by times go so far as 
to adopt the banner of Catholicism and Atheism and that contrary to the intention of the said 
Honorable Society of A.B.C.F.M. 5." 
Osunkhirhine or Masta as he was called, had gained power and followers in the village. He 
established hirnse1f and the protestant faith as a real threat and act of defiance to the 
traditional chiefs, most of whom supported Catholicism and the status quo. Even as a 
targeted dissenter by the majority, the political context of Canada at these times favored his 
2 Joseph Anselme Maurault, Histoire des Abénakis, depuis 1605 jusqu 'à nos jours, 1819-
1871, Sorel: Gazette de Sorel, 1866. 
3 Petition of the St-Francis Abenakis to William McKay, July 7, 1832, NAC, RGl 0, vol. 
93, p. 37798-37799, microfilm C-11468, and Joseph Anselme Maurault, op. cit. · 
4 Petition of the St-Francis Abenakis to William McKay, July 7, 1832, NAC, RG10, vol. 
93 , p. 37798-37799, microfilm C-11468, and Joseph Anselme Maurault, op. cit. 
5 Petition of John Stanislas and others to Reverends Anderson and Greene, February 14, 
1849, UCCA, F 3387, doc. n° 67, microfilm D2.110. 
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initiatives and provided momentum to the challenge he posed to the pre-established Abenaki 
order. 
In the case of St-Francis, Protestantism' s leaders, doctrines, and institutions can be 
considered precursory to the values the government hoped to implant in Indian communities. 
In addition to Masta' s success with the building of the chape!, a Protestant school was 
established in 1844. The Protestant movement had unarguably gained sorne impetus. From its 
barely ten followers in 1837, the school counted sixteen students. Ran by Simon Annance, 
the latter proclaimed the following as his school's goals for the education of the community: 
"It is desirable that an English school should always be encouraged in this village to enlighten the 
children of the tri be that they may be something when they become grown persans. The best way to 
meliorate the condition oflndian Tribe is to give them leaming as fast as it can be done, it is the best 
gift that will benefit them the most .in future, they cannat al ways depend on hunting and as they are 
now surrounded by civilized people they must adopt a different !ife and of course they must have 
leaming or e!se they will always be in a most degraded state6." 
For Annance to state his mission as such, he and his Protestant clique were undoubtedly 
serious in their challenge against the Catholic order supported by the more traditional 
members of St-Francis. More impoitantly, in direct parallel with Masta, Annance was 
blatantly declaring that the current lifestyle Abenakis were following could not be maintained 
in an increasingly white-dominated society. Paraphrasing the message of Annance, to 
overcome their 'degraded state' and 'meliorate the condition of the tri be' , children had togo 
to school to becom~ 'grown persons' that would not only cope but strive in an increasingly 
civilized world (as opposed to their own 'uncivilized' people) . Annance pushed the benefits 
of European-inspired schooling further two years later with a similar message about the 
necessity of becoming a useful member of society: 
"We want a School on the basis of freedom, of utility and humanity: teaching the simple rudiments of 
English education, teaching the young Idea how to School, inculcating the princip les of industry: and 
by infusing into the young mind, a taste and Love for the comforts of civilized !ife, leading the rising 
generation imperceptibly from the most Simple, to the higher branches of science, which make man an 
honor to himself and a useful member of Society 7." 
6 Pierre-Paul Osunkhirhine to Duncan C. Napier, March 5, 1846, NAC, RGl 0, vol. 603, p. 
49126-49132, microfilm C-13381. 
7 Noe! Annance to Duncan C. Napier, November 9, 1846, NAC, RG10, vol. 603, p. 
49187-49189, microfilm C-1338 1. 
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In retrospect, Masta, Annance and ether followers of Protestantism in St-Francis 
were communicating new modes of survival in response to realities outside the reserve. 
Unsurprisingly, their discourse was imbued with Euro-Canadian values observable through 
the concrete initiatives of the Department of Indian Affairs at the time. For instance, the 
Superintendent urged the creation of manuallabour schools despite his recognition of Indian 
tenacity to customs and habits, with an added punishment for student absence: "the 
. missionaries may select the children for the manuallabor schools & that the present to which 
they are entitled be made available to the schools & that non-attendance will exclude the 
children from their presents8." While the project of systematically sending Indians through 
manual labour schools did not take flight as the government had hoped, policy makers could 
celebrate. sorne victories, albeit partial cnes. By 1865, the pro-progressive Protestant school 
had a similar number of students than the Catholic one; the former with 25 and the latter with 
36 students9. The authority of Traditional Chiefs had been cracked, leaving the population 
with self-doubt, thus engendering the open-mindedness and curiosity the government needed 
to more easily implement the system of Band Council government. Therefore, the series of 
worried if not alarmed tone of petitions and communications written by the Traditional 
Chieftains, proved to be justified. 
1.2. Traditional Leaders Undermined 
The Abenaki of St-Francis' almost immediate cooperation and recognition of 
'municipal style' government had precursory signs. Prior to the imposition of an electoral 
process based on the Euro-Canadian mode!, Abenaki chiefs were wary of ambitious and 
independent minded leaders within their community that threatened to widen the gap between 
tradition and civilizing tendencies. Believing that the situation necessitated sorne form of 
8 Extract from the superintendent's report, July 1, 1846, NAC, RG10, vol. 604, p. 49455-
49458, microfilm C-1 338 1. 
9 Report of C.C. Obomsawine to William Spragge, January 18, 1865, NAC, RG10, vol. 
611 , p. 53902-53903, microfilm C-13385 . 
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state intervention, the Abenaki Council petitioned the government to help counter the rise of 
dissident chiefs. According to those who signed the petition, sorne chiefs were: 
"[ ... ] acting contrary to the very purpose for which they were appointed to be chiefs for to do always 
the will of the greatest number of the Tribe by whom they were appointed and erhployed for the very 
express purpose that they may never do any other way than as the Tribe have always intended they 
should do, otherwise they would not have been appeinted at all; for none would appoint any one to 
destroy his own purposes. In consequence of such wrong doings just mentioned, misunderstandings, 
contentions and troubles have arisen, not because the intention of the verbal constituted co un cil is not 
known or indefinite, for the usage or custom has al ways made it very simple and well known, [ ... ] that 
the chiefs never had any more power than to do what they and majority of the members of the Tribe 
have decided to be done [ ... ] [The dissenting chiefs] aim to deprive of our undeniable right to exercise 
equal voices ·in deciding what concerns the whole Tribe, which must always be done by the united 
agreement of ali the shareholders in what respects or belongs equally to all. It is easy to prove that the 
chiefs never had any exclusive right in what concems the whole, for all our ancients have always 
called what belongs to our community, our common dish, to which no one has any more right than 
another [ ... ] 10. " 
In short, sorne Abenaki chiefs were not only acting different! y to the decisions decided by the 
Council, but in the opinion of the petitioners, they were also going directly against age old 
customs of trying to ac hi eve consensus and acting for the common benefit of the community. 
' . 
In the same year, another petition was sent to the government, this time demanding direct 
intervention for the behaviour of one man in particular: 
"That the conduct of the Rev. Peter P . Osunkhirhine since his appointment as local Agent for the tribe, 
as been such, that the undersigned representing their tribe and acting in their behalf, are imperiously 
called upon by their duty to make a complaint against the said local Agent in the following terms: That 
he has contemptuously refused the orders of the Chiefs when requested to give a certain sum of the 
money in his keeping for the use of the tri be in their common business; that he has attempted to reduce 
the power and influence of the Chiefs by encouraging insubordination among the young men, giving 
them the same weight and importance as the Chiefs in the councils of the tribe contrary to their 
common and ancient usage; that he has created and fomented dissension and discord in the village, that 
he may make himself the leading man, and dictate to the Chiefs what to do, and give them their money 
when he thinks proper; that he has appropriate the money to his own use on severa! occasions, 
declaring that he is not accountable to the chiefs for the money he receives as rent due to the tribe. 
Therefore, your petitioners pray, that before he may be dismissed from his charge before he does more 
[ .. . ) 11_, 
1
°Constitution of the St-Francis Abenaki Band Council, February 9, 1856, NAC, RG10, 
vol. 603, p. 49410-49417, microfilm C-13381. 
11 Petition from the Abenakis of St-Francis to Edmund Walker Head, July 7, 1856, NAC, 
RGl 0, vol.228, p. 13554.4-135545, microfilm.C-11539. 
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1'he accusations forwarded are of the most severe nature. According to the petitioners, 
Reverend P.P. Osunkhirhine was undermining not only the current chiefs, but the traditional 
pillars that enabled the band to function. Perhaps factionalism is too strong of a term to 
describe the trend emerging at St-Francis, but the fact remained that sorne individuals had 
accumulated worrying amounts of social and political power. Pro-modem influences, coming 
from both internai and extemal sources, proved disturbing enough to push the more 
traditional members of the village to create a written constitution- a rarity for any indigenous 
community- to immortalise Abenaki law and custom to any potential dissenters. 
The position of Chief was becoming increasingly figurative in the latter part of the 
191h century. Sorne members of the band were finding different avenues to gain influence 
within the band that would have been impossible previously. Previously in the chapter, the 
segment 1.2.Traditional Leaders Undermined highlights this trend, which could most often 
be witnessed during negotiations with the increasingly patemalistic state. Y et, still observable 
today, the title of 'Chief has yet to be abolished. The 1870s marks the transition to the 
govemment sanctioned system outlined in the Act for the gradua! enfranchisement of Indians 
and the better management of Indian Affairs, 1869. Chieftaincy in St-Francis prior to 1876 
still carried most of the traditional elements. Leadership was more abstract, Jess official, and 
Jess empowering than the European system. For instance, Louis Watso, senior chief for the 
Abenakis of St-Francis, had been named chief for !ife as was the custom, but no longer 
directly Jead the band even though he maintained the highest political status: "To their 
knowledge they have only one old chief, Louis Watso, nearly a centenarian, and whose 
advanced age renders him incapable of acting as such 12 ." The band was not headless 
however. Jean Harmess and Salomon Benedict were the two recognized chiefs and shared 
equal stature- and they were to be the last chosen outside of band elections 13. 
12 Saint Francois Agency - Request by the Abenakis of Saint Francois that they be 
pennitted to elect two chiefs and four subchiefs and that Jean Harmess and Salomon Benedict be 
confirmed as chiefs for !ife, NAC, RGl 0, vol. 1949, p. 9, microfilm C-11119. 
13 Jean Hanness was elected chief at a council of the tribe. Salomon Benedict after his 
return from the Grand Council where he was named chief, he announced his nomination, t<i which 
there was no protest. See Saint Francois Agency - Request by the Abenakis of Saint Francois that 
they be perrnitted to elect two chiefs and four subchiefs and that Jean Harmess and Salomon 
Benedict be confi.rmed as chiefs for !ife, NAC, RGlO, vol. 1949, p. 18, microfilm C-11119. 
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The flexibility and tolerance that Vassal showed for the dual system of leadership 
was not shared by all. Chief H.L. Masta, the rest of the elected Band Council and 
approximately 40 other signatories, wrote to the Superintendent of Indian Affairs in 1879 
arguing that Salomon Benedict, still holding title of 'Chief although not elected, should be 
deposed. According to the petition, Benedict incarnated every ill that the band hoped to get 
rid of: 
"We don't want a tyrant. We never chose him. He's not worthy, he didn' t win the esteem and 
confidence of the public [ ... ] He works for his own interest and not for the people. He needs to forget 
himself and direct his care to make his people happy [ .. . ] Instead of maintaining or der and decorum he 
sews disorder himself [ ... ] He's not honest. He has retained money from the band [ .. . ] He is still today 
the source of our troubles, refusing to subrnit to the order of the Department and desires of the band 
[ ... ] We wish for him to be removed from his post immediately14 ." • 
At !east for this group of politically active Abenakis, they bought in the ideological 
foundations of the new system and its promise of serving the people; democratically elected 
leaders were therefore the only legitimate form of rule . Still, the Department ofindian Affairs 
thought wiser to keep Benedict's title valid for the time being, even though administrative 
exchanges only truly occurred between Band Council and state. 
1.3. Rise of Political Competition 
St-Francis would be one of the first bands to have not only willingly cooperated, but 
actively participated in the election-based system. In many respects, the new structure 
severed ties with the traditional form of governance and changed the face of Abenaki poli tics 
forever. In reality, Western-type dernocracy opened a window of opportunity for influential 
band mernbers to gain positions of leadership that would have been previously impossible 
under traditional custom. In fact, for over three decades after the first elections St-Francis 
would witness the emergence of two ' new era' politicians that would dominate Abenaki 
political culture: Joseph Laurent and H.L. Masta. Every cycle, the two would compete for the 
14 Saint Francois Agency - complaints by Chief H.L. Masta and other band members 
against Chief Salomon Benedict, NAC, RGlO, vol. 2097, p. 2-4, microfilm C-11156 [own 
translation} 
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position of head chief. When one was not elected head chief, he would assault the 
Department of Indian Affairs with letters of careful wording. Election after the next, one 
would accuse the victor of "Dishonesty, intemperance, immorality, or incompetency15," the 
exact characteristics that are outlined in the Jndian Act that would justify government 
intervention for repudiation of title16. · 
Joseph Laurent 
The first elections in St-Francis marked the official arrivai of the Band Council 
system. Thereafter, the Canadian government no longer bad to recognize Traditional Chiefs 
as head figures, wiping clean the mande of leadership. As discussed above, the Protestant 
bloc inherited a strong leader in Masta who became an obvious candidate for a position of 
power in the community; yet, a void remained for the Catholic majority. Joseph Laurent 
emerged out of the group to become one of the most vocal and involved politicians ofhis era. 
More importantly, he became Masta's main opponent and provided a balance of power. 
A man of his times, Laurent's career is a direct product of !ife in the reserve of St-
Francis. He bad been a hunter but bad to resort to other means of subsistence as hunting lands 
were being increasingly restricted. Like the great majority of Abenakis living in St-Francis, 
he invested time and interest in the business of basket weaving, which lead him to create a 
dictionary to facilitate the leaming of English in order to eut out intermediaries when 
handling business with Americans 17 . Inclined to gain influence in the community and 
notwithstanding his low leve! of education, Laurent was named by the 'Government Agent' 
for the Abenakis in 1865 and instructor for the Catholic school of St-Francis from 1868 to 
1881 18. Additionally, he held the position of 'Chief of Prayer', which combined ancestral 
15 An Act to amend and consolidate the laws respecting lndians, Chap 18, sec 62. 
16 Saint Francois Agency - Correspondence regarding the desire of the Abenakis Indians 
of Pierreville to hold an election for their chiefs, NAC, RG1 0, vol. 2496, p. 283, rnicrofùm C-
11230. 
17 Sylvain Rivard, Jos Laurent, Québec: Cornac, 2009, p. 34. 
18 Ibid., p. 30. 
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spiritual elements of the traditional Abenaki healer with the tasks ordained by Catholicism 19. 
This unique role exemplifies the syncretism of Laurent's · character, which can also be 
extended to St-Francis' socio-cultural reality. In other words, Laurent, like the rest of the 
reserve, were attempting to reconcile the old with the new, the traditionally indigenous with 
the inescapable Western influence.At the dawn of the frrst elections in St-Francis, Laurent 
was thus already in an undisputable position of leadership and at the head of the Catholic 
majority, granting him position of head chief four times in total and twice as councillor20 . 
Laurent and Masta had been school instructors, were weil educated and corresponded 
eloquently with the govemment, and as the voting polis demonstrated, both managed to 
muster an almost deadlock number of followers. The fact that Laurent was associated with 
the Catholics and Masta with the Protestants adds a classic sense to their rivalry; in reality, it 
crystallized party politics in St-Francis. Having these two men as candidates, the voting was 
split in two. The law never stipulated that electors had to vote for candidates belonging to a 
certain ' party', but the tendency demonstrated that loyalty only rare! y crossed !ines. Taking 
the same five sample election ballots analyzed in Chapter III, 3. Participation21 , the votes 
clearly illustrate the split. In the elections ofNovember 1890, January 1894, February 1903, 
and January 1909, the number of electors that voted for both Laurent and Masta are minimal: 
6, 2, 7, and 0 respectively. The ballot of 1894 deserves special attention. Six candidates were 
nominated, but a thicker line separated the two parties in two groups of three. This indicates 
that the lndian Agent, creator of the ballot, was aware of party politics and thus divided the 
candidates in two respective camps. Since the electors could vote for anybody, this 'line' was 
probably just a reference for the Agent, but it also illustrates the reality of political division. 
As on1y two people in the election of 1894 voted for candidates across the ' line ', the political 
atmosphere in St-Francis undoubtedly was of intense division. In 1909, the trend was even 
19 Ibid. , p. 37. 
20 Ibid., p. 36.Laurent was elected Head Chief: 1879, 1884, 1887, 1990, and Councillor: 
1897, 1906. 
2 1 The election of May 1880 is excluded since it was annulled. 
---------
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more extreme: while sorne voted across party !ines, nobody voted for both unofficialleaders 
Laurent and Masta. This phenomenon is testimony to how far both of them managed to rail y 
voters for their own party, but also how far Laurent and Masta grew apart. Considering how 
few voters decided to cross !ines in 1909 when Laurent and Masta were candidates 
nominated for the Council, the election of 1906 demonstrates the exact contrary. ln January 
of that year, 39 people voted across what had previously been established as ' party !ines'. 
Obviously, the election of 1906 cannot be considered when analysing party politics in St-
Francis - there is little or no trend observable. However, there is one determinant factor that 
can provide an explanation: H.L. Masta was not up for election. Without its leader, the 
'party' usually opposing Laurent altogether disappeared - electors voted ali across the 
spectrum, political polarization vanished. The tendency is ever more apparent when 
compared to the next cycle of election in J anuary 1909 when Masta re-entered as a pol~tical 
norninee: out of 74 electors with five votes e~ch, none voted for both Laurent and Masta out 
of eleven candidates. In short, Laurent and Masta were 'parties' by themselves; party politics 
were in direct correlation with their leadership and involvement. Prior to the 1890s, votes 
could be spread across ali candidates, irrespective of their religious affiliation. But as Masta 
and Laurent gained experience and ambition in their political careers, they ostracized the 
opposing camp to effectively create a split in the voting popu1ace22 . 
2. Opportunities through the Band Council: Position, Power and Prestige? 
By participating in elections, signing petitions and writing 1etters, the Abenakis were 
building a new political culture. Embarking wholesale into the Band Council system, they 
decided to put their faith in a new generation of leaders that would solidify, protect, and 
empower their band. On the other side of the coin, Band Council elections could be 
interpreted as fostering ali the ills of any modem democratie society: competition, avarice 
and dishonesty. No matter the incentives of electors and politicians to support the system, 
22 Both Laurent and Masta used easy categorizations to polarize their opponents. See Saint 
Francois Agency - Correspondence regarding the desire of the Abenakis Indians of Pierreville to 
hold an election for their chiefs, NAC, RGlO, vol. 2496, p. 196-205, microfilm reel C-11230. For 
greater detail on the electoral process, refer to Chapter III, 1. First Elections in St-Francis. 
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'doing what was good for the band' fuelled ali behaviour. However, fact remains that the 
emerging political culture in St-Francis was constantly hostile, exacerbated by the 
partisanship embodied by its leaders. 
2.1. Struggle for Influence 
As soon as Laurent and Masta burst onto the political scene, almost every detail of 
village li fe was communicated to the Department oflndian Affairs. In the first decades of the 
creation of the Band Council, none more than Laurent corresponded with the govemment; 
sometimes going through the Indian Agent, but more often than not writing directly to higher 
representatives. He usually took the pen to contest elections when he was not elected chief-
to be a councillor, or even worse, not elected to a position at the Council at ali, was a 
persona! catastrophe. He obviously believed in his persona! abilities to lead and represent the 
band, and few could criticize his dedication. Nonetheless, Laurent had trouble swallowing the 
democratie choices of his people. 
A few months prior to the elections, Jos Laurent and H.L. Masta made sure that no 
ills were attributed to his character. Laurent, during a Council meeting in 1890, made sure 
that the Indian Agent P.E. Robillard heard the band members present stating that they had 
nothing to reproach him, even though sorne criticism was directed towards his administration 
after severa! months of being elected chierz3. Masta would go through the same process, 
rectifying ali accusations that had been made against him24. As was to become custom, both 
leaders cleansed their reputations and enumerated the good they had brought to the band, 
especially in the crucial few months prior to elections - the most important period for the 
career of these ambitious men. In one episode during the electoral campaign of 1890, Laurent 
referred back to an inquiry pursued against him in 1880. No verdict of culpability was 
pronounced - he was thus more than fit to be chief, because the law would never tolerate 
23 Saint Francois Agency - Correspondence regarding the desire of the Abenakis Indians 
of Pierreville to hold an election for their chiefs, NAC, RG10, vol. 2496, p. 2-4, microfilm reel C-
11230. 
24 Ibid., p. 242-254 
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immorality, dishonesty, or intemperance 25 . While raising his own position, he would 
simultaneously attack his political rivais, particularly the most threatening candidate, urging 
· the government to pass sanction before the election: "Many complaints have been directed 
against H.L. Masta along the years, for his bad temperament and his drunkenness26." Laurent 
must have sensed that he was losing influence around this time because Masta was elected on 
the Band Council, while he was not. Thus began the process of attempting to undermine the 
legality of the results . The reasons behind this effort were far from novel. Systematically, the 
losing party would forward petitions disclaiming the victors. In an overwhelming number of 
letters between 1876 and 1909, candidates and elected Band Çouncil members were accused 
of intemperance, immorality, and lacking education, consequently unfit to rule. Additionally, 
opposing camps called each other out for corrupt practices, having paid for vot~s, distributed 
alcohol, recruited minors or non-band members 27. In the case of the 1890 election, violence 
and intimidation were also thrown in the mix of accusations28. Agent P.E. Robillard- writing 
during the political campaign for the elections of 1894 - was stunned at the intensity of the 
competition. Having become a target himself, anytime that Masta or Laurent entered his 
office, he would be accused of favoritism 29 . In January 1895, more than forty electors 
recognized the crippling problem: 
"There being greater trouble in our Band than ever before, we can no longer place confidence in our 
chiefs [ ... ] Therefore, we the undersigned, who voted for them in the last election of chiefs on the 24th 
of January 1894 together with our brothers of the band who voted adversely delegate to yoi.u-
Department Jos Laurent, ex-chief in order that he may better represent to you the alarming situation in 
25 Ibid., p. 4-5 
26 Ibid., p. 66, 71 
27 Jos Laurent being accused of having obtained fraudulent votes in the elections of 1880. 
See Saint Francois Agency - Correspondence regarding the desire of the Abenak.is Indians of 
Pierreville to hold an election for their chiefs, NAC, RG10, vol. 2496, p. 127, microfilm reel C-
11230. In the elections of 1894, Laurent accused ~ortneuf of having sorne fraudulent votes and 
Masta of having promised a feast to those who would vote for him. See Ibid. , p. 160. 
28 Saint Francois Agency - Correspondence regarding the desire of the Abenakis Indians 
of Pierreville to ho1d an election for the ir chiefs, NAC, RGl 0, vol. 2496, p. 91, microfilm reel C-
11230. 
29 Ibid., p. 136. 
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which we are and suggest to you the most effective way or putting an end to these difficulties and 
restoring the band peace which has been disturbed for years30." 
Chief or not, the majority of band members thought that the man most capable of fixing this 
crisis was Jos Laurent. Paradoxically, the sarne person was arguably the source o.f the 
problem. Even though the latter petition did not provoke any change from the part of the 
Department of Indian Affairs, it indicates that political influence, by contrast to political 
office, remained in the hands of a very limited number of candidates. 
2.2. The Brosseau Commission 
To his credit, Laurent's relentless protests managed to attract enough attention for the 
Department of Indian Affairs to launch an investigation of the electoral process in 1897. 
Contestation and talk of corruption had reached a climax that required direct governrnental 
intervention. Usually, the Indian Agent would have been called upon to review the process, 
as was the case of many other scenarios preceding and following the election of 1897. In this 
particular case however, Laurent had directly accused appointed Agent W.C. Boucher of 
intemperance, of having arbitrarily tampered with the voting list, and of generally acting in 
concert with Masta in . order to "go vern the band by themselves 31 ." In the mi dst of this 
tension, the citizens of Pierreville and traditional chief Salomon Benedict along with thirty 
signatories hoped to hait an investigation. Both groups sent a petition in an effort to counter 
Laurent and his followers , stating that Agent Boucher was an honorable man and that the 
complaints made against him were assaults from his political adversaries driven by 
vengeance32 . the involvement of Iùdian Agents in the political affairs of their respective 
bands has been documented, but St-Francis has been fortunate to encounter this problem only 
moderately. However, the fact that Boucher was termed a ' political adversary' indicates that 
30 Ibid., p. 284. 
3 1 Pierreville (Saint Francois) Agency - Correspondence, reports, memoranda, petitions 
and orders in council regarding complaints registered against agent W.C. Boucher, Chiefs H.L. 
Masta and Joseph Portneuf of the Abenakis band and irregularities in elections for chief of the 
band, NAC, RG10, vol. 2900, p. 5-6, 9-12, 48 and 150-153, microfilm C-11294. 
32 Ibid., p. 97 and 106. 
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this particular agent might have been everly involved. Before the investigation was officially 
launched, Agent Boucher gave his resignation, which initially cancelled the projece3 . 
While the accusations directed toward Agent Boucher were now irrelevant, 
-
govemment authorities judged that comrnissioner J.B. Brosseau sho1,.1ld go through with the 
inquiry. A large number of interviews ~ith candidates from the losing and winning parties 
were conducted, guided through six points of thorough investigation: rninors, non-members, 
absences, drunkenness, corruption, and undue influence 34 . In terms of number of votes 
disallowed, the numbers are unimpressive. In total, out of the six categories stated above, 
only six votes were annulled. Nonetheless, the process did bring to the surface the illegality 
of sorne key votes, which in most cases were attributed to the victorious candidates, pre-
investigation. Masta's campaign suffered the most from Brosseau's inquiry, having his vote 
tally fall from 46 to 42 and thus losing his position in the Band Council, comprised of one 
chief and two councillors at the time35. Joseph Portneuf and Pierre Emmett also both lost 
votes, but remained in the Band Council, the former maintaining his position of head chief. In 
the end, the only change in the Council was Laurent replacing his main adversary, Masta. 
2.3. The Culture of Contest and Internai Turbulence 
In commissioner's Brosseau opinion, the result of the election of 1897 was of 
secondary importance. Omitting comments "about Portneuf and Emmett in his concluding 
remarks, Brosseau's short stint in St-Francis confmned what had become obvious; in reality, 
the leaders of the band were none other than Laurent and Masta, no matter the electoral 
33 Ibid., p. 11 3. 
34 Pierreville (Saint Francois) Agency - Report dated at Sorel 30 December 1898 of J .B. 
Brosseau, Comrnissioner, of the election of chiefs of the Abenakis of St. Francois held on 30 
J anuary 1897, and complaints against Joseph Portneuf, chief of the same tri be, NAC, RG 10, vol. 
2901 , p. 730, microfilm C-11294 and Pierreville (Saint Francois) Agency - Correspondence, 
reports, memoranda, petitions and orders in council regarding complaints registered against agent 
W.C. Boucher, Chiefs H.L. Masta and Joseph Portneuf of the Abenakis band and irregularities in 
elections for chief of the band, NAC, RGlO, vol. 2900, p. 150-153, microfilm C-11294. 
35 Ibid., p. 150-153. 
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results : "Masta and Laurent, from their education, ability, and influence, outside the election, 
are the true leaders of the band. Before they worked together, but the creation of one chief 
and two sub-chiefs is the apple oftheir discord". He continued by stating that "the old system 
of one chief and councillors may be suitable for sorne tribes but not the Abenaki" and that 
according to the law, it was possible for them to "have four chiefs or councillors, ali holding 
equal rank36." Brosseau had identified the source of the heavy political tension in St-Francis: 
the two most competent leaders of the band were constantly undermining each other, their 
energies focused at gaining the position of chief. Furthermore, he recommended that the 
electoral process be slightly modified to encorppass the nomination of four chiefs of equal 
stature. In Brosseau's opinion, the competition fostered by democratie elections- a creation 
of the Band Council system- was detrimental to Abenaki political culture. Perhaps due to the 
fact that Brosseau's conclusions were directly opposed to the efforts and ideology of the 
government, the system remained status quo. 
At the tum of the 201h century, the string of controversy over the result of elections 
and the burdensome back and forth debates over the legality and morality of those in power 
reached a new climax. In 1901, Indian Agent Co mire wrote: "It is impossible to please 
everyone. The Indians are jealous of each other and ali want me on their side. If I am forced 
to take part in one issue or another, they send a letter of complaint". In 1903 , the problem 
persisted: "Louis Watso and Thomas Msadoquis have spent their time making complaints 
about chief Jos Laurent. They are jealous of him and sow dissention among lndians in order 
to make political capital. I am convinced that right and justice are on the side of Laurent37 ." 
Bittemess and distrust can also be illustrated within the project of building the Maurault 
road38 : "The band is against Laurent' s proposition to build a road because he is only serving 
his own ends by enhancing the value of the lands he owns at the cost of the band which has 
36 Ibid., p. 150-153. 
37 Saint Francois Agency - Correspondence regarding the appointment of constables on 
the Abenakis of St. Francois, charges against certain constables and law enforcement on the 
reserve, NAC, RG 10, vol. 3030, p. 29 and 46-4 7, microfilm C-9666. 
38 See Chapter 3, 4. Administrating the Band: The Elected Council Self-Determined? 
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little mone/9." Competition had in fact grown so tierce that it had become customary to 
contest the results of the elections. Headed by Laurent, the defeated party in the elections of 
1903 wrote to the government demanding its cancellation on the grounds that the process has 
been irregular, illegal, and informai since the last elections of 190040 . By now, St-Francis had 
been undergoing elections for more than two decades, and the governmental authorities were 
getting used to its party politics and intense political rivalries. The Department argued that 
"Laurent should have expressed his views on the last occasion in 1900 or at any time before 
the present, and not after 41 ." 
Having been elected on severa! occasions and gaining the confidence of higher 
authorities surely must have fostered Laurent and Masta's sense of entitlement; even when 
not elected, they continued their correspondences with the Indian Agent and the Department 
of Indian Affairs . On the quotidian, they made sure their voice was heard. Thomas 
Msadoquis and Louis Gill, councillors between 1903 and 1906, complained that Laurent and 
Masta showed up to meetings to annoy the Council and throw sorne insults thereby turning 
the people against the elected Council; Laurent went as far as saying that the current Council 
had done nothing good for the band42 . Msadoquis also took the pen to accuse chief Jules Paul 
Denis of n6t caring about the band, provoking a response by Denis stating that Msadoquis is 
a traitor to the band, his wife, and the government43 . Agent Comire entered the chaos and 
declared Msadoquis a hypocrite, a liar of no good faith, constantly changing camps and 
betraying them in succession44 . Laurent's response to this endless political bickering- again, 
largely fuelled by the latter - was to gather his political followers and current councillors 
39 Saint Francois Agency - request by the band for construction of a road called the 
Maurault road, NAC, RG 10, vol. 2121, p. 22, microfilm C-11162. 
40 Saint Francois Agency (Pierreville) - Elections of chiefs and councillors of the 
Abenakis of the St.Francois Indians, NAC, RG1 0, vol. 3060, p. 298-307, microfilm C-1 1318. 
41 Ibid., p. 309-312. 
42 Ibid., p. 19 and 40. 
43 Ibid, p. 21 and 24. 
44 Ibid., p. 33 . 
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favorable to him and forward a proposai arbitrarily nominating himself as chief: "[ ... ] even if 
Laurent do es not receive a maj ority nurnber of votes, we still wish that Laurent be preferred 
to any other to have the title of first chief and for us to be councillors[ ... ] even if we all 
received enough votes to enter the Council, it is in the interest of the band, believing that 
Laurent is much better qualified than us 45 ." The elections of 1906 proceeded as all others 
before, but Jos Laurent only reached the title councillor, whereas Nicolas Panadis was named 
chief. Despite the fact that Panadis was one of the signatories of the request highlighted 
above favoring Laurent, the latter stated that it would be a retrograde to have an uneducated 
chief su ch as Pana dis 46 . A gain, the government chose to ignore the veteran statesman, and so 
did the voters. Undoubtedly, Laurent's message must have gotten stale; in the following 
elections 6f 1909, he was not even elected in the Council. 
3. Conclusion 
The balance of power in St-Francis had been maintained by tradition and custom; 
before the mid-nineteenth century, !ife in the community was not much different than at the 
moment of the villages' inception. Stability was disturbed by a strong and ambitious leader, 
hoping to attract sorne people toward Protestantism. H.L. Masta was successful in convincing 
a few band members to follow his faith, which led to the development of an opposing camp 
to the previously heterogeneous Catholic population. More importantly, Masta brought with 
him a set of values and ideologies that were closer to the Euro-Canadian mould than the 
indigenous Abenaki. At !east in part, he was responsible for accelerating the rift between 
tradition and 'civilization' by challenging the authority of the pre-established order. Realities 
of geography, demography, and the elaboration of law relative to the Indian population were 
going to affect ali bands in the St-Lawrence valley. In the case of St-Francis, a few 
enlightened people had already been seeking ways of expressing agency externally and 
internally. 
45 Ibid. , p.137. 
46 Ibid. , p. 162-166. 
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The passing of the Act of 1869 and the subsequent establishment of the electoral 
system in St-Francis opened the political field, albeit according to the Euro-Canadian mode} 
of law for the reserves. Two men in particular, H.L. Masta and Jos Laurent, jumped on the 
occasion to lead the band. While religious affiliation was their initial subject of discord, it 
soon became secondary to the political parties they came to embody. Elections were thus 
conducted with Masta and Laurent leading the ball until the 1910s, becoming the epicentre of 
Abenaki political !ife. To the surprise of the Department of Indian Affairs , controversy and 
protest came around every four years with the approach of a new electoral cycle. The 
government would receive and respond to the correspondences sent by St-Francis' 
inhabitants and would address issues conceming the legitimacy of the results - never did they 
change their policies to accommodate the realities of this reserve in particular, even when 
proposed by non-Indian officiais 47 . In conclusion, the ferocity and tenacity of political 
adversaries illustrated the importance the Abenakis placed on the ·control of their own 
destinies, no matter the limitations of Band Councillaw. 
47 See Chapter IV, 2.2. The Brosseau Commission. 
CONCLUSION 
Western scholars, from the 1960s onwards, have helped define the status of 
indigenous people through time and within their respective postcolonial societies. While 
sorne shared the altruistic motive of moving c!oser to a state of reconciliation, their work 
undoubtedly expanded understanding in the field of indigenous experience. Enlarging the 
academie field of indigenous studies brought parallel developments in the treatment of legal 
struggles between governments and their indigenous populations. The project presented 
above is thus a product of these two paradigrns; the study provides continuity within the 
scope of Native Studies through a politico-judicial framework of analysis . The case study of 
Odanak in particular is part of a larger project of understanding the implementation of Band 
Councils in the province of Quebec, its communities having been the first subjected to the 
political system instated by the Canadian government. 
This research paper was developed under four guiding frames of observation: the 
precursory actions from the colonial state that eroded pre-1812 customs, paving the way for 
the establishment of a new legal framework; the elaboration and evolution of the official 
Band Council government policy; the initial process of implementing the Band Council 
system; and the transformations of indigenous political culture within the band of the St-
Francis Abenaki. Primarily centered in the period following the War of 1812, these angles of 
analysis were discussed through four chapters. 
Chapter I focused on the colonial state as the instigator of change for communities in 
the Eastern Americas. It can be argued that the New World was forever altered the moment 
Europeans set foot on it. In fact, this section started with an overview of the first contacts 
between the Abenaki and European settlers. As encounters became more frequent and 
prolonged, indigenous social structures were affected. In the case of the Abenaki as with 
most Eastern nations, the observable transformations were adaptations in answer to the new 
political, economie, social, and cultural positions native people were confronted with. From 
the fur trade to pressure by settlers in Abenaki territory, to open military conflicts to written 
agreements, culrninating in the exile of a large proportion of their people, the 171h and 18th 
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centuries changed Abenaki life in almost every aspect. The trend continued as the Seven 
Years ' War drew to a close. The Abenaki people, traditionally allied to the French during 
almost every conflict, were left to face British domination on the continent. With the war of 
1812 marking the final conflict that primarily opposed two non-native powers, the British 
Indian Departrnent began taking concrete action toward indigenous people within what they 
considered 'Crown Territory'. Undoubtedly, Indian bands living within its boundaries had 
been subjected to a much different reality than more Western bands. The chapter thus served 
to contextualize this situation: as Canada approached the mid-nineteenth century, indigenous 
identity, territory, culture, and economy was already under transformation. In direct parallel, 
the colonial state was increasingly taking strides to organize legislation that would establish 
its dominance permanent! y. 
Chapter II observed the establishment of Britain' s colonial vision. As European 
powers scrambled to gain influence in the New Worldand beyond, ali had their strategies and 
priorities. In the British colonies, most efforts were directed at securing military dominance 
especially through alliance with the Iroquois and their web of influence. More than·any other 
imperial power, Britain sought to legitimize their authority through legal means. On the 
mainland, British intellectuals and politicians were constantly formulating policies and 
reconceptualising colonial laws that would put their mind - and that of public opinion - at 
ease with their endeavours overseas. The most important, and a hallmark of British colonial 
culture, is the formulation of property law. Through this legal construct, the British were able 
to justify an Empire that rested largely on territorial possession. In deciding the future fate of 
Indians within the developing Canadian society, ideologies, concepts, and social experiments 
became laws often through ad hoc legislation; little or no room was left for indigenous self-
determination. The most notable effect of these laws, culminating in the Indian Act of 1876, 
is still present to this day. Whereas almost every aspect of Indian life was altered during the 
nineteenth century, no greater effort was placed in order to transform traditional indigenous 
political systems. The desired effect was to make Indian communities resemble Euro-
Canadian municipalities as much as possible. The legal process in the implementation ofthis 
objective therefore constituted the chief foundation for this chapt er. 
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Chapter III examined the concrete effects of the Band Council legislation on the 
community of Odanak. Not only has this form of government replaced traditional 
chieftainship, but as many other communities, it remains to this day the form of governance 
in native reserves . The process by which Odanak's inhabitants adopted the Band Council at 
the tum of the 19~ century provided key insights into a new phase of indigenous politics 
through state-imposed st~ctures. Analysis centered frrstly on the electoral procedure in order 
to paint a picture of this brand new event within an indigenous society. Secondly, 
participation tendencies revealed key indicators of the system's success and acceptance. 
Finally, observation of the Band Council's duties within the framework of Canadian law 
illustrated what issues concemed the Abenakis of St-Francis and how they went about acting 
upon them within the entity of a band. 
Chapter IV examined the new political dynamic created by the imposition of the 
Band Council. The chapter highlighted how traditional chieftaincy was replaced by a new 
group of enthusiastic leaders that seized the latest opportunities presented by the emergence 
of an un-indigenous system of governance based on the European model. Only through the 
new socio-political realities outside the reserve combined with the state-imposed Band 
Council could these leaders have emerged. In particular, H.L. Masta and Joseph Laurent are 
two characters that steered the Abenakis of St-Francis away from traditional chieftaincy by 
full y embracing elective politics. The importance of these two men cannot be overstated; it is 
largely through their involvement, conflicts, and the importance they placed in the system 
that the Band Council quickly established finn roots in the hearts and rninds of the 
' 
community. In short, they were largely responsible for the instant success in the process of 
implementing the Band Council. Through the struggle of these two political opponents, the 
importance the Abenakis put on the acquisition of political power came to light. Albeit 
lirnited, it provided a renewal in the sense of agency and self-determination for this 
indigenous band. 
In conclusion, to fmally settle the question of the indigenous population, government 
officiais recommended to greatly modify or extinguish the existing authority of chiefs, being 
the only way to teach "lndians to feel and value personal Independence bath in Property and 
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Condud ." Indigenous communities in the valley of the St-Lawrence were the first to feel the 
effect of this initiative, giving birth to the establishment of Band Coi.mcils. Odanak, or St-
Francis as the village was called in the nineteenth century, had already been introduced to 
Euramerican cultural and social mores. Geography, demographies , and the ephemeral nature 
of their land title rendered St-Francis a target for land-hungry outsiders; simultaneously, the 
proxirnity and quantity of exchanges with Whites rendered St-Francis an ideal candidate to 
start implementing the Band Council experiment. In addition, the retum of P.P. Osunkhirine 
(Masta) from the United States challenged Catholic homogeneity. Beyond the religious 
confrontation, Masta shook the pre-established order by making his demands through direct 
correspondence with the government, as weil as spreading a new set of values through his 
church and school. 
In other words, St-Francis' socio-political foundations were already weakened and in 
sorne respects, in a state of metamorphosis by the time the government imposed Band 
Councils. New leaders became influential outside the structure of traditional chieftaincy; 
Catholicism was no longer the sole faith binding the community together; the political fabric 
of the band was questioned and adaptive solutions were forwarded. Ali these factors help 
explain why the Band Council's system was not challenged but in fact, elections proceeded 
with high participation levels and the elected Council took to administrating the band albeit 
with the limited powers it was granted by the law. The new system created avenues for the 
attainment of poli ti cal power that would have been inaccessible in the traditional indigenous 
political structure. In the honest opinion of Commissioner Brosseau, the competition that he 
felt it created was poisonous for the social fabric of the band; St-Francis became obsessed 
with elections and political parties constantly undermined each other even after decision was 
-rendered. According to Brosseau, the position of head chief was consuming the population. 
Still, for this Abenaki population, it has become clear that they welcomed the change. 
The enormous amount of correspondences regarding the result of elections and the actions of 
the elected Council demonstrates the considerable degree of socio-cultural investment the 
band placed in the municipal-type organization. This least can be said for the frrst decades of 
1 Report from a committee of an executive council for Archibald Acheson Gosford, June 
13, 1837, NAC, RG10, vol. 792, p. 7597-7624, nùcrofilm C-13449. 
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the Band Council of the Abenakis of St-Francis, they had faith that it would provide them 
with sorne degree of agency and self-determination. 
- -------- - - ~ - -- --- - ---- - --~-----
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